TL;DR: There is no single maintenance law in India and no statutory percentage formula. A claimant can choose among BNSS Section 144, the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the Domestic Violence Act, or personal-law provisions for Muslim, Christian, and Parsi parties, and can often run more than one at once, subject to a set-off. The Supreme Court’s guidelines in Rajnesh v Neha govern how quantum is actually calculated.

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Five routes, not one law

A person seeking maintenance in India is not filing under “the maintenance law.” They are choosing among several independent statutes, each with its own forum, eligibility test, and procedural rhythm. The choice matters because the routes differ in speed, in who can claim, and in what happens if the claimant later pursues a second route for the same period.

The five routes are: Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the secular criminal-procedure remedy that replaced Section 125 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) with effect from 1 July 2024; Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), which operate only where a matrimonial proceeding is pending or has concluded; Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA), a civil personal-law obligation that does not require any divorce or matrimonial suit; Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act), which folds monetary relief into a broader protection-order framework and, unlike the others, covers live-in relationships; and separate personal-law provisions for Muslim, Christian, and Parsi parties.

RouteForumWho can claimNeeds pending matrimonial caseCovers live-in partners
BNSS Section 144First Class Magistrate / Family CourtWife, children, parents, any religion✗not specified in the Act
HMA Section 24 (interim)Family Court / civil courtEither spouse✓✗
HMA Section 25 (permanent)Family Court / civil courtEither spouse✗ (post-decree)✗
HAMA Section 18Civil courtHindu wife✗✗
DV Act Section 20MagistrateWoman in a domestic relationship✗✓
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986MagistrateDivorced Muslim woman✗✗
Indian Divorce Act, 1869, Section 37High Court / District CourtChristian spouse✓ / post-decree✗
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, Section 40Court under the ActParsi spouse✓ / post-decree✗

This piece works through each route, the framework the Supreme Court laid down in Rajnesh v Neha for calculating the amount, and why the commonly quoted “25 percent of income” figure is not a rate fixed by any statute. For procedural detail on the most heavily used route, see maintenance under BNSS section 144, treated here as one option among several rather than repeated in full.

Route one: BNSS Section 144, the magistrate’s remedy

Section 144 BNSS is the direct successor to Section 125 CrPC, secular and open to claimants of any religion, heard before a First Class Magistrate rather than a civil court. Under Section 144(1), four classes may claim: a wife unable to maintain herself (the definition expressly includes a divorced woman who has not remarried); a legitimate or illegitimate minor child; a major child, other than a married daughter, unable to maintain itself because of a physical or mental abnormality; and a father or mother unable to maintain themselves. A wife loses her claim if she is living in adultery, if the spouses live apart by mutual consent, or if she refuses to cohabit without sufficient reason, though the provision itself treats a husband’s second marriage or a mistress in the household as sufficient reason for the wife’s refusal.

The route’s advantages are speed and universality: no religion-based test, and a workable procedure through a magistrate’s court rather than a full civil trial. Its limitation is that it does not, on its own terms, cover a live-in partner, and the quantum a magistrate is used to handling tends to sit lower than what a civil court awards as permanent alimony. Practitioners frequently pair it with a civil-court claim, discussed below.

Route two: the Hindu Marriage Act, interim and permanent alimony

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides two separate and sequential remedies, and conflating them is a common drafting error.

Section 24, maintenance pendente lite. Where a matrimonial proceeding, whether for divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, or nullity, is pending, either spouse may apply for the expenses of the proceeding and monthly maintenance during its pendency. Section 24 HMA directs the court to consider “the income of the petitioner and the respondent” and fix a sum that “seems to the court to be reasonable,” with a proviso requiring such applications “as far as possible” be disposed of within sixty days of service of notice. Section 24 exists only for the duration of the pending case; once the main proceeding ends, it ends with it.

Section 25, permanent alimony and maintenance. Once a decree has been passed, either party may apply for permanent alimony. Section 25 HMA empowers the court to order the respondent to pay “such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having regard to the respondent’s own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court to be just.” The order can be secured by a charge on the respondent’s immovable property. Sub-section (2) allows variation on proof of a material change in circumstances; sub-section (3) allows the court to modify or rescind the order if the recipient remarries or, in the case of a wife, is not chaste.

