Full Judgement
State of Gujarat & another Vs. Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja
[Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002]
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. The State of Gujarat and the Mamlatdar & Agriculture are the appellants. The appellants are aggrieved by the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 11.10.2000 and the final order of the Division Bench dated 20.10.2000 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.597/2000 in Special Civil Application No.4015 of 1990. By the said impugned judgment and the final order, the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants came to be dismissed confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No.4015 of 1990 dated 06.05.1999.
2. The second appellant herein initiated proceedings under the provisions of The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (hereinafter called as 'the Act of 1960') and after hearing the interested party, passed an order dated 24.08.1982 in Ceiling Case No.2 of 1976 holding that the land to an extent of 587 acres 35 Gunthas was in excess of ceiling limit and the respondent was entitled to retain only balance land i.e. 51 acres.
3. The respondent preferred an appeal under Section 35 of the 1960 Act to the Deputy Collector, Rajkot. The Deputy Collector dismissed the appeal by an order dated 10.11.1983. The respondent preferred a revision under Section 38 of the Act of 1960 which was registered as TEN.B.R.4/84 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its judgment dated 08.09.1989 partly allowed the revision and directed that Randarda lands admeasuring 40 acres to be included in the total holding, that Bhomeshwar Temple admeasuring 12 acres 34 Gunthas to be excluded from the holding of the respondent and remanded the matter back to the second appellant for taking evidence regarding the age of the members of the family.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, the respondent preferred the writ petition in Special Civil Application No.4015 of 1990. Before the learned Single Judge, the respondent took the stand that his lands were covered by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the 'Act, 1976') and was not governed by the Act of 1960. In fact, the said stand of the respondent was raised for the first time in the writ petition. The stand of the respondent was accepted by the learned Single Judge and by the judgment and order dated 06.05.1999 passed in Special Civil Application No.4015 of 1990, the judgment and order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 08.09.1989 in Revision Application No.TEN.B.R.4/84 was set aside and the Rule was made absolute.
5. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.597/2000 and by the order impugned in this civil appeal, the said LPA having been dismissed, the appellants have come forward with this appeal.
6. We heard Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel for the respondent. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellants in the first instance traced the existence of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood which was enforced on 15.06.1961 and, thereafter, the initiative taken by the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly by passing a resolution on 14.08.1972 under Article 252 (1) of the Constitution of India authorizing the Parliament to legislate with respect to 'imposition of ceiling on the holding of urban immovable property'. Learned senior counsel also referred to the amendment passed by the State Legislature to the definition of 'land' in the Act of 1960 by way of 'removal of doubts' to the expression 'Bid lands' also to be included in the definition of 'land' on 23.02.1974 which amendment was notified on 01.04.1976 under the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972. Learned senior counsel also brought to our notice the coming into force of the Act, 1976 on and from 17.02.1976.
7. While elaborating his submissions on the various provisions contained in the different enactments, in the foremost, the learned senior counsel referred to the expressions 'agriculture' under Section 2(1) and 'land' under Section 2(17) of the un-amended, Act of 1960. Learned counsel also referred to Section 6 which sought to fix the ceiling on holding of such agricultural land. In that context, learned senior counsel brought to our notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing out the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972 (being Gujarat Act No.2 of 1974) (hereinafter called the Amendment Act, 1974) wherein, inter alia, it sought to remove doubts relating to 'Bid lands' of former Princes, as well as, Girasdars and Barkhalidars in the Saurashtra area which were duly covered under the definition of 'land' and submitted that it was only with a view to remove doubts that the Amendment Act was brought out and that it was not by virtue of the said amendment alone 'Bid lands' fell within the definition of 'land'.
8. In other words, according to learned senior counsel, even as per the definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) read along with the definition of "agriculture" under Section 2(1) of the un-amended Act of 1960, 'Bid lands' were duly covered within the said expression of 'land' and the Amendment Act, 1974 only sought to remove any doubt in the mind of anyone as regards the character of the 'Bid lands'.
9. The learned senior counsel then referred to Section 2(q), namely, the definition of 'vacant land' and Section 2(o), the definition of 'urban land' under the provisions of the Act, 1976 to contend that even going by the said definitions, such land within the urban agglomeration which fall within the definition of 'agricultural land' stood excluded for the purpose of application of the Act, 1976.
10. Learned senior counsel also brought to our notice the definition of 'Bid land' under Section 2(a) of the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 (hereinafter called as the "Saurashtra Act No. III of 1952") as well as the definition of the very same expression, namely, 'Bid land' under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 (hereinafter called as the "Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951) as well as Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act (hereinafter called as the "Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951) and contended that even long prior to the Amendment Act 1974 'Bid land' has been defined to mean a land used by Girasdars or Barkhalidars for grazing cattle or for cutting grass, for the use of cattle, meaning thereby that such lands were nonetheless 'agricultural lands'.
In the light of the above statutory provisions relating to the 'Bid land' learned counsel submitted that de hors the Amendment Act 1974 which came to be notified on 01.04.1976 'Bid land' fell within the definition of 'land' under the Act of 1960 and consequently there was no scope for the respondent to fall back upon the Act, 1976 in order to challenge the order passed by the second appellant which ultimately came to be confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was set aside by the judgment of the Division Bench in the order impugned in this appeal.
