Sedition is gone: BNS Section 152 explained

TL;DR: The word “sedition” does not appear anywhere in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023. IPC Section 124A - the colonial-era sedition provision - has been replaced by BNS Section 152, which targets acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India: exciting secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, and separatist conduct. The ingredients, maximum punishment, and constitutional debates have all shifted. Counsel working on free-speech challenges, FIR quashings, and bail applications need to understand how far the new offence departs from the old one, and where the incitement threshold the Supreme Court drew in Kedar Nath Singh (1962) still matters.

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The colonial origins of IPC 124A

To understand what has changed under the BNS, you need to start with where the old provision came from - and why its colonial character became impossible to defend.

Section 124A was inserted into the Indian Penal Code by the British colonial administration in 1870, roughly two decades after the IPC itself was enacted. Thomas Macaulay’s original 1837 draft had not included a sedition clause; the gap was filled when the colonial government grew alarmed by growing criticism of British rule in the Indian press. The provision that eventually appeared was deliberately broad. It made it an offence to bring or attempt to bring into “hatred or contempt” the government established by law, or to “excite disaffection” towards it, by words spoken or written, by signs, or by visible representation.

The word “disaffection” was defined to include “disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.” The British administration used 124A against figures who are today among India’s most celebrated: Bal Gangadhar Tilak was prosecuted under it in 1897 and 1908. Mahatma Gandhi, who called 124A “the prince of the political sections of the IPC designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen,” was tried under it in 1922 and accepted conviction. Jawaharlal Nehru was charged under it.

After independence the provision survived the transition into the republic’s statute book, a fact that was always an uneasy fit with the constitutional guarantees of free expression. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which came into force in 1950, guaranteed citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. The state’s power to restrict that right was confined by Article 19(2) to narrow grounds: sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to an offence. Criticism of the government appeared nowhere in that list.

The tension between 124A and Article 19(1)(a) was the subject of litigation almost immediately.

What IPC 124A actually said

The provision made it an offence punishable with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of three years, with or without fine, to bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards, the government established by law in India.

Three explanations accompanied the main provision. The first clarified that “comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt, or disaffection, do not constitute an offence.” The second said the same for disapprobation of administrative action. The third drew a similar line for comments on government acts generally.

In theory, then, mere criticism was supposed to be outside the provision. In practice, the breadth of the phrase “excite disaffection” meant prosecutors and police could draw the perimeter wherever they chose. An inflammatory article, a speech at a protest, a piece of satire: each could be framed as exciting disaffection if the authorities wanted to pursue it. The provision became a tool to chill legitimate political dissent rather than a targeted response to genuine threats to state security.

By the time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of 124A directly, the gap between how the provision was written and how it was used had become a live constitutional problem.

Kedar Nath Singh (1962) and the incitement threshold

The Constitution Bench decision in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, reported at AIR 1962 SC 955, remains the foundational precedent on sedition. The court addressed a direct challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 124A and upheld it - but only by reading the provision down to a narrow compass.

The court held that 124A must be read as confined to words or acts that have a tendency or intention to create disorder, or that tend or are likely to incite violence. Speech that merely criticises the government, however strongly, does not satisfy this test. Comments that disapprove of government measures, question government policies, or express hostility toward the administration do not amount to sedition unless there is a call to violence or a tendency to produce public disorder.

This is the incitement threshold that Kedar Nath established. The principle can be stated simply: the offence is not excited by criticism but by incitement - words that have a real tendency to move an audience toward violent or disorderly action against the state.

The court’s reading drew on Article 19(2), noting that only restrictions on speech that serve the constitutionally specified purposes are valid. Criticism of government policy, however sharp, is speech about government; it is not an act endangering the security of the state. The line between these two things is the line between protected expression and criminal liability under a constitutionally valid sedition law.

Kedar Nath has been cited in virtually every subsequent sedition prosecution of significance. State High Courts, and the Supreme Court in later decisions, consistently repeated the proposition that the incitement threshold is essential to the constitutional survival of 124A. Any charge that did not demonstrate a tendency to incite violence or public disorder was vulnerable to quashing.

The 2022 Supreme Court proceedings and suspension of 124A

By 2022 the sedition provision had become the subject of sustained public criticism and significant litigation. A number of petitions reached the Supreme Court challenging 124A both as applied in specific cases and in the abstract.