Section 25 is the provision most often described loosely as “alimony,” and the only route among the five that reaches a lump-sum settlement rather than only a periodic payment. The mutual consent divorce process commonly resolves the Section 25 question by agreement, folding an agreed lump sum into the consent terms alongside any streedhan and property settlement reached separately.

Route three: the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act

The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is a personal-law statute, not tied to any matrimonial litigation. Section 18 HAMA states that “a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her life time.” A wife may claim maintenance while living separately, without forfeiting the right, if the husband is guilty of desertion, has treated her with cruelty causing reasonable apprehension of harm, has another wife living, keeps a concubine in the same house, has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion, or if there is any other cause justifying separate living. Sub-section (3) removes the right if the wife is unchaste or has herself converted.

Section 18’s distinguishing feature is that it does not require a divorce petition or any other matrimonial suit to be pending. A Hindu wife with no intention of seeking divorce, whose husband is neglecting her, can bring a straightforward civil suit for maintenance under this provision alone. It is slower than BNSS Section 144, being a full civil suit rather than a summary magistrate’s proceeding, but it carries the weight of an ordinary civil decree and does not depend on criminal-procedure machinery.

Route four: the Domestic Violence Act’s monetary relief

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not use the word “maintenance” as its organising concept; it uses “monetary relief” as one of several protective remedies available to a woman in a domestic relationship, a civil remedy distinct from any criminal cruelty complaint a woman may separately choose to bring. Section 20 DV Act allows the magistrate, while disposing of an application under the Act, to direct the respondent to pay monetary relief covering loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss from destruction or removal of property, and, under sub-section (1)(d), “the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.” That cross-reference has not been updated in the statute book since the CrPC’s repeal on 1 July 2024, so the DV Act’s own text still names the old provision rather than BNSS Section 144.

Sub-section (2) requires relief to be “adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.” Sub-section (3) lets the magistrate order a lump sum or monthly payments. Sub-section (6) gives the order real teeth: on default, the magistrate may direct the respondent’s employer or a debtor of the respondent to pay the aggrieved person directly out of wages or any debt owed, cutting out the collection step entirely.

The route’s defining feature is that it extends to a woman in a domestic relationship who is not married to the respondent at all. A live-in partner who would have no claim under the HMA, HAMA, or Section 144 BNSS’s “wife” definition can still claim monetary relief here. For the residence-rights side of the same statute, which often accompanies a monetary-relief claim, see protection and residence rights under the Domestic Violence Act and a wife’s residence rights in the husband’s house under PWDVA.

Route five: Muslim, Christian, and Parsi claimants

Personal law does not disappear once a claimant is not Hindu; it substitutes a different statute for the HMA and HAMA, while BNSS Section 144 and the DV Act remain available regardless of religion.

Muslim claimants. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 addresses maintenance for divorced Muslim women. Section 3(1)(a) entitles a divorced woman to “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband.” Read literally, that could suggest the obligation ends with the iddat period, typically about three months. The Supreme Court rejected that reading in Danial Latifi v Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740, decided 28 September 2001, holding that “provision” and “maintenance” are separate obligations: the provision must be made, meaning arranged or secured, within the iddat period, but it must be adequate for the woman’s reasonable needs for the rest of her life or until remarriage. Whether a Muslim wife may also claim under BNSS Section 144 alongside the 1986 Act is a question different High Courts have answered differently; a claimant should take jurisdiction-specific advice before assuming both routes run freely together.

Christian claimants. The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 governs alimony for Christian parties. Section 37 empowers the court, on a decree of dissolution or judicial separation, to order the husband to secure to the wife “such gross sum of money, or such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life” as it thinks reasonable, having regard to the wife’s own fortune, the husband’s ability to pay, and the conduct of the parties, and the order may later be discharged, modified, or suspended if the husband’s means change.

Parsi claimants. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 mirrors this structure. Section 40 allows the court to order a party to pay the other “such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum, for a term not exceeding the life of the plaintiff,” having regard to the defendant’s own income and property, the plaintiff’s income and property, and the conduct of the parties, with later variation on proof of changed means or the recipient’s remarriage or misconduct.

None of the personal-law statutes above prescribes a percentage or a formula; each directs the court to the same broad considerations, income, needs, conduct, and circumstances, that Rajnesh v Neha later systematised for the most commonly litigated routes.