11. The learned senior counsel further contended that this very issue was considered by this Court in a recent decision in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 10 SCC 594 which has taken the view that the definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) read along with Section 2(1) of the Act of 1960 'Bid land' would fall within the definition of 'agriculture' and consequently governed by the definition Section 2(17) which define the expression 'land' and, therefore, the ceiling limit prescribed under Section 6 of Act of 1960 would be applicable to the 'Bid lands' of the respondent.
The learned senior counsel also relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in London Jewellers Limited Vs. Attenborough - (1934) 2 K.B. 206; the House of Lords decision in Jacobs Vs. London County Council - (1950) 1 All E.R. 737; and the Queens Bench decision in Behrens and another Vs. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd. - (1957) 1 All E.R. 583 for the proposition that wherein a decision more than one reason is assigned to support the ultimate conclusion, both the reasons will have binding effect and that one cannot be excluded under any pretext.
The learned senior counsel also relied upon Smt. Somawanti and others Vs. State of Punjab and others - AIR 1963 SC 151 wherein it was held that the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that in the recent judgment of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) when the ultimate decision was reached based on two grounds, both the grounds, would be the ratio of the decision and, therefore, the said decision will be complete answer to the question involved in this appeal.
12. In the alternate learned senior counsel submitted that the argument of the respondent which weighed with the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment based on the Act, 1976 vis-Ã -vis the Act of 1960 read along with Amendment Act 1974 was not sustainable. According to learned senior counsel, in the first place, there could not be any repugnancy as between the Act of 1960 and the Act, 1976, inasmuch as the amendment of the definition of 'land' in the Act of 1960 was amended as early as on 23.02.1974, namely, long prior to the coming into force of the Act, 1976.
According to learned senior counsel the relevant date is the date when the Amendment Act came to be passed in the Assembly on 23.02.1974 and the subsequent notification dated 01.04.1976 bringing into effect the Amendment Act 1974 was not the relevant date. In other words, according to him, when once the amending legislation was passed in the Assembly in the year 1974 the subsequent notification though was made in the year 1976 for bringing into force the amendments, the relevant date would be the date when the Act was passed and not the date when it was notified.
The learned counsel then contended that in any case the resolution dated 14.08.1972 was passed under Article 252(1) of the Constitution relating to the legislation with respect to ceiling on 'urban immovable property' and it had nothing to do with the 'agricultural land'. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that the conclusion of the learned Single Judge, as well as, that of the Division Bench in having non-suited the appellants on the specific ground that by virtue of the provisions of the Act, 1976 the appellants' action in proceeding against the respondent under the Act of 1960 was null and void was unsustainable in law.
Learned senior counsel contended that once the Act, 1976 stood repealed, as a corollary, the Act of 1960 with all the Amendments carried to it would automatically get revived and it will not become a dead letter as contended on behalf of the respondent. Learned senior counsel referred to the decision of this Court in M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & another - 1958 SCR 1422 in support of the said submission. Learned senior counsel also relied upon Thumati Venkaiah and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others - (1980) 4 SCC 295 for the said proposition. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that, in the light of the recent decision of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra), which squarely covers the case on hand, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.
13. As against the above submission, Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel prefaced his submission by contending that the stand of the appellants that 'Bid lands' were agriculture lands under the Act was not correct. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the appellant initiated proceedings against the respondent both under the Act of 1960, as well as, the Act, 1976 and that in fact they were also keen to proceed under the Act, 1976. While referring to the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Naphade contended that the argument based on Article 252 of the Constitution and its effect was almost given up by the appellant.
The learned senior counsel after referring to the unamended Act of 1960 and the definition of 'agriculture', 'agriculturist' and 'to cultivate personally' and the definition of 'agricultural land' and 'Bid Land' of Girasdar under the Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951 contended that the various definitions under the Act of 1960 were more concerned with the 'agriculturists' and their close proximity to the land held by them, while under the Saurashtra Reforms Act the stress was more on the lands held by the grantees as tenure holders in some form or the other.
In that context, learned senior counsel submitted that the definition between the 'Bid land' and the 'agriculture land' was clearly known to the Legislature as could be seen from the definition so drawn in the provisions contained under the Act of 1960, as well as, the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act. According to learned senior counsel, the reference to the description of 'Bid lands' under Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951 and the 'Act XXVI of 1951 disclose that the Legislature was conscious of the fact that the Act of 1960 did not include 'Bid lands' in the definition of 'land'.
14. While referring to the amendment which was brought out to the definition of 'land' in the Act of 1960, in particular Sections 4, 5 and 10 of the Amendment Act by which amendment was brought into Sections 2(1) and 2(17) and introduction of Section 2(27A) in the principal Act the learned counsel contended that the intention of the Legislature to bring into effect certain consequences pursuant to the amendment after the specified date, namely, 01.04.1976 was clearly spelt out. According to learned counsel, it was not merely by way of removal of doubt that the Amendment Act of 1974 was brought in but a significant purport was intended in bringing out such amendments to take effect on and after 01.04.1976 which has been specifically mentioned in Section 2 (27A) which came to be introduced by Amendment Act of 1974.
15. The learned senior counsel then contended that even assuming that the Amendment Act of 1974 would apply to the case on hand, since the respondent did not fall under the definition of 'Ruler' as stipulated in Section 2(17)(ii)(d) of the Amended Act, the Act of 1960 cannot be applied to the case of the respondent.
