TL;DR: The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a civil law, not a criminal one. It lets an aggrieved woman ask a Magistrate for fast, practical relief: a protection order under Section 18 to stop the abuse, a residence order under Section 19 so she is not thrown out of her home, monetary relief under Section 20, custody of children under Section 21, and compensation under Section 22. “Domestic relationship” is wide. It covers wives, live-in partners, mothers, sisters, and daughters, and the Supreme Court has held that even female relatives can be respondents. The right to reside in the shared household survives even where the woman does not own a brick of it. A breach of a protection order under Section 31 is a separate criminal offence, cognizable and non-bailable. This guide walks through who is covered, what counts as violence, every relief, the role of Protection Officers, the procedure and timelines, and the cases that fixed the limits.
On this page
- What the Domestic Violence Act actually does
- Who is an aggrieved person and what is a domestic relationship
- Who can be a respondent
- What counts as domestic violence under Section 3
- The right to reside in the shared household
- The five reliefs you can ask for
- Protection Officers and how a case starts
- Procedure, timelines, and interim orders
- Breach of a protection order is a crime
- The DV Act alongside the criminal law
- How Niyam helps you research domestic violence law
- Frequently asked questions
What the Domestic Violence Act actually does
Most people assume the Domestic Violence Act sends someone to jail. It does not, at least not directly. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a civil statute. Its job is to give a woman protection and relief, fast, while the criminal law does the separate work of punishment. The Act came into force on 26 October 2006, and it was the first Indian law to recognise that abuse inside a home is not only physical.
The scale of the problem the law was built for is not small. According to the National Family Health Survey-5 (2019-21), close to 30 percent of ever-married women aged 18 to 49 reported physical or sexual violence by a spouse. The same survey found that only about 14 percent of women who faced such violence sought any help at all. Of those who did reach out, around 95 percent went to family rather than to any formal authority. The police were the main formal route, used by under 9 percent. The Act exists precisely because the formal system was, and remains, the road less taken.
The design choice matters in practice. A woman does not have to lodge an FIR and wait for a trial to get relief. She files an application before a Judicial Magistrate, and the court can pass orders that change her situation in weeks, not years. The reliefs are layered. She can stop the violence, keep her home, secure money for survival, hold on to her children, and claim compensation, all in one proceeding. The criminal consequence comes later and only if the man breaks the court’s order.
So read the Act for what it is. It is a remedy-first law that treats a battered woman as someone who needs the court to act now, not as a complainant in a slow prosecution.
Who is an aggrieved person and what is a domestic relationship
The Act protects an “aggrieved person,” defined in Section 2(a) as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges she has been subjected to domestic violence. Two pieces carry the weight here: the person must be a woman, and the connection must be a domestic relationship.
“Domestic relationship” is defined in Section 2(f), and it is deliberately broad. It covers two people who live or have lived together in a shared household, where they are related by consanguinity, marriage, a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family. This sweeps in far more than wives. A mother can be an aggrieved person against a son. A sister can be one against a brother. A daughter, a daughter-in-law, a woman in a live-in relationship: all of them can come under the Act.
The live-in category is where the courts have drawn careful lines. A “relationship in the nature of marriage” does not mean any casual arrangement. In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the tests it had first set out in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010): whether the couple held themselves out to society as spouses, whether they cohabited for a significant period, whether they pooled resources and shared a household, whether they had children, and whether there was social recognition of the relationship. The Court denied relief to the appellant in Indra Sarma because she had entered the relationship knowing the man was already married, which kept it outside the protected category. The point survives: live-in partners can claim under the Act, but only where the relationship genuinely resembles marriage.
One more feature surprises people. The domestic relationship need not be alive when the woman files. In Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022), the Supreme Court held that a subsisting domestic relationship is not required at the time the application is filed, because a past relationship can still ground relief for violence suffered during it. A divorced or separated woman is not shut out simply because she has left.
Who can be a respondent
For years the Act’s definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) limited it to an “adult male person.” A woman could complain against her husband or a male partner, but the words seemed to block complaints against a mother-in-law, a sister-in-law, or other female relatives who often drive the abuse inside a household.