In proceedings before the Supreme Court in May 2022 - in which the petitioners included several individuals and organisations who had been prosecuted under 124A or who challenged its validity as a matter of principle - the court took an extraordinary step. Without finally deciding the constitutional question, it effectively put Section 124A on hold. It asked the central and state governments not to register fresh FIRs under 124A while the matter was under re-examination. Ongoing prosecutions were also asked to be put in abeyance pending the outcome.

The court noted that the government itself had indicated a willingness to reconsider the provision. The Union expressed the view that a review of colonial-era laws was underway, and that Section 124A’s continued existence was being examined. Against that backdrop the court was not inclined to strike the provision down immediately; it chose instead to leave it in suspension while the executive’s review proceeded.

That suspension proved to be the practical end of active enforcement of 124A. When the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 received assent and came into force on 1 July 2024, repealing the Indian Penal Code 1860 in its entirety, Section 124A went with it. The new statute did not carry sedition forward under any label.

What it did instead was something more specific.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 and what changed

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 is the statute that replaced the Indian Penal Code 1860 with effect from 1 July 2024. The BNS was enacted as part of a three-statute overhaul of the criminal law framework that also produced the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (replacing the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023 (replacing the Indian Evidence Act 1872). The exercise was presented as a process of decolonising Indian criminal law and replacing provisions of British origin with legislation suited to an independent republic.

For the law of sedition the result was that the word itself was dropped and the provision was restructured from the ground up. The government’s position was that a general disaffection offence of colonial provenance was not something an independent India needed to retain, but that threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country remained a legitimate subject of criminal law. Section 152 of the BNS was the product of that position.

The change is not merely cosmetic. The architecture of the new offence is different from 124A in several respects that matter practically, and the constitutional questions it raises are different too - though overlapping.

BNS Section 152: what the provision covers

Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 is placed in Chapter VII of the statute, which is headed “Of offences against the state.” The provision targets acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

The offence as framed covers conduct such as: exciting or attempting to excite secession; inciting armed rebellion or subversive activities; encouraging feelings of separatist activities; or endangering the sovereignty or unity and integrity of India. This can be done by words spoken or written, by signs, or by visible representation, or through electronic communication or the use of financial means.

The punishment is imprisonment for life, or imprisonment which may extend to seven years, with fine.

Two qualifications accompany the provision. The first preserves commentary, criticism, and dissent that do not cross into the conduct the section targets. The second makes clear that the section does not apply to lawful means of disagreement.

Several points are worth noting immediately. First, the maximum punishment of life imprisonment is the same as under the old 124A. Second, the reference to electronic communication and financial means is new - 124A had no equivalent. Third, the framing is around specific types of conduct (secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, separatism) rather than the more diffuse concept of “disaffection.” Fourth, and most significantly for constitutional analysis, the section is not directed at criticism of the government at all; it is directed at conduct threatening the territorial integrity and constitutional order of India.

Comparing 124A and Section 152: ingredients, punishment, and intent

The table below maps the key features of the two provisions against each other.

FeatureIPC Section 124A (repealed)BNS Section 152 (in force)
LabelSeditionActs endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity
Core wrongExciting disaffection against the governmentExciting secession, armed rebellion, separatism, subversive activities
TargetGovernment established by lawSovereignty, unity and integrity of India
ModeWords (spoken/written), signs, visible representationSame, plus electronic communication and financial means
Punishment (maximum)Life imprisonment or 3 years, with fineLife imprisonment or 7 years, with fine
Criticism of government protected?Yes, by the three ExplanationsYes, by the qualifications to the section
Incitement requirement (per Kedar Nath)Yes - tendency to incite violence or disorderTo be determined; tendency to produce secession/rebellion implied
Intent elementNot explicit; tendency test appliedActs that endanger or tend to endanger sovereignty
FIR cognisabilityCognisableCognisable
Bail characterNon-bailableNon-bailable
Trial courtSessions CourtSessions Court
Colonial originYes - 1870 insertionNo - 2023 enactment

The sharpest difference lies in the object of the offence. Under 124A the government of the day was the protected object - which is precisely what made the provision easy to misuse. A new political party attacking the incumbent, a journalist publishing investigative work, a civil society organisation criticising policy: all of them could be framed as exciting disaffection against “the government established by law” because the word “government” in 124A was read as the administration of the day, not merely the constitutional framework.