Learned senior counsel by referring to Article 366 of the Constitution pointed out that under sub- clause 22 of Article 366 a 'Ruler' has been defined to mean the Prince, Chief or other person who at any time before the commencement of the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971 was recognized by the President as the 'Ruler' of an Indian State or any person who at any time before such commencement was recognized by the President as the successor of such 'Ruler' and a person thus fulfill the above criteria alone would come within the definition of 'Ruler'.
The learned senior counsel contended that the respondent was never recognized in accordance with such constitutional provision and, therefore, the said Section 2(17)(ii)(d) of the Amended Act can have no application to the case of the respondent. It was further contended that the respondent would neither fall under the category of Girasdar or Barkhalidar or in the category of 'Ruler' and, therefore, even if the Amended Act of 1974 is applied, the respondent stood excluded from the coverage of the Act.
16. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that the argument that 'Bid lands' were already governed by the definition of 'agriculture' (i.e.) long prior to the coming into force of the 1974 Act, namely, from 01.04.1976 cannot be accepted. A fortiori, learned senior counsel contended that when the statute is clear in its ambit and scope and there being no ambiguity, there was no necessity to rely upon or refer to the Objects and Reasons to understand the purport of the enactment and relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of this Court reported in Pathumma & Others Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (1978) 2 SCC 1.
The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that whatever argument now raised based on the expression 'Bid lands' on behalf of the appellant may hold good only after 01.04.1976 and that the heavy reliance placed upon Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) cannot also come to the aid of the appellant since the various principles set out in the said decision were solely based on the Amendment Act, 1974 as has been specifically spelt out in various paragraphs of the said decision.
The learned senior counsel pointed out that the said decision, does not, apply to the facts of this case, inasmuch as, there was no reference to the implication of the Act, 1976 which came into effect as early as on 17.02.1976 vis-Ã -vis the Act of 1960 and the said Act being an Act of Parliament, the appellant was bound by the provisions contained therein which would negate the entire submission made on behalf of the appellant.
17. According to learned senior counsel when the application of Act, 1976 was not the subject matter of consideration while deciding the scope of the amendment Act of 1974 in the judgment reported in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra), reliance placed upon the said decision on behalf of the appellant is of no relevance.
18. The next submission of Mr. Naphade was that the Act, 1976 and the Act of 1960 were operating in their respective fields, though relatable to holding of lands. Learned counsel after making reference to Section 1(2), 2 (A), 2 (C), 2(N) and the Schedule to the Act, 1976 pointed out that Rajkot where the disputed land situate, fell within the urban agglomeration area, that the land in question is admittedly a land referred to in the Master Plan as has been stipulated under Section 2(o) of the Act, 1976 and, therefore, there is a world of difference for considering the land classified as 'agricultural land' under both the enactments.
According to learned senior counsel, having regard to the Explanations A, B & C of Section 2(q) of the Act, 1976 a conscious departure has been made with reference to the description of 'agricultural land' inasmuch as under the said Act it must be shown that the land was being 'used' for agricultural purposes in contradistinction to the Act of 1960 where a land simpliciter falling under the definition of 'agriculture' would alone be the relevant factor. Mr. Naphade in his submissions contended that having regard to the emergence of Act, 1976 on and from 17.02.1976 and by virtue of the Constitutional mandate, the Act of 1960 ceased to have any effect on any 'agricultural land' in the State of Gujarat.
In other words, according to learned senior counsel, since admittedly the lands belonged to the respondent were lying within the urban agglomeration specified under the Schedule to the Act, 1976 the application of Act of 1960 ceased to have any effect on the said land and, therefore, the appellant had no authority to invoke the provisions of the Act of 1960 for the purpose of acquisition.
19. Learned senior counsel contended that the 1974 Amendment to the Act of 1960 was a 'still born child' inasmuch as it came into effect only from 01.04.1976 whereas the Act, 1976 was brought into force on 17.02.1976 itself and was holding the field. The learned counsel stressed the point that the date of passing of the Act was not the relevant date and what was relevant was the date of implementation of the Act which legal principle was well settled as per the decision reported in In the matter of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 - AIR 1941 F.C. 72.
20. While meeting the argument of Shri Soli Sorabjee, the contention of Mr. Naphade on Article 252 was that having regard to the invocation of the said Article by the State of Gujarat, there was a virtual surrender of its power to legislate and thereby it was denuded of bringing out any legislation afresh or by way of amendment on the subject governed by this legislation brought out pursuant to invocation of Article 252 of the Constitution.
In that context, learned senior counsel brought to our notice Section 103 of the 1935 Act which was the comparative provision to Article 252 of the Constitution and pointed out that under Section 103 of the 1935 Act while the States could approach the Federal Government for bringing out a legislation, having regard to the specific provisions contained in the said Section, the power to deal with such legislation for any future contingency was retained by the State Government, while on the contrary the framers of our Constitution even after a specific point raised in the Constituent Assembly proceedings for retention of such a power by the State Government,
Article 252 (2) ultimately came to be framed making it clear that once the power of the legislative competence of the State was surrendered to the Parliament, thereafter any future legislation on the subject could only be dealt with by the Parliament and the state was completely denuded of such power. In support of the said submission, learned senior counsel relied upon M/s R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Private Ltd. (supra) and State of U.P. Vs. Nand Kumar Aggarwal and others - (1997) 11 SCC 754.