Can you run more than one route at the same time

Yes. There is no statutory bar to a claimant pursuing more than one of these routes simultaneously, and in practice it is common. A Hindu wife facing a matrimonial dispute might file a Section 144 BNSS application before a magistrate for immediate relief, an interim application under Section 24 HMA in a pending divorce case, and, if she is also in a household where the respondent has committed acts of domestic violence, a monetary-relief application under Section 20 of the DV Act, all at once.

What is not permitted is double recovery for the same period. Rajnesh v Neha directly addressed this: where a claimant has obtained orders under more than one statute for an overlapping period, the later proceeding must account for and set off what has already been awarded in the earlier one. A magistrate awarding maintenance under BNSS Section 144 after a Family Court has already awarded interim maintenance under Section 24 HMA for the same months cannot simply add the two figures; the later court must net them so the claimant receives a just aggregate, not a doubled one. The Court also directed that a later application must disclose any earlier order under the other statutes, so the deciding court can perform the set-off with full information.

Rajnesh v Neha: the affidavit and the eight factors

Rajnesh v Neha, Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020, decided by the Supreme Court on 4 November 2020 and reported at (2021) 2 SCC 324, is the framework judgment governing how quantum is worked out across all the statutory routes above. The bench, Justices Indu Malhotra and R. Subhash Reddy, was troubled by overlapping and duplicative maintenance litigation, unpredictable delay, and inconsistent quantum, and issued directions covering four heads: overlapping jurisdiction and set-off, the procedure for interim maintenance, the criteria for fixing quantum, and enforcement.

The affidavit of disclosure. The Court directed both parties in every maintenance proceeding, before every forum, to file a standardised Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, within four weeks of the first hearing and updated if circumstances change. It covers income from all sources, movable and immovable assets, and existing liabilities. Courts are directed to draw an adverse inference against a party who fails to file it or files an incomplete or false one.

The factors for quantum. Drawing on the considerations already embedded in Section 23 of the HAMA and on decades of case law, the Court set out the factors a court must weigh when fixing the amount:

  1. The status and social position of the parties during the marriage.
  2. The reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children.
  3. Whether the applicant is educated and has a source of independent income, and, if so, whether that income is sufficient to maintain the standard of living the applicant was accustomed to.
  4. Whether the applicant was employed before marriage, and, if she gave up employment to look after the household or children, whether it would be reasonable to expect her to resume employment at this stage.
  5. The income and property of the respondent, including reasonable expenses for their own support, and any liabilities the respondent must discharge, such as loans or dependents.
  6. Whether the respondent has remarried, or has any other dependents to support.
  7. The age and number of years the parties have cohabited, and the standard of living the parties enjoyed during marriage.
  8. The cost of litigation for a non-working wife or a wife with limited independent income.

The Court was explicit that the exercise is one of judgment, not arithmetic: the amount awarded “must be reasonable and realistic, and avoid either of the two extremes,” meaning neither an amount so high that it becomes oppressive and disables the respondent from meeting their own reasonable expenses, nor one so low that it fails to provide genuine sustenance. No formula converts these eight factors into a number; a court weighs them against the specific facts of the case before it.

The diagram below summarises how a claimant selects a route and how the quantum question is then resolved regardless of which route was chosen.

flowchart TD
    A[Claimant needs maintenance] --> B{Religion and relationship}
    B -->|Any religion, wants speed| C[BNSS Section 144: Magistrate]
    B -->|Hindu, matrimonial case pending| D[HMA Section 24 interim /<br/>Section 25 permanent]
    B -->|Hindu wife, no divorce sought| E[HAMA Section 18: civil suit]
    B -->|Domestic relationship, incl. live-in| F[DV Act Section 20: monetary relief]
    B -->|Divorced Muslim woman| G[Muslim Women Act 1986, Section 3]
    B -->|Christian spouse| H[Indian Divorce Act, Section 37]
    B -->|Parsi spouse| I[Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 40]
    C --> J[Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets<br/>and Liabilities filed]
    D --> J
    E --> J
    F --> J
    G --> J
    H --> J
    I --> J
    J --> K[Court applies the eight<br/>Rajnesh v Neha factors]
    K --> L[Quantum fixed; set off against<br/>any other concurrent award]

The framework applies most directly to the Hindu-law and secular routes, where the eight factors have been expressly imported into practice; the Christian, Parsi, and Muslim personal-law routes apply broadly similar considerations, income, needs, and conduct, under their own text, even where this list has not been formally read into those provisions.