Under Section 152 the protected object is different: it is the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. This is a constitutionally significant phrase - it appears in Article 19(2) as one of the grounds on which the state may restrict free speech. A provision explicitly tied to the Article 19(2) ground of sovereignty and integrity is on firmer constitutional ground than one tied to preventing criticism of the government.

But critics of Section 152 point out that terms like “subversive activities” and “separatist feelings” are capable of broad construction. A provision that punishes exciting “separatist feelings” - without clearly defining what separatist feelings means - could be applied to speech that falls well short of incitement to secession. The risk of over-breadth has not disappeared; it has moved to different words.

The free-speech dimension: Article 19(1)(a) and its limits

The constitutional framework for evaluating both 124A and Section 152 is the same. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) permits the state to impose reasonable restrictions on that right in the interests of, among other things, the sovereignty and integrity of India and the security of the state.

The reasonableness requirement in Article 19(2) has been interpreted by the Supreme Court over decades to mean that restrictions must be proportionate and must not be so broad as to swallow the right they are supposed to limit. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124) the court struck down a restriction that was not tied to public order or security in any precise way. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (AIR 2015 SC 1523) the court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which had been used to prosecute online speech, because it was not confined to speech that incited or tended to incite a clearly defined public order problem.

The Shreya Singhal framework is relevant to Section 152 analysis. The court in that case drew a distinction between discussion, advocacy, and incitement. Discussion of an idea, even an idea the government finds unpalatable, is protected. Advocacy of a position, even a position that argues for political change, is protected. Incitement - speech that crosses from argument into a call for illegal action - is the category the state may legitimately target.

Applied to Section 152, the argument runs: speech that discusses the concept of secession or analyses separatist political demands is discussion or advocacy. Speech that calls an audience to take up arms, to engage in subversive conduct against the constitutional order, or to actively pursue secession by illegal means is something closer to incitement. The provision ought to be read to cover the latter, not the former. And the Kedar Nath Singh incitement threshold, though it was developed in the context of 124A, reflects a constitutional principle that is not tied to any particular statute - it derives from Article 19(2) itself.

Whether the courts will read Section 152 through a Kedar Nath lens is the central question for constitutional litigation in this area. The argument that Kedar Nath applies by analogy is available and plausible. The counter-argument - that Section 152 is a new provision with a different structure and the court must interpret it fresh - is also available. The litigation on this question has not yet produced a definitive answer at the Supreme Court level.

For a broader introduction to the new criminal laws, including where BNS fits within the overall overhaul, that post covers the three-statute framework in full.

Practical implications for accused and counsel

For counsel working on matters under Section 152, the practical landscape has several dimensions worth working through carefully.

The first point is that Section 152 is cognisable and non-bailable. A police officer may arrest without warrant. The accused is not entitled to bail as of right; the court must consider whether bail ought to be granted. Given that the provision carries life imprisonment as the maximum, courts are likely to apply careful scrutiny to bail applications.

The second point is that the nature of the allegations must be examined against the ingredients of the section with precision. The FIR must allege conduct that falls within the types of acts the provision targets: secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities, separatism, or endangering sovereignty/integrity. An FIR that alleges criticism of government policy, or that characterises political speech as seditious without identifying the specific ingredient the speech allegedly satisfies, is vulnerable to challenge.

The third point is that the standard of proof at the charge stage and at trial remains unchanged by the change in statute. The prosecution must establish that the accused’s conduct actually tended to endanger or did endanger the sovereignty, unity or integrity of India - not merely that the speech was inflammatory or offensive to some.

The fourth point concerns the transition from 124A. Cases that were initiated under 124A before 1 July 2024 and remained pending at the time the BNS came into force are subject to transitional provisions in the BNSS. The general principle is that proceedings initiated under the old law continue under the old law unless the accused can take advantage of any provision in the new statute that is more beneficial. Counsel in pending 124A matters should check whether the allegations as framed could sustain a conviction under the new provision; if not, that affects the overall shape of the case.