21. Learned senior counsel after referring to the orders of the Mamlatdar dated 24.08.1982, the Deputy Collector dated 10.11.1983 and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 08.09.1989 as compared to the return filed by the respondent under Section 6 of the Act, 1976 dated 13.08.1976, the order of the competent authority dated 25.05.1983 and the order of the Tribunal under the Act, 1976 dated 18.09.1991 contended that even according to the appellants themselves as stated in their reply affidavit no agricultural operation was carried out in survey No.111/2- 30 and thereby virtually admitting the position that the lands in question can never be held to be 'agricultural lands'.
The learned counsel contended that the appellants were blowing hot and cold, that for the purpose of coverage under the Act, 1976 they wanted to contend that the lands were not agricultural land, while when it came to the question of coverage under the Act of 1960, they contended that the very same lands as 'Bid lands' would fall within the definition of 'agriculture'. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court was well justified and does not call for interference.
22. Lastly, it was contended by the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the case of the appellant is also hit by the principle of res judicata. The learned senior counsel by referring to an order passed by the Deputy Collector, Bhavnagar relating to Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' in his order dated 09.11.1979 specifically held that the Act of 1960 was not applicable to the said lands and that only Act, 1976 would apply.
It was pointed out that when the issue went before the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No.941 of 1980 a joint affidavit of two Deputy Collectors dated 06.10.1980 came to be filed with reference to Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' wherein it was reiterated on behalf of the Government that only Act, 1976 would apply to 'Bid land' in urban agglomeration of Bhavnagar and that the Act of 1960 was not applicable. Learned senior counsel also referred to an affidavit dated 16.02.2000 filed by the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat in relation to Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' before the High Court of Gujarat in Civil Application No.15529/1999 in S.C.A. No, 10108/1994 wherein a clear stand was taken by the State Government that possession of Bhavnagar 'Bid land' not having been acquired and taken under the Act, 1976 when the Act was in force, after its repeal, there was no scope to take possession of those lands.
23. The learned senior counsel also referred to the decision of this Court in Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and another Vs. State of Gujarat and others - (2004) 12 SCC 645 and contended that in a contempt petition filed at the instance of a purchaser of Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' this Court after tracing the history of the earlier litigation wherein it was concluded that Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' were controlled by the provisions of the Act, 1976 and not by the Act of 1960 and consequently the matter having been finally decided by the Courts and reached its finality the authorities cannot reopen the same.
The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that since the decision on the applicability of the Act of 1960 vis-Ã -vis the Act, 1976 in relation to 'Bid lands' of the 'Ruler' of erstwhile Bhavnagar State having been examined and ultimately concluded that in respect of such lands only the Act, 1976 would apply, in the case on hand as the lands in question were lying within the 'urban agglomeration' area, the said conclusion which reached its finality in this Court would operate as res judicata. The learned senior counsel contended that though this contention was raised before the High Court, the Division Bench after referring to the contention felt it unnecessary to decide the issue since the stand of the appellant was rejected on other grounds.
24. While meeting the last of the submission of learned senior counsel for the respondent, Mr. Soli J. Sorabji contended that the principle of res judicata can have no application to the case on hand since none of the earlier proceedings relating to Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' had anything to do with the lands of the respondent with reference to which alone we are concerned and, therefore, on that score itself the said contention should be rejected. According to learned senior counsel, the application of the principle of res judicata, as set out in Section 11 of CPC, was not fulfilled and, therefore, the said submission made on behalf of the respondent cannot be considered.
The learned senior counsel pointed out to the specific facts which were referred to in the joint affidavits of two Deputy Collectors filed in S.C.A. No.941/1980 wherein it was specifically averred to the effect that since a long time to the knowledge of the land holder, the land in question were demonstrated or meant for residential purpose in the master plan which was prepared since August 1976, that the land in question fell within the definition of 'urban land' under Section 2(o) of the Act, 1976 and, therefore, the overriding effect of Section 42 of the Act, 1976 excluded the application of the Act of 1960.
The learned senior counsel contended that in the light of the above peculiar facts relating to Bhavnagar 'Bid lands' which ceased to be a 'Bid land' and was classified as residential plot in the Master Plan at the relevant point of time, the stand of the authorities as regards the exclusive application of Act, 1976 continued to be maintained even after the said Act came to be repealed.
The learned senior counsel contended that it will be preposterous if a decision reached in regard to a case which was governed by its own special facts to apply the principle of res judicata to a different case where the fact situations are entirely different and in which case in no prior proceedings it was admitted by the authorities concerned that Act, 1976 alone would apply to the exclusion of the Act of 1960.
25. Having heard the eloquent submissions of Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant and the enlightening submissions of Shri Naphade, learned senior counsel for the respondent, we find that while the simple case of the appellant, namely, the State of Gujarat is that the respondents' lands being 'Bid lands' are agricultural lands and thereby governed by the provisions of Act of 1960, the whole endeavour of the respondent was that the lands were never classified as "agricultural lands", that they were indisputably "urban lands" governed by the provisions of the Act, 1976 and consequently the application of the Act of 1960 stood excluded. The enlightening submissions of the respective counsel oblige us to set out various legal principles highlighted before us in order to appreciate the respective submissions and thereby arrive at a just conclusion.