The date maintenance runs from

Rajnesh v Neha resolved a question that had produced inconsistent orders for years: from which date does an award take effect? The Court held that maintenance is to be awarded from the date the application was filed, not from the date of the final order and not from the date notice was served on the respondent. If maintenance began only from the order date, a claimant would go unsupported for the entire period the case took to decide, penalising her for ordinary litigation delay rather than anything within her control.

The practical consequence is that every month a case remains pending adds to the arrears owed once an order is finally passed, calculated back to the filing date. A claimant who delays filing loses nothing for the period before filing, since the statute simply does not reach that far back; but early filing, not just eventual success, is what protects a claimant’s financial position.

Enforcement when the payer defaults

An order is only as good as the mechanism behind it, and each route carries its own enforcement teeth, layered on top of what Rajnesh v Neha added generally.

Under BNSS Section 144, a defaulting respondent faces a warrant for levy of the amount due as a fine, and, failing recovery, imprisonment up to one month or until payment, whichever is earlier; that machinery must be invoked within one year of each installment falling due. Under the DV Act, Section 20(6) lets the magistrate bypass the respondent entirely and direct the respondent’s employer or any debtor to pay the aggrieved person straight out of wages or a debt owed. Under the HMA, HAMA, and the Christian and Parsi statutes, an unpaid order is enforceable as a civil decree, through attachment of property or, in appropriate cases, civil imprisonment.

Rajnesh v Neha added two further tools available regardless of which statute the order was made under. First, where the defaulting respondent is also a party to a pending matrimonial proceeding, the civil court hearing that proceeding may strike out the respondent’s defense or written statement, a consequence that can leave the respondent unable to contest the matrimonial case at all. Second, contempt of court proceedings remain available for wilful disobedience of an order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. A claimant facing persistent non-payment typically has more than one enforcement path open; choosing the right one depends on which forum issued the order, and tracking the status of that enforcement proceeding through eCourts and the NJDG is a useful first step before escalating further. For drafting a notice to a defaulting party, see how to draft a legal notice in India.

Earning, qualified but idle, or hiding income

Courts treat three recurring fact patterns differently, and the difference explains a large share of contested maintenance litigation.

The claimant who is earning. An independent income does not disqualify a claimant; it goes to quantum, not eligibility. The Rajnesh v Neha factors ask whether her own income is sufficient to maintain the standard of living she was accustomed to. Income that falls short of that standard leaves her entitled to the shortfall.

The claimant who is qualified but not working. Where a claimant holds a professional qualification or prior work experience but gave up employment to run the household or raise children, Rajnesh v Neha directs courts to ask whether it is now reasonable to expect resumption of employment, rather than assume she should have been working all along. Years out of a profession, the age of children still needing care, and the length of the gap all bear on that assessment. Courts do not, on a qualification alone, impute income the claimant is not in fact earning.

The respondent concealing income. Treated as seriously as outright non-payment. The affidavit regime exists to counter this: courts draw an adverse inference against a respondent who files no affidavit, or an incomplete one, and look beyond self-reported figures to bank statements, tax returns, Form 16, and property records. Where a respondent has deliberately given up income to defeat a claim, the abandoned earning capacity is taken into account rather than the artificially reduced figure now reported.

A worked example

Consider a Hindu wife, aged 36, married for eleven years, with one child aged nine in her custody. She holds a B.Ed degree obtained before marriage but has not worked since the child was born, having given up her career for the unpaid work of running the household that Rajnesh v Neha treats as a real factor rather than a non-contribution. Her husband is a salaried employee who reports a monthly salary of Rs 1,20,000 on his payslip but also owns a rented-out flat he did not disclose in his initial affidavit, and bank statements later obtained show additional deposits inconsistent with the salary figure alone. She has filed both a Section 144 BNSS application and an interim application under Section 24 HMA in a pending divorce petition.