Bail and anticipatory bail under BNS Section 152

Section 152 of the BNS is a non-bailable offence. Bail applications will go to the Sessions Court in the first instance; in appropriate cases, bail may be sought from the High Court. Anticipatory bail applications under BNSS Section 482 are also available where an arrest is apprehended before it takes place.

The considerations relevant to bail in cases of this nature overlap significantly with those that applied under 124A. Courts look at: the nature of the alleged acts and whether they are prima facie within the offence; the likelihood of the accused absconding or influencing witnesses; the possibility of recurrence; and the interest of the state in investigating serious offences against sovereignty and integrity.

Where the allegations are based on speech rather than overt acts - a speech at a public meeting, an article, a social media post - the bail argument will typically focus on whether the content, read fairly and as a whole, comes anywhere near the incitement threshold the offence implies. A court that applies Kedar Nath Singh by analogy will want to know whether the speech had a real tendency to move its audience toward secession, armed rebellion, or subversive conduct.

For the broader principles on bail in serious criminal matters, our post on bail and the rule that jail is the exception covers the Article 21 jurisprudence that courts apply when considering deprivation of liberty.

For anticipatory bail specifically, our analysis of BNSS Section 482 sets out the procedure, the relevant considerations, and how courts approach the balance between individual liberty and the gravity of the offence.

FIR quashing and the incitement argument

Quashing a Section 152 FIR under BNSS Section 528 (the equivalent of the former Section 482 CrPC) is the most immediate remedy where the allegations do not disclose the ingredients of the offence.

The Supreme Court’s approach to quashing in speech-related offences is well established from the 124A era. In Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2021) the court quashed a sedition FIR against a journalist, applying Kedar Nath Singh to hold that statements criticising the government’s handling of public health and resource allocation did not satisfy the incitement threshold. The court’s reading was narrow: without a call to violence or tendency to produce disorder, the offence did not arise. The Kedar Nath standard was treated as a mandatory filter through which any 124A allegation had to pass before a prosecution could proceed.

The principle underlying Vinod Dua is not tied to the 124A label. It derives from Article 19(2) and from the proposition that a speech-based criminal charge must demonstrate a real, as opposed to a fanciful, connection between the words and the harm the law seeks to prevent. Counsel arguing for quashing of Section 152 FIRs will rely on this principle directly, even though the statute has changed.

The strongest quashing arguments will arise where: the FIR is based on political speech or commentary with no reference to violence or subversive conduct; the complainant’s characterisation of the speech is tendentious and not borne out by the content; the speech is clearly a statement of political position rather than a call to action; or the FIR appears to have been registered to harass or silence a critic rather than to address a genuine threat to sovereignty or integrity.

For the broader law of defamation and related speech offences in India, our post on defamation law covers the distinction between protected criticism and actionable statements, which is analytically adjacent to the Section 152 analysis.

How grounded precedent research helps argue the threshold

The incitement threshold argument - both for bail and for quashing - depends on establishing what the courts have actually said about when speech crosses the line from protected expression into criminal conduct. That argument is only as strong as the precedents behind it.

The difficulty is that the BNS came into force in July 2024 and there is as yet a limited body of Section 152-specific judgments. Counsel working on these matters therefore needs to find and deploy two bodies of precedent: first, the 124A case law (Kedar Nath Singh, Vinod Dua, Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, and others) for the constitutional principles that survive the change of statute; and second, any emerging Section 152 decisions from High Courts that are beginning to interpret the new provision.

This is exactly the kind of layered research problem that benefits from a tool grounded in a large judgment corpus. Niyam’s legal research product searches across 72,000+ Indian judgments to surface the decisions that are actually on point, with citations back to the source material. When you are building an argument about where the incitement threshold sits under Section 152, the tool helps you find the cases that established the threshold under 124A, the cases that applied it to quash prosecutions, and the early Section 152 decisions that have begun to develop the new provision’s own case law. Every answer comes with a citation you can open and verify - the model does not generate authorities that do not exist in the corpus.

For complex constitutional challenges, the Citator shows you whether a case you are relying on is still good law, has been distinguished, or has been qualified by a later bench. The Kedar Nath Singh 1962 decision has been affirmed and applied many times; confirming that it has not been watered down or qualified in any way that matters for your argument is something the Citator does in seconds rather than through a manual search of commentary and subsequent references.