26. In the forefront, we want to make a detailed reference to certain relevant provisions of the Act of 1960 prior to its amendment and after its amendment, Saurashtra Act No.III of 1952, Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951, Saurashtra Act No. XXVI of 1951, Section 103 of The Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 252 of the Constitution. The relevant provisions under the unamended Act of 1960 are Section 2(1), Section 2(3), Section 2(11), Section 2 (12), Section 2(17) and Section 6. Under the amended Act of 1960, the relevant provisions are Section 2(1) (a) (b), (c), Section 2(17) (i) (ii) (a), (b), (c), (d) and Section (27A). Under Saurashtra Act No.III of 1952, the relevant provisions are Section 2(a), (b), (e), (f), Section 4 and Section 5(1), (2). Under Saurashtra Act XXV of 1951, the relevant provision are Sections 2(6), 2 (15) and 2(18). Under the Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951, the relevant provision is Section 2 (ii).
27. For easy reference, the above provisions are extracted hereunder: The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 Section 2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context requires otherwise-
1) "agriculture" includes horticulture, the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof for grazing but does not include-
i) the use of any land, whether or not an appenage to rice or paddy land, for the purpose of rab-mannure;
ii) the cutting of wood, only;
iii) dairy farming;
iv) poultry farming;
v) breeding of live-stock; and vi) such other pursuits as may be prescribed.
Explanation - If any question arises as to whether any land or part thereof is used for any of the pursuits specified in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (vi), such question shall be decided by the Tribunal;
(3) "agriculturist" means a person who cultivates land personally" (11) "to cultivate" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce, whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon; Explanation- A person who enters into a contract only to cut grass or to gather the fruits or other produce of trees, on any land, shall not on that account only, be deemed to cultivate such land; (12) "to cultivate personally" means to cultivate land on one's own account- (i) by one's own labour, or
(ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or (iii) under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of one's family by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share; Explanation- I.-A widow or a minor or a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability, or a serving member of the armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate land personally, if such land is cultivated by her or his servants or hired labour; Explanation II.- In the case of a joint family, land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is so cultivated by any member of such family;
(17) "land" means land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes and includes the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land; Section 6. Ceiling on holding land -
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement usage or decree or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day no person shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) be entitled to hold whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area.
(2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a member of a family, not being a joint family and land is also separately held by such individual's spouse or minor children, then the land held by the individual and the said members of the individual's family shall be grouped together for the purposes of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person.
(3) Where on the appointed day a person holds exempted land along with other land then- (i) if the area of exempted land is equal to or more than the ceiling area he shall not be entitled to hold other land; and (ii) if the area of exempted land is less than the ceiling area, he shall not be entitled to hold other land in excess of the area by which the exempted land is less than the ceiling area.
(4) Land which under the foregoing provisions of this section a person is not entitled to hold shall be deemed to be surplus land held by such person. The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 1960 (After the amendment) 2. In this Act, unless the context requires otherwise-
1) "agriculture" includes- a) horticulture, b) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, c) the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof for grazing 17. "land" means- i) in relation to any period prior to the specified date, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purpose and includes the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land; ii) In relation to any other period, land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes, and includes-
a) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such land;
b) the lands on which grass grows naturally;
c) the bid lands held by the Girasdars or Barkhalidars under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 or the Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act, 1952, as the case may be;
d) such bid lands as are held by a person who, before the commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 was a Ruler of an Indian State comprised in the Saurashtra area of the State of Gujarat, as his private property in pursuance of the covenant entered into by the Ruler of such State: (27A) "specified date" means the date of coming into force of the Amending Act of 1972. Under Saurashtra Act No.III of 1952 the relevant provisions areSection 2(a), (b), (e), (f), Section 4 and Section 5(1), (2): "2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context- (a) "Bid land" means such land as on the 17th April, 1951 was specifically reserved and was being used by a Girasdar or Barkhalidar for grazing cattle or for cutting grass:
(b) "cultivable waste" means cultivable land which has remained uncultivated for a period of three years or more before the 17th April, 1951 (c) xxx xxx xxx (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) "land" means land of any description whatsoever and includes benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. (f) words and expressions used but not defined, in this Act, and defined in the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 and the Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 shall have the meanings assigned to them in those Acts. 3. xxx xxx xxx 4. When a notification is issued by the Government in respect of an estate or any part thereof under section 3, then, with effect from the date specified in the notification, the following consequences shall, in respect of that estate or part thereof, ensue, namely:-
(a)
(i) all public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences on, or beside the same, the bed of the sea and/or harbours, creeks below high water mark, and of rivers streams, nalas, lakes, public wells and tanks, all bunds and palas, standing and flowing water and gauchars;
(ii) all cultivable and uncultivable waste lands (excluding land used for building or other non agricultural purposes), iii) all bid lands,
iv) all unbuilt village site lands and village site lands on which dwelling houses of artisans and landless labourers are situated, and
v) all schools, Dharmashalas, village choras, public temples and such other public buildings or structures as may be specified in the notification together with the sites on which such buildings and structures stand, Which are comprised in the estates so notified shall, except in so far as any rights of any person other than the Girasdar or the Barkhalidar may be established in and over the same, and except as may otherwise be provided by any law, for the time being in force, vest in, and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State of Gujarat and all rights held by a Girasdar or a Barkahalidar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished and it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the general or special orders of the Collector, to dispose of them as he deems fit, subject always to the rights of way and of other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting.