That changed in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016). The Supreme Court struck the words “adult male” out of Section 2(q), holding that the restriction “do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India,” the equality guarantee. The Court reasoned that domestic violence is not the preserve of adult men, and that excluding female perpetrators left genuine victims without a remedy against the people actually harming them. After Hiral Harsora, an aggrieved woman can name female relatives as respondents.
“The words ‘adult male’ in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
Supreme Court of India, Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016)
The practical effect is large. Many domestic violence cases involve a joint family, where the cruelty comes as much from in-laws as from the husband. After Hiral Harsora, the respondent array can include the husband, his mother, his sisters, and other relatives who share the household, so long as the woman can plead acts of violence against each of them. This is one reason the Act tends to be wider in its reach than people expect, a contrast explored in our guide on the new criminal laws under the BNS, BNSS, and BSA, which carry the separate criminal cruelty provision.
What counts as domestic violence under Section 3
The heart of the Act is its definition of domestic violence in Section 3, and it is far wider than a beating. The section recognises four broad categories of harm: physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. Each is defined.
Physical abuse covers any act causing bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health, including assault and criminal force. Sexual abuse covers any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, or degrades, or otherwise violates the dignity of a woman. These two are the categories people expect.
The other two are where the Act broke new ground. Verbal and emotional abuse includes insults, ridicule, humiliation, and name-calling, and specifically includes insults for not bearing a child or not bearing a male child, along with repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person the woman cares about. Economic abuse is broader still. It covers depriving the woman of money and resources she is entitled to, taking away her stridhan or property, denying her access to the shared household, and disposing of assets in which she has an interest. Stopping a woman from working, or seizing her salary, fits here.
Section 3 also adds an explanation that tells the Magistrate to look at the overall facts and circumstances of the case when deciding whether an act amounts to domestic violence. The threshold is not a single grievous injury. A pattern of economic control or sustained emotional cruelty can qualify on its own. This is the conceptual leap the 2005 Act made over the older criminal cruelty provision, which courts had read mainly through the lens of physical harm and dowry harassment. For how that criminal provision is litigated and where it is misused, see our note on Section 498A, misuse, and quashing.
The right to reside in the shared household
The single most contested area of the Act is the residence right, and it is worth understanding the journey the law took. Section 17 gives every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title, or beneficial interest in it. The point is simple in principle: a woman cannot be thrown out of her home merely because the property is in someone else’s name.
The early reading was narrow. In S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (2007), the Supreme Court held that a “shared household” meant only a house owned or rented by the husband, or a house belonging to the joint family of which the husband was a member. On that reading, a daughter-in-law had no residence right in property owned solely by her in-laws, which is the most common arrangement in Indian families. That cramped the protection badly.
The correction came in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020). A three-judge bench overruled S.R. Batra and held that the definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is wide. A property can be a shared household if the aggrieved woman lived there at any stage of her domestic relationship, even if it is owned by the in-laws and the husband has no ownership share in it. The Supreme Court Observer’s account of the judgment sets out how the Court reread the provision to match the Act’s protective purpose. A father-in-law can still pursue his own civil suit over the property, but he cannot use ownership as a shortcut to evict the daughter-in-law without the DV Act court weighing her residence right.
Prabha Tyagi pushed the right further. The Court held that the residence right does not depend on the woman having actually lived in the household. The right can be enforced as a constructive right where she had the right to live there, which protects a woman who was kept out from the start.
“Every woman in a domestic relationship has a right to reside in the shared household even in the absence of any act of domestic violence.”
Supreme Court of India, Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022)
If the dispute turns on who owns ancestral property in the first place, the related rules are in our guide on daughters and ancestral property rights.
The five reliefs you can ask for
The Act lets a Magistrate grant five kinds of relief, and they can be combined in a single order. Knowing which section carries which relief is the practical skill, because a well-drafted application asks for the right relief under the right head.
The protection order under Section 18 is the core shield. It can prohibit the respondent from committing or aiding any act of domestic violence, from entering the woman’s workplace or any place she frequents, from attempting to communicate with her, from alienating assets or her stridhan, and from causing violence to her relatives or anyone who helps her.
