Delhi High Court · 2025-04-25
KHILENDER GUPTA TRADING AS M/S BOBBY ENTERPRISES vs M/S HIND FOOD PRODUCT & ORS.
- Citation / case number
- FAO (COMM)-100/2025 2025:DHC:2987-DB
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Petitioner
- KHILENDER GUPTA TRADING AS M/S BOBBY ENTERPRISES
- Respondent
- M/S HIND FOOD PRODUCT & ORS.
Judgment text excerpt
$~51 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + FAO (COMM) 100/2025 KHILENDER GUPTA TRADING AS M/S BOBBY ENTERPRISES .....Appellant Through: Mr. Ankit Jain, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Shantnu Aggarwal and Ms. Sakshi Garg, Advs. versus M/S HIND FOOD PRODUCT & ORS. .....Respondents Through: Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Prakriti Varshney and Mr. Prashant, Advs. CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL JUDGMENT (ORAL) % 25.04.2025 C.HARI SHANKAR, J. 1. Khilender Gupta, trading in the name and style of M/s Bobby Enterprises, assails, in this appeal, order dated 7 April 2025 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial)1, in applications filed by the appellant under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19082, in CS (Comm) 26/20253. 2. CS (Comm) 26/2025 was instituted by Khilender Gupta before 1 “the learned Commercial Court”, hereinafter 2 “CPC”, hereinafter 3 Khilender Gupta v Hind Food Product Signature Not Verified FAO (COMM) 100/2025 Page 1 of 8 Digitally Signed By:AJIT KUMAR Signing Date:28.04.2025 16:05:58 the learned Commercial Court under Sections 51 and 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957 read with Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. The appellant claimed to be the registered owner of the trademark BOOM BOOM and also that the trade dress/label/packaging under which the appellant sold its products constituted an “artistic work” within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the Copyright Act. The appellant alleged that the respondent Hind Food Product was selling Aampapad under the marks DHOOM WOOM and DHOOM BOOM on its packing pouch/material along with its other mark STAR MOON. The said acts of the respondents, it was alleged, tantamounted to infringement of the appellant’s registered trademark