(b) A Girasdar or a Barkhalidar shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to be an occupant in respect of all other land held by him. 5. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, or section 4 - (a) no bid land which is also uncultivable waste, wadas and kodias shall vest in, and be the property of the State of Gujarat (b) no bid land comprised in the estate of a Girasdar who is considered to be of B and C class for the purpose of making rehabilitation grant under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act 1951, or of a Barkhalidar, the total area of agricultural land comprised in whose estate does not exceed eight hundred acres, shall vest in and be the property of the State of Gujarat] and (c) no bid land which is also cultivable waste or no village site land shall be acquired unless it is in excess of the requirements of the Girasdar or Barkhalidar in accordance with the rules to be made in this behalf; and (d) in the case of Girasdari Majmu villages, one fourth of the total area of bid land in the village shall not be acquired.
(2) If any bid land or village site, land is not acquired under the provisions of sub-section (1) and such bid land or village site land is use by the Girasdar or Barkhalidar for a different purpose, it shall be liable to be acquired under the provision of section 4." Under Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951, the relevant provisions areSections 2 (6), 2(15) and 2(18). They are as follows: "2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:- (6) "bid land" means such land as has been used by the Girasdar for grazing his cattle or for cutting grass for the use of his cattle.
(15) "Girasdar" means any talukdar, bhagdar, bhayat, cadet or mulgirasia and includes any person whom the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a Girasdar for the purposes of this Act. (18) "land" means any agricultural land, bid land or cultivable waste" Under Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951 the relevant provision isSection 2(ii). 2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context- (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) "bid land" means such land as has been used by Barkhalidar for grazing his cattle or for cutting grass for the use of his cattle;
28. "In order to appreciate the contentions raised before us, we wish to make a specific reference to the Preamble as well as the object of the Act of 1960. The Preamble shows that the Act was contemplated and was brought into effect since it was felt expedient in public interest to make a uniform provision for the whole of the State of Gujarat and in particular in respect of restrictions upon holding agricultural land in excess of certain limits. The expediency so noted was for securing the distribution of agricultural land to subserve the common good for the purpose of allotment of some lands to persons who are in need of land for agriculture and also to appreciate for other consequential and incidental matters. As far as the object of the Act was concerned, it is stated therein that the said enactment came to be enacted only for the purpose of fixing the ceiling area and not with any intention directly to interfere with the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants.
29. Keeping the above perspective of the law makers in mind, when we examine Section 2(17) which defines the expression 'land' it means the land which is used or capable of being used for agricultural purposes including the sites of farm, building appurtenant to such land. Section 6 of the 1960 act imposes restriction in the holding of the land which has been defined under Section 2(17) of the Act which is in excess of the ceiling area. The ceiling area has been set out under Section 2(5) of the Act. The definition of 'land' in its cognates and expression is specific in its tenor and mentions about its usage as well as its capability of usage for agricultural purposes. The expression "agriculture" has been defined under section 2(1) of the act which inter alia includes horticulture, raising of crops, grass or garden produce and the use by an agriculturist of the land held by him either in full or part for grazing purposes. The definition of "agriculturist" under Section 2(3) read along with Section 2(11) and 2(12) which define the expression 'to cultivate' and 'to cultivate personally' make the position clear that it would include a person who indulges in the avocation of agriculture by way of cultivation of the land either by himself or through other persons again under the supervision of his own men.
30. A careful consideration of the above provisions under the Act of 1960 gives a clear idea that lands which are used as well as which are capable of being used for the purpose of agriculture including lands used for raising grass or either full or part of it used for grazing purposes would come within the ambit of the Act, which in turn would be subject to the restrictions imposed for the purpose of ascertaining the ceiling limit. Consequently, the excess or surplus land in the holding of a person who is an agriculturist is to be ascertained in order to initiate and ultimately acquire such surplus land. Such acquisition as expressed in the Preamble to the Act would be for the purpose of equal distribution of land to other landless persons.
31. Keeping the above statutory provisions in mind, when we consider the respective submissions, the following broad legal principles are required to be dealt with by us. i) Whether 'Bid Land' would fall within the definition 'Land' read along with the definition of 'Agriculture' as defined under Sections 2(17) and 2(1) of the Act of 1960 ? ii) In order to ascertain the nature of description of 'Bid Land' can the definition of the said expression under the earlier statutes viz. Act No.XXV of 1951, Act No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952 can be imported ? iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 vis-Ã -vis the Act of 1960 in respect of 'Bid Land' ? iv) Whether the Amendment Act of 1974 which came into effect from 01.04.1976 and the definition of 'Bid Land' under the said Amendment Act of 1974 can be applied for the purpose of deciding the issue involved in this litigation ? v) Whether the ratio decidendi of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) can be applied to the facts of this case ? vi) Whether the orders of the authorities under the Act of 1960 impugned before the High Court were hit by the principles of Res Judicata ? vii) What is the effect of the repealing of the Urban Land Ceiling Act over the Act of 1960 ?