The residence order under Section 19 protects the home. It can restrain the respondent from dispossessing the woman from the shared household, direct him to remove himself from it, restrain him or his relatives from entering the portion she occupies, and in an appropriate case direct him to secure alternative accommodation of the same level, or to pay rent for it. The court can also direct return of her stridhan and personal belongings.
Monetary relief under Section 20 covers the cost of survival. It includes loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss caused by destruction or removal of property, and maintenance for the woman and her children, including maintenance that can run alongside an order under other laws. Custody of children comes under Section 21, where the Magistrate can grant temporary custody to the woman or the person applying on her behalf, with arrangements for visitation. Compensation under Section 22 is for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the violence.
Here is the relief map in one view.
| Relief | Section | What the Magistrate can order |
|---|---|---|
| Protection order | Section 18 | Stop the violence, no contact, no entry to workplace, no alienation of assets |
| Residence order | Section 19 | No eviction from the shared household, respondent to vacate, alternative accommodation or rent |
| Monetary relief | Section 20 | Maintenance, lost earnings, medical and property loss |
| Custody order | Section 21 | Temporary custody of children with visitation terms |
| Compensation | Section 22 | Damages for injuries, mental torture, and emotional distress |
Crucially, Section 26 allows any of these reliefs to be sought not only before a Magistrate but also in any pending civil, family, or criminal proceeding between the same parties. A woman fighting a divorce or a maintenance case does not need a separate DV proceeding to claim residence or protection. The maintenance head overlaps with the standalone maintenance remedy, which we cover in maintenance under BNSS Section 144.
Protection Officers and how a case starts
The Act built a support structure around the woman so she does not have to walk into a court alone. State governments are required under Section 8 to appoint Protection Officers in each district, and Section 9 sets out their duties. The Protection Officer assists the Magistrate, prepares a Domestic Incident Report, helps the woman file her application, ensures she gets legal aid, and helps her access medical facilities and shelter homes.
The Domestic Incident Report is the document that often decides the early shape of a case. It records the woman’s account of the violence in a prescribed form, and it is filed with the Magistrate. A careful report, prepared with the Protection Officer or a registered service provider under Section 10, gives the court a clear basis to pass interim relief quickly.
A case can start in more than one way. The aggrieved woman can apply directly to the Magistrate under Section 12. She can approach a Protection Officer or a service provider, who then routes the matter to the court. She can also reach a police officer, who is obliged to inform her of her rights under the Act. The application under Section 12 is the operative document, and it can ask for one relief or all five at once. Because the Protection Officer’s role is administrative support rather than adjudication, the woman keeps control of what reliefs she seeks. If she wants help drafting the formal notice that often precedes or accompanies a complaint, our guide on how to draft a legal notice sets out the structure.
Procedure, timelines, and interim orders
The Act was written for speed, and the procedure reflects it. Once an application under Section 12 reaches the Magistrate, the court fixes a first hearing date, ordinarily within three days of receiving the application. The Magistrate is then directed to endeavour to dispose of every application within 60 days from the date of the first hearing. The timeline is aspirational rather than mandatory, and in practice many cases run longer, but the statutory intent is plain: this is meant to be quick relief.
The Act gives the court two tools to act before a full hearing. Under Section 23, the Magistrate may pass interim orders as the case proceeds. More importantly, where the application discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed, or is likely to commit domestic violence, the court may grant an ex parte order, meaning relief granted on the woman’s affidavit alone before the respondent is heard. This is what allows a court to keep a woman in her home, or to restrain immediate violence, on the very first day.
Notice and service follow their own rhythm. The Protection Officer serves notice of the date of hearing on the respondent within two days, or such further time as the Magistrate allows. Proceedings are governed, as far as possible, by the summary procedure under the criminal code, which keeps them lighter than a full civil trial. Appeals go to the Court of Session under Section 29, within 30 days of the order. None of this displaces the woman’s other remedies. If a respondent fears arrest in a connected criminal matter, the separate route of pre-arrest protection is explained in anticipatory bail under BNSS Section 482.