Compare how Niyam’s approach differs from general-purpose AI tools and other Indian legal research platforms at /compare.

The criminal law practice area overview on the site covers the range of matters where grounded judgment research makes a concrete difference to the quality of submissions.

Frequently asked questions

What is BNS Section 152?

BNS Section 152 is a provision in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 that creates an offence for acts that endanger the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. It covers conduct such as exciting or attempting to excite secession, inciting armed rebellion or subversive activities, encouraging separatist feelings, and using words, signs, electronic communication or financial means to endanger India’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. It is the provision that replaced the colonial-era sedition offence under IPC Section 124A.

Is sedition still a crime in India?

The word “sedition” no longer appears in Indian criminal law. IPC Section 124A, which was the sedition provision, was repealed when the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 came into force on 1 July 2024. What replaced it is BNS Section 152, which targets a different and more specific set of acts: those that endanger sovereignty, unity and integrity, including secession, armed rebellion, subversive activities and separatism. The underlying concern about state security has not been abandoned; the label and the specific ingredients have changed.

What was IPC Section 124A?

IPC Section 124A was the sedition provision in the Indian Penal Code 1860. It made it an offence to bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards, the government established by law in India. The maximum punishment was life imprisonment. It was inserted by the British colonial administration in 1870 and was used both before and after independence to prosecute speech that the authorities characterised as anti-government. It was declared unconstitutional in scope by several High Courts and was effectively suspended by the Supreme Court in 2022 before being repealed entirely by the BNS in 2024.

What did the Supreme Court decide in Kedar Nath Singh?

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 955) was a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court that upheld the constitutional validity of IPC Section 124A, but only after reading it down significantly. The court held that the provision could only be applied to words or acts that had a tendency or intention to create disorder or to incite violence. Mere criticism of the government - however strong - did not attract the offence. Comments that disapproved of government measures or expressed hostility to the administration were protected as long as they did not call for violence or produce a tendency toward public disorder. This incitement threshold became the standard framework for evaluating 124A prosecutions in all subsequent cases.

Does the Kedar Nath Singh threshold apply to BNS Section 152?

This is a live question that has not yet been definitively answered by the Supreme Court in the context of the new provision. The argument that the incitement threshold applies by analogy is well-founded: the threshold derives from Article 19(2) of the Constitution, not from the language of 124A specifically, and Article 19(2) continues to govern what restrictions on speech are constitutionally valid. A restriction on speech that does not require any incitement to illegal action is harder to justify under Article 19(2) than one that does. Counsel challenging Section 152 prosecutions routinely invoke Kedar Nath Singh for this constitutional principle.

What is the punishment under BNS Section 152?

The punishment for an offence under BNS Section 152 is imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, together with a fine. The maximum penalty of life imprisonment is the same as under the old IPC Section 124A. However, 124A also permitted a lesser sentence of imprisonment which might extend to three years; under Section 152 the range is up to seven years before reaching life, which arguably represents an increase in the intermediate punishment available to courts.

Is BNS Section 152 bailable or non-bailable?

BNS Section 152 is a non-bailable offence. A person arrested under this provision is not entitled to bail as of right. Bail must be applied for before the Sessions Court, or the High Court in appropriate cases. Anticipatory bail under BNSS Section 482 is also available where a person apprehends arrest. The court will weigh the standard considerations: flight risk, tampering with evidence, gravity of the allegation, and whether the materials prima facie support the offence.

Can an FIR under BNS Section 152 be quashed?

Yes. An FIR under Section 152 can be challenged through a petition under BNSS Section 528 before the High Court, which has inherent power to quash proceedings that do not disclose a cognisable offence. The High Court will examine whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their highest, disclose the ingredients of Section 152. Where the FIR is based on speech that amounts to criticism or political advocacy rather than incitement to secession, armed rebellion or subversive activity, a quashing petition has a reasonable prospect of success. The principles from 124A quashing cases - particularly the Kedar Nath Singh incitement threshold - remain relevant to this analysis even under the new statute.

How does Section 152 differ from the old sedition law in its ingredients?