Applying the eight Rajnesh v Neha factors: the standard of living during the marriage was that of a two-income-capable household, even though only the husband earned, because the family’s actual lifestyle and the child’s schooling were set at that level. The wife’s B.Ed qualification is real, but an eleven-year employment gap and a nine-year-old still needing care weigh against expecting immediate re-entry into full-time work; a court would likely treat her present earning capacity as limited rather than impute a teacher’s salary to her outright. The husband’s declared Rs 1,20,000 is not the end of the inquiry once the undisclosed rental income and deposits surface; the affidavit requirement and the adverse inference for incomplete disclosure entitle the court to look past the payslip. The child’s costs form a distinct head, layered on top of the wife’s own maintenance. With two proceedings running in parallel, the two awards for the same months must be set off against each other, not added.

No sentence in that reasoning produces a number by formula. The eight factors describe a direction of travel, income concealment counts against the husband, an employment gap counts in the wife’s favour, standard of living during the marriage sets a floor, but the court, not a calculation, converts that direction into a rupee figure appropriate to the facts before it.

Why there is no fixed formula, and where the 25 percent figure actually comes from

None of the five statutory routes above, and no direction in Rajnesh v Neha itself, fixes a percentage of income as the maintenance rate. The Court’s own language, that the award must be “reasonable and realistic” and avoid both oppression and inadequacy, is deliberately open-textured, not arithmetic.

The 25 percent figure that circulates widely traces to a specific Supreme Court decision, not to any statute. In Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v Rita Dey Chowdhury, (2017) 14 SCC 200, decided 19 April 2017, the Court, on the facts before it, held that 25 percent of the husband’s net salary would be just and proper maintenance for the wife, a figure the judgment attributes to an earlier decision it followed. That holding was fact-specific to the parties in that case; it was never enacted as a rate for all maintenance claims, and decisions applying the eight Rajnesh v Neha factors continue to arrive at figures above and below that mark. Treating 25 percent as a default is common shorthand for negotiation, not a rule any claimant or respondent can rely on as a floor or a ceiling.

Verifying whether a particular percentage or approach cited in submissions still reflects current law, rather than a since-superseded or fact-specific holding, is the kind of check a citator is built for; a tool that flags whether a cited maintenance judgment remains good law before it is relied on in drafting saves the embarrassment of anchoring an argument to an outlier figure. Niyam researches primary statutory text and case law for exactly this kind of verification, with citations traceable back to the source.

Frequently asked questions

Is there a fixed percentage of income that Indian courts award as maintenance?

No. No statute among the HMA, HAMA, DV Act, BNSS, or the personal-law provisions for Muslim, Christian, and Parsi claimants sets a percentage. The often-cited 25 percent figure comes from Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v Rita Dey Chowdhury, (2017) 14 SCC 200, a fact-specific holding, not a general rate. Courts apply the eight Rajnesh v Neha factors to each case’s actual facts, which can produce awards well above or below that figure.

Can I file for maintenance under more than one law at the same time?

Yes. There is no bar to filing under BNSS Section 144, the HMA, HAMA, and the DV Act simultaneously if the facts support each. Rajnesh v Neha requires overlapping awards for the same period to be set off against each other, and requires disclosure of any other pending or decided maintenance proceeding to the court hearing a later application.

From what date does a maintenance order take effect?

Per Rajnesh v Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, maintenance is awarded from the date the application was filed, not from the date of the final order or the date of service of notice. Arrears accumulate from the filing date through to the date payment is actually made once the order is passed.

What is the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities?

A standardised financial disclosure form that Rajnesh v Neha requires both parties to file in every maintenance proceeding, within four weeks of the first hearing, covering income, movable and immovable assets, and liabilities. Courts may draw an adverse inference against a party who files it incompletely or falsely, and can look to bank statements and tax returns instead.

Does a wife lose her right to maintenance if she is employed?

No. Employment reduces the quantum rather than the eligibility. Rajnesh v Neha directs courts to ask whether the applicant’s own income is sufficient to maintain the standard of living she was accustomed to during the marriage; a shortfall between her income and that standard remains recoverable as maintenance.

Can a live-in partner claim maintenance in India?

A live-in partner has no claim under BNSS Section 144, the HMA, or the HAMA, all of which require a marital relationship. She may claim monetary relief under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which extends to a woman in a domestic relationship regardless of formal marriage, subject to proving that relationship falls within the Act’s scope.

How is maintenance calculated for a divorced Muslim woman?

Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance, arranged within the iddat period. The Supreme Court in Danial Latifi v Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740, held the provision must be adequate for her needs beyond the iddat period, effectively for life or until remarriage, even though it must be secured within the iddat window.

What happens if the paying spouse conceals income?