A note on who is covered as an applicant. The Act protects women, but Hiral Harsora widened the respondent side, so an older woman facing abuse from a daughter-in-law or son can use it too. Parents in that situation should also know the parallel remedy in the Senior Citizens Maintenance Act, 2007, which can run alongside a DV proceeding.
Breach of a protection order is a crime
This is where the civil law grows teeth. A protection order or interim protection order by itself does not punish the respondent. But Section 31 makes a breach of such an order a separate criminal offence, punishable with imprisonment up to one year, or a fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both. The offence under Section 31 is cognizable and non-bailable, which means the police can arrest without a warrant and the respondent cannot claim bail as a matter of right.
The structure is worth holding onto. The first stage is civil and protective. The court hears the woman, weighs the evidence, and passes an order. Only if the man then defies that order does the criminal sanction kick in. This two-stage design is what lets the Act move fast at the start while still carrying a real penalty at the back end. The offence is, as far as practicable, tried by the same Magistrate who passed the order that was breached.
The two-stage structure also shaped the law of limitation. In Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022), the Supreme Court held that the limitation period in Section 468 of the old Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to an application under Section 12 of the DV Act, because such an application is not a complaint or the start of a prosecution.
“Filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act cannot be equated to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution.”
Supreme Court of India, Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022)
The Court reasoned that there is no offence at the Section 12 stage, so there is no starting point for limitation. Limitation begins only when a protection order is later breached, because that breach is the offence under Section 31. The appellant in Kamatchi had left her matrimonial home in 2008 and filed her Section 12 application in 2018, and the Court held it was not time-barred. The practical takeaway is direct: delay in filing a DV application is not, by itself, fatal.
The DV Act alongside the criminal law
A common confusion is whether the DV Act and the criminal law of cruelty are alternatives. They are not. They run together, and they do different jobs. The DV Act gives civil protection and relief. The criminal cruelty provision, formerly Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 since 1 July 2024, aims at punishment.
A woman can pursue both at once. She can file a Section 12 application for residence, protection, and maintenance, and separately set the criminal law in motion against cruelty. The reliefs do not cancel each other. They address different needs: one keeps her safe and housed now, the other seeks a conviction later.
The two routes differ in speed, burden, and outcome. The comparison below sets out how they line up.
| Feature | DV Act, 2005 (civil) | Criminal cruelty, BNS Section 85 |
|---|---|---|
| Primary goal | Protection and relief | Punishment of the offender |
| Who is protected | Any woman in a domestic relationship | A married woman against husband or his relatives |
| Residence and maintenance relief | ✓ Yes, directly | ✗ Not the purpose of the provision |
| Custody and compensation | ✓ Yes, under Sections 21 and 22 | ✗ No |
| Speed of first relief | ✓ Fast, ex parte and interim orders possible | ✗ Slower, runs as a criminal trial |
| Standard of proof | Civil, preponderance of probability | Beyond reasonable doubt |
| Can run alongside the other | ✓ Yes | ✓ Yes |
The choice is rarely either-or. A well-advised woman uses the DV Act for immediate safety and the criminal law where punishment is warranted, and the two proceed in parallel. For litigants weighing remedies across forums, our comparison page helps map the options.
How Niyam helps you research domestic violence law
Domestic violence litigation moves on two tracks at once, civil and criminal, and the law has shifted under leading judgments more than once. S.R. Batra was good law for over a decade before Satish Chander Ahuja overruled it on the shared household. Hiral Harsora rewrote who can be a respondent. A guide that quotes the wrong rung of that ladder leads a litigant straight into a dismissal.
That is the work Niyam is built for. Ask a question in plain English, such as “can a daughter-in-law claim residence in a house owned by her in-laws” or “does limitation apply to a Section 12 DV application,” and Niyam answers with the controlling Indian judgments, every proposition tied to a real case you can open and read. Before you rely on a precedent, check whether it is still good law so you do not build an argument on an overruled decision the way S.R. Batra was. And when you need to extract the ratio from a long shared-household judgment, the method in how to read a judgment gets you there faster.
Indian legal research should be quick and grounded in real sources, not guesswork. That is the standard Niyam holds itself to.
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Frequently asked questions
Is the Domestic Violence Act a criminal law?