32. Though the definition of 'land' and 'agriculture' read together would include a 'land' used for raising grass or used for grazing purposes, the question for our consideration is whether 'Bid lands' can be brought within the scope of the said expression, namely, the definition of 'land' read along with the definition of 'agriculture' under the Act of 1960 as has been so construed by the authorities constituted under the provisions of Act of 1960 up to the level of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the subsequent amendment brought out under the 1974 amending Act which came to be notified on 01.04.1976 was only by way of clarification about 'Bid lands' in consonance with the definition of 'agriculture'. According to the respondent even such a clarification sought to be made under the amending Act 1974 by way of removal of doubts only revealed that as on the date when Act, 1976 which came into effect from 17.02.1976 'Bid lands' were not part of agricultural lands as defined under Section 2(1) read along with 2(17) of the 1960 Act.
33. Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, to support the submission made on behalf of the appellant, would draw succor to the definition of the very same expression 'Bid land' under Act No.XXV of 1951 as well as Act No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952. Under Act XXV of 1951 in Section 2(6) definition of 'Bid land' has been defined to mean such land raised by Girasdar for grazing his cattle or for cutting grass for the use of his cattle. Under Section 2(18) of Act No.XXV of 1951, the definition of 'land' under said Act included 'Bid land'. The purport of the said enactment was to end Girasdar system and while doing so regulate the relationship between the Girasdars and their tenants and to enable the latter to become occupants of the 'land' held by them as tenants and simultaneously to provide for the amount of compensation payable to Girasdars for the extinguishment of their rights. Whatever be the purport of the enactment, the definition of 'land' as defined under Section 2(18) and 'Bid land' as defined under Section 2(6) discloses that 'Bid land' would be a land which was treated on par with agricultural land and such land is none other than the land which is used for grazing by cattle as well as for cutting grass for the use of cattle.
34. With that when we come to the nature of description of 'Bid land' in the Act No.III of 1952, under Section 2(a) 'Bid land' has been defined to mean such land as on 17.04.1951 specifically reserved for being used by a Girasdar or Barkhalidar for grazing cattle or for cutting grass. Under Section 4 the manner of vesting of such of those lands described therein vested in the State and thereby assuming the character of the property of the State of Gujarat and consequently all rights held by Girasdars or Barkhalidars in such property deemed to have been extinguished.
For our limited purpose, it will be sufficient to confine our consideration to the definition under Section 2 (a) of Act No.III of 1952 which defines 'Bid land'. As stated earlier 'Bid land' is a land used for grazing by cattle or for cutting grass in the tenure lands held by Girasdar or Barkhalidar. When we refer to Saurashtra Abolition Act 1951 i.e. Act XXVI of 1951 the definition under section 2 (ii) which defines 'Bid land' to mean such land as has been used by Barkhalidars for grazing his cattle or for cutting grass for the use of his cattle. The purport of the said enactment was for improvement of the land revenue administration and agrarian reforms which necessitated abolition of Barkhalidars tenure prevailing in certain parts of Saurashtra.
Under Section 6(1) of Act XXVI of 1951, the right of allotment of land under the said act in favour of Barkhalidar is stipulated. The manner in which the application for allotment is to be made is also provided therein. Under sub-section (2) of Section 6 while making an application for allotment the details to be furnished by Barkhalidar has been set out wherein under clause (c) (iii) of sub clause (2) of Section 6 it is stipulated that full particulars of a Barkhalidar's estate containing the area of agriculture also, 'Bid land' and 'cultivable waste' in his estate should be furnished. Apparently in order to fulfill the said obligation by a Barkhalidar, the definition of 'Bid land' has been set out in Section 2(ii) of Act No.XXVI of 1951.
35. Keeping the above statutory prescription relating to the description of 'Bid land' in the above enactments which were all prior to coming into force of Act, 1976 namely, 17.02.1976 the nature of 'Bid land' has been succinctly described to mean a land which was used for grazing of cattle or for cutting grass for the use of rearing of cattle. To recapitulate the definition of 'agriculture' under Section 2(1), as well as, the definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) of the unamended Act of 1960, the expression 'agriculture' included inter alia, the land used for raising of grass, as well as, the land held by the agriculturist for grazing purpose.
When we consider the explanation part of sub section (1) of Section 2 which contains as many as Clauses (i) to (vi) the lands used for grazing purposes as well as cutting of grass for rearing of cattle are not the lands to be excluded from the definition of 'agriculture'. The definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) categorically mentions that the land which is either used or capable of being used for agriculture purposes would fall within the said definition.
Therefore reading the above definitions together a 'land' where grass is grown or used for grazing purposes fall within the inclusive provision of the definition of 'agriculture'. The definition of 'Bid land' in the earlier enactments namely Act Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952 make the position clear that the 'Bid land' is nothing but the land used for grazing of cattle and for raising grass for the purpose of rearing of cattle.
36. Under the amended Act of 1960 the definition of agriculture under Section 2(1) as it existed prior to the said amendment was maintained. In addition, some of those excluded categories, namely, the one mentioned in sub clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) were also included as falling within the definition of the expression 'agriculture'. Further the nature of exclusion as mentioned in sub- clause (vi) of clause 1 of Section 2, namely, such other pursuits as may be described was also mentioned by stating that such of those pursuits which have been prescribed prior to the specified date would continue to stand excluded for that period which was prior in point of time to the specified date as mentioned in the Amendment Act which was notified on 01.04.1976.