Courts treat concealment seriously. Following Rajnesh v Neha, an adverse inference may be drawn against a party who files an incomplete or false Affidavit of Disclosure. Courts examine bank statements, tax returns, Form 16, and property records rather than relying on the respondent’s own figures, and may impute income deliberately abandoned to defeat the claim.

Is maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act the same as maintenance under BNSS Section 144?

No, though they overlap in effect. Section 20 of the DV Act creates “monetary relief,” a broader category that includes maintenance alongside compensation for lost earnings, medical expenses, and property damage, and it can be awarded in addition to a Section 144 BNSS order. The DV Act also reaches live-in relationships, which Section 144 BNSS does not.

Can maintenance be claimed for a period before the application was filed?

No. None of the statutory routes provides for maintenance before the date of filing. Rajnesh v Neha confirmed the filing date as the starting point; a claimant who delays filing forfeits any claim to arrears for the period before the application was lodged.

Is a wife with a professional qualification but no job expected to support herself?

Not automatically. Rajnesh v Neha directs courts to ask whether it is reasonable, given the length of any employment gap and ongoing childcare responsibilities, to expect her to resume work now, rather than assuming an unused qualification should be treated as equivalent to actual income.

What enforcement options exist if a maintenance order is not paid?

Options vary by route: warrant and imprisonment up to one month under BNSS Section 144; direct payment from the respondent’s employer or debtor under Section 20(6) of the DV Act; civil execution as a decree under the HMA, HAMA, and the Christian and Parsi statutes; and, following Rajnesh v Neha, striking out the respondent’s defense in a related matrimonial case, or contempt proceedings, regardless of which statute the order was made under.

Can permanent alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act be a lump sum instead of monthly payments?

Yes. Section 25 HMA allows the court to order either “a gross sum” or a “monthly or periodical sum,” secured, if needed, by a charge on the respondent’s immovable property. A lump sum is common where the parties want a clean financial break, particularly in mutual consent divorces.

Does a second divorce revive a maintenance claim that was forfeited on remarriage?

No. Once a divorced wife remarries, her maintenance right under the applicable statute (BNSS Section 144, HMA, or HAMA) is extinguished. That right does not revive if the second marriage also ends in divorce; any claim arising from the second marriage would need to be pursued independently against the second spouse.

How long does it typically take to get an interim maintenance order?

Section 24 HMA and Section 145 BNSS both direct that interim maintenance applications be disposed of, as far as possible, within sixty days of service of notice on the respondent. Rajnesh v Neha further directed that substantive maintenance applications generally be decided within four to six months, though actual timelines vary by court and case load.

Can parents claim maintenance from their children under Indian law?

Yes, under BNSS Section 144, a father or mother unable to maintain themselves can claim against a child, son or daughter, who has sufficient means and neglects or refuses to provide support. A dedicated, faster remedy also exists for elderly parents; see the guide on the Senior Citizens Maintenance Act 2007 for that specific tribunal-based route.

Do High Courts differ on whether a Muslim woman can claim under both the 1986 Act and BNSS Section 144?

Yes, this remains an unsettled question across jurisdictions, with different High Courts reaching different conclusions on how the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 relates to the secular maintenance provision. A claimant should verify the current position in the relevant High Court before assuming both routes can be pursued without complication.

Is maintenance received by a spouse taxable?

Tax treatment is governed by the Income Tax Act, not by any maintenance statute. Periodic maintenance received by a spouse is generally treated as income in the recipient’s hands and taxed accordingly; a lump-sum permanent alimony payment is treated differently in practice and is often not taxed as recurring income. See the Income Tax Act 2025 changes from April 2026 for the slab structure that would apply, and consult a tax adviser for case-specific treatment.

Because the eight Rajnesh v Neha factors depend on financial documents, income-tax filings, and prior case history rather than a fixed rule, drafting a maintenance application or an affidavit of disclosure is research-heavy work. Niyam’s judgment corpus and citator can pull the relevant Rajnesh v Neha progeny for a specific High Court and confirm a cited quantum figure is still good law before it goes into a pleading; see how good-law checking works for how that verification is done. For the procedural mechanics of the BNSS route specifically, maintenance under BNSS section 144 remains the fuller reference, and for the property side of a separating household, see family settlement deeds in India and, where children are involved, child custody laws in India.