No. It is a civil law that gives an aggrieved woman protection and relief through a Magistrate. The only criminal consequence comes under Section 31, which makes the breach of a protection order a separate offence that is cognizable and non-bailable, punishable with imprisonment up to one year or a fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both.
Who can file a case under the Domestic Violence Act?
Any woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and alleges domestic violence. This includes wives, live-in partners in a relationship in the nature of marriage, mothers, sisters, daughters, and daughters-in-law. After Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022), the domestic relationship need not be subsisting when the application is filed.
Can a woman file a DV case against another woman?
Yes. In Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016), the Supreme Court struck the words “adult male” out of the definition of respondent in Section 2(q). A woman can now name female relatives, such as a mother-in-law or sister-in-law, as respondents, provided she pleads acts of violence against them.
What are the five reliefs available under the Act?
A protection order under Section 18 to stop the violence, a residence order under Section 19 to protect her home, monetary relief under Section 20 including maintenance, a custody order under Section 21 for children, and compensation under Section 22 for injuries including mental torture. All five can be combined in a single application.
What counts as domestic violence under the Act?
Section 3 recognises four categories: physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. Economic abuse includes denying a woman access to the shared household, taking her stridhan, and stopping her from working. Emotional abuse includes insults for not bearing a child or a male child.
Can a wife be evicted from her in-laws’ house?
Not as a shortcut. Section 17 gives a woman the right to reside in the shared household regardless of ownership. In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020), the Supreme Court overruled S.R. Batra and held that a house owned by in-laws can be a shared household if the woman lived there during her domestic relationship. The in-laws can still pursue a separate civil suit, but cannot evict her without the DV court weighing her residence right.
What is a shared household?
A shared household under Section 2(s) is the household where the aggrieved woman lives or has lived in a domestic relationship, whether owned or rented by either party, and includes a household that belongs to the joint family. After Satish Chander Ahuja, the woman need not have any ownership interest, and after Prabha Tyagi the right can be a constructive one even where she did not actually reside there.
Who is a Protection Officer?
A Protection Officer is an official appointed by the State government under Section 8. Under Section 9, the officer assists the Magistrate, prepares the Domestic Incident Report, helps the woman file her application, and connects her with legal aid, medical help, and shelter. The officer supports the woman but does not decide the case.
How long does a DV case take?
The Act directs the Magistrate to endeavour to dispose of every application within 60 days from the date of the first hearing, and to fix the first hearing within three days of receiving the application. These timelines are aspirational, and in practice cases often run longer, but the statute is built for speed, including interim and ex parte orders.
Can the court pass an order without hearing the husband first?
Yes. Under Section 23, where the application shows the respondent is committing or is likely to commit domestic violence, the Magistrate can grant an ex parte order on the woman’s affidavit before the respondent is heard. This is what allows a court to keep a woman in her home or restrain violence on the first day.
Is there a time limit to file a DV case?
In Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022), the Supreme Court held that the limitation period in Section 468 of the old Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to a Section 12 application, because the application is not a complaint or a prosecution. Limitation runs only after a protection order is breached. So delay in filing is not by itself a bar.
Can a woman use the DV Act and Section 498A together?
Yes. The DV Act is civil and aims at protection and relief, while the criminal cruelty provision, now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, aims at punishment. A woman can pursue both at the same time, and one does not cancel the other.
Can a live-in partner claim under the Act?
Yes, where the relationship is in the nature of marriage. In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court applied tests including the length of cohabitation, social recognition as spouses, shared household and resources, and children. A genuine marriage-like relationship qualifies, but a casual or adulterous arrangement may not.
Can DV relief be claimed in an ongoing divorce or maintenance case?
Yes. Section 26 lets any relief under Sections 18 to 22 be sought in a pending civil, family, or criminal proceeding between the same parties. A woman in a divorce or maintenance case does not need a separate DV proceeding to ask for residence, protection, or maintenance.
What happens if the husband breaches a protection order?
It becomes a criminal offence under Section 31, cognizable and non-bailable, punishable with imprisonment up to one year or a fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both. The offence is, as far as practicable, tried by the same Magistrate who passed the order that was breached.