The most significant ingredient difference is in what is protected. Under IPC 124A the target of the offence was “the government established by law,” which courts interpreted to mean the current administration. Under BNS Section 152 the protected interest is the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, which is a constitutionally grounded concept that refers to the constitutional order as a whole rather than the administration of the day. This means that speech criticising the government cannot, as a matter of the section’s own structure, satisfy the ingredient of the new offence, because the section is not about protecting governments from criticism. The ingredient is endangering India’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, not exciting disaffection against those who govern.

What does “subversive activities” mean in Section 152?

The BNS does not provide a statutory definition of “subversive activities” within Section 152 itself. In the absence of a definition, courts will interpret the phrase by its ordinary meaning and by the company it keeps in the provision. Read in context alongside “secession,” “armed rebellion,” and “separatism,” subversive activities appears to mean conduct directed at undermining the constitutional order or the territorial integrity of the country by means outside lawful political activity. The absence of a precise definition is one of the grounds on which the provision may be challenged as over-broad: terms that lack clarity allow prosecution on the basis of ordinary dissent recharacterised as something more sinister.

What happened to pending 124A cases after the BNS came into force?

When the BNS repealed the IPC with effect from 1 July 2024, transitional provisions in the BNSS addressed pending proceedings. The general position is that proceedings initiated under the old IPC for an offence under 124A may continue to be tried under the old law. The accused may, however, take advantage of any provision in the new statute that is more beneficial to them - for example, if the new provision is interpreted more narrowly or carries a lesser punishment in some respect. Counsel in pending 124A matters should carefully examine the transitional provisions and consider whether the change in law affects the framing of the charges, the admissibility of materials, or the available sentences.

Did the Supreme Court strike down IPC 124A?

No. The Supreme Court did not strike down IPC 124A. What happened in the 2022 proceedings before the Supreme Court was that the court, while the question of the provision’s constitutional validity was under examination, effectively put Section 124A in suspension. It asked the central and state governments not to register fresh FIRs under the section and asked that pending prosecutions be kept in abeyance. The constitutional question was not finally decided before the BNS repealed the IPC in 2024, at which point the question became academic so far as 124A is concerned.

Can you be arrested under Section 152 for social media posts?

Yes. Section 152 explicitly covers electronic communication as one of the modes through which the offence can be committed. A social media post that the authorities characterise as exciting secession, encouraging separatist feelings, or inciting subversive activity can in principle ground an arrest and FIR under Section 152. The same analysis applies as for any other mode: the content of the post must be examined against the ingredients of the section, and the constitutional protections of Article 19(1)(a) apply. A post that expresses a political opinion, criticises a government policy, or discusses a separatist movement as a political and historical phenomenon without calling for illegal action is not within the section.

What role does “intent” play in Section 152?

The provision is not framed as a strict intent offence in the traditional sense - it does not require proof of a purpose to endanger sovereignty in the same way that a specific intent offence would. It targets acts that endanger or tend to endanger. However, intent and purpose are relevant to the overall constitutional analysis. A person who deliberately publishes material calling for armed secession stands in a different position from a person who shares a news report about a separatist movement for the purpose of commentary or analysis. The distinction between intent to endanger and intent to discuss is material both to the prosecution’s ability to establish the offence and to the constitutional validity of the application of the provision.

How does Section 152 relate to the UAPA?

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UAPA) operates alongside and independently of Section 152 of the BNS. The UAPA has its own provisions covering unlawful activities, terrorist acts, and membership of banned organisations. In practice, some cases that might previously have been registered under IPC 124A could be registered under either Section 152 or the UAPA, or both. The UAPA has significantly more restrictive bail provisions than the BNS: under the UAPA’s Section 43D(5), bail cannot be granted if the court is satisfied that the prosecution’s case is prima facie true - a standard that is difficult to satisfy in favour of the accused. Section 152 does not carry an equivalent bail restriction.

What is the significance of the phrase “sovereignty, unity and integrity” in Section 152?

The phrase “sovereignty and integrity of India” appears in Article 19(2) of the Constitution as one of the grounds on which restrictions on free speech are permitted. By using this phrase as the core of the protected interest in Section 152, Parliament has expressly anchored the provision in the constitutional text that authorises restrictions on speech. This is a deliberate improvement over 124A, which protected “the government established by law” - a phrase that appeared nowhere in Article 19(2) and therefore raised a direct constitutional gap. The alignment between Section 152 and Article 19(2) is one of the reasons the new provision is thought to be on firmer constitutional ground than the old one, even if its breadth in other respects remains contested.

Are there defences available under Section 152?

The qualifications within Section 152 itself preserve the right to criticise government and to advocate for change through lawful means. Beyond those, the general criminal law defences available under the BNS apply. There is no reverse burden of proof under Section 152, so the prosecution must establish the ingredients of the offence to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The primary line of defence in most speech-based Section 152 cases will be that the conduct alleged does not satisfy the ingredients of the section: it is criticism, commentary, advocacy, or analysis rather than incitement to the specifically listed acts.

What should a person do if they receive notice of an FIR under Section 152?

The immediate steps are: do not make any statements to the police without consulting a criminal lawyer; apply for anticipatory bail as early as possible, ideally before any arrest is effected; obtain and examine the FIR to understand the specific allegations; and instruct counsel to assess the material on which the FIR is based. In parallel, counsel should examine whether a quashing petition under BNSS Section 528 is appropriate, given the content of the allegations. The incitement threshold analysis should be done at the outset to form a view on the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prospects of early disposal.

Is it possible to argue that Section 152 is unconstitutional?

Yes, constitutional challenges to Section 152 are available and are being developed by commentators and litigants. The main lines of challenge are: first, that terms like “subversive activities” and “separatist feelings” are void for vagueness because they lack sufficient precision to tell a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is prohibited; second, that the section is over-broad in that it captures protected speech within its compass; and third, that the section fails the proportionality test under Article 19(2) because it is not closely enough tailored to the constitutional grounds it invokes. These arguments are not yet settled at the Supreme Court level, and the constitutional trajectory of Section 152 will become clearer as cases work their way through the High Courts.

How does Section 152 affect journalists and civil society?

The concern for journalists and civil society is that investigative reporting on separatist movements, academic analysis of secessionist politics, human rights documentation in conflict-affected areas, and advocacy for political communities with aspirations of greater autonomy could all potentially be characterised as encouraging separatist feelings or subversive activities if the provision is broadly applied. The textual protection within the section for lawful means of expression is there, but the history of 124A shows that textual protections can be bypassed when the provision is used to suppress inconvenient voices rather than to address genuine security threats. The safeguard against over-application lies in the constitutional protections under Article 19, the incitement threshold derived from Kedar Nath Singh by analogy, and the courts’ willingness to quash proceedings that do not satisfy those requirements.

Where can I find judgments on Section 152 and its 124A predecessors?

The Supreme Court and High Court decisions on IPC 124A - from Kedar Nath Singh (1962) through to the 2021 and 2022 decisions - are part of the permanent record of Indian constitutional law and can be found through judgment databases and law reporters. Section 152-specific decisions are still emerging from the High Courts as matters under the new provision come before them. Niyam’s research product indexes 72,000+ Indian judgments and can surface both the constitutional precedents from the 124A era and the emerging BNS case law, with citations back to the source documents. Every result is grounded in the indexed corpus rather than generated from statistical inference.

Research sedition and BNS precedents with Niyam

Section 152 is one of the provisions where the gap between knowing the statutory text and knowing how courts are actually applying it is at its widest right now. The provision is new. The constitutional questions are open. The early High Court decisions are beginning to develop the doctrine, and each one matters for how the incitement threshold argument, the bail analysis, and the quashing strategy are framed in pending and future matters.

Niyam is built for exactly this kind of evolving research problem. The platform’s research tool searches across 72,000+ Indian judgments - including Supreme Court constitutional decisions, High Court bail and quashing orders, and the emerging BNS case law - and returns results with citations grounded in the actual corpus. When you run a query on the Section 152 incitement threshold, you get the Kedar Nath Singh precedent, you get the Vinod Dua quashing order, you get the Shreya Singhal Article 19 framework, and you get whatever Section 152-specific decisions the courts have produced. The answer comes with a citation you can open; nothing is invented.

Niyam also offers Drafting, Notices, Translation, and Matters modules for counsel managing the full lifecycle of a criminal matter - from the anticipatory bail application through to the final submission in a constitutional challenge. The /solutions/research page covers what each module does. The /compare page shows how the grounded-retrieval approach compares to other options.

When you are ready to try it: Start for ₹100 - 200 credits to start, cancel anytime. Questions: [email protected].