Here and now it is relevant to mention the date which was specified under the Amendment Act which as per Section 2 (27A) meant the date of the coming into force of the amended act of 1972, namely, 01.04.1976. Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn would be that while as from 01.04.1976 the definition of 'agriculture' under the amended Act was wider in scope which included land used whether or not as an appendage to rice or paddy land for the purpose of rabmanure, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding of livestock and the cutting of woods and such of those lands which were in the excluded category under the unamended Act cease to have effect of such exclusion on and after 01.04.1976.
37. Having regard to the reference to the specified date, namely, the date of notification (i.e.) 01.04.1976, the expanded definition of 'land' under Section 2(17) was brought to our notice wherein specific reference to the 'Bid lands' held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars under Act Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and III of 1952 and also such 'Bid lands' held by a person prior to the commencement of the Constitution 26th Amendment Act 1971 as a 'ruler' of an Indian State comprised in the Saurashtra Area of State of Gujarat.
The endeavour of learned counsel for the respondent while drawing our attention to the new Section 2(17), in particular, the reference to 'Bid lands' in clause (c) and (d) of Section 2 (17) (ii) was to stress upon the point that a clear distinction was drawn as regards the land falling within the said definition held by a person prior to the specified date and after the specified date. Under Section 2(17) (i) after the amendment the provision relating to the definition of 'land' was sought to be distinguished as was existing prior to the specified date while under Section 2(17)(ii) a wider scope of such definition of 'land' was introduced.
Having regard to such distinction shown in respect of a 'land' one prior to the specified date and the one in relation to any other period, learned counsel contended that the specific reference to 'Bid lands' held by Girasdar and Barkhalidar under sub clause (c) and (d) in Section 2 (17) (ii) makes a world of difference, as the scope of inclusion of the 'Bid lands' within the ambit of the expression 'land' under Section 2(17) was introduced on and after 01.04.1976 namely the specified date which was not the position prior to the said date.
38. The submission of leaned counsel was two fold, namely, that the specific reference to 'Bid lands' under Section 2(17) sub clause (ii) (c) and (d) came to be introduced for the first time on and after 01.04.1976 and hence the said situation requires a different consideration in the light of the Central enactment namely the Act, 1976 which had already come into force from 17.02.1976 by the State Legislature surrendering its legislative competence to the Union Government by invoking Article 252 (1) of the Constitution.
The further submission is that in the light of the field being occupied by the Central Act, having regard to the restriction contained in Article 252 (2) of the Constitution there could not have been any competence for State Government to bring about an amendment effective from 01.04.1976 in relation to the Act and the subject with reference to which the State Government has surrendered its legislative power that bringing any amendment was exclusively within the competence of the Parliament and thereby the State amendment had no effect and was void as from its inception.
39. Before considering the said submission it is necessary to also refer to the provisions contained in the Act, 1976 for an effective consideration and to reach a just conclusion. Under the Act, 1976 by virtue of Section 1(2) of the Act, the Act was applied to the whole of the State of Gujarat. Under Section 2(a) the appointed day was defined to mean in relation to any State to which the Act applied in the first instance the date of introduction of the Act, 1976 in the Parliament which was admittedly 17.02.1976. Under Section 2(n) what is an 'urban agglomeration' has been defined and it is not in dispute that district Rajkot where the lands in question situate falls within the definition of urban agglomeration mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Act.
Under Section 2(o) 'Urban Land' has been defined to mean any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan. However, it does not include any such 'land' which is mainly used for the purpose of 'agriculture'. Under Section 2 (q) 'vacant land' has been defined to mean land not being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration subject to other exclusions contained in the said sub-clause (q). The expression 'agriculture' has been specifically defined under the Explanation (A) to Section 2(o) by which it is stated that agriculture would include 'Horticulture' but would not include 'raising of grass', 'dairy farming', 'poultry farming', 'breeding of livestock' and such cultivation or growing of such plant as may be prescribed.
Under Explanation (B) it is mentioned that lands are not being used mainly for the purpose of 'agriculture' if such land has not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of 'agriculture'. Under Explanation (C) it is further stipulated that notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation (B) 'land' shall not be deemed mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the Master Plan for the purpose other than agriculture. Section 6 of the Act, 1976 prescribes the ceiling limit of vacant land which a person can hold in an urban agglomeration of the Act, 1976. If a person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at the commencement of the Act, he should file the statement before the competent authority of all vacant land to enable the State Government to acquire such vacant land in excess of ceiling limit under the Act.
40. In the light of the above provisions contained in the Act, 1976 Mr. Naphade learned senior counsel contended that Amendment Act of 1974 would be a 'still born child' having regard to the existence of the Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976. The learned counsel also sought to repel the contention of the appellants that the date of passing of the Act alone would be relevant and not the date of notification. For that purpose, learned counsel relied upon In the matter of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (supra). In the said decision the Federal Court considered the question referred to by His Excellency the Governor General under Section 213 of the Constitution Act. The first question is relevant for our purpose which reads as under:- "(1) Does either the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Central Act, 18 of 1937) which was passed by the Legislative Assembly on 4th February, 1937, and by the Council of State on 6th April 1937, and which received the Governor-General's assent on 14th April 1937, or the Hindu Women's rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938 (Central Act, 11 of 1938) which was passed in all its stages after 1st April 1937, operate to regulate (a)succession to agricultural land? (b) devolution by survivorship of property other than agricultural land? (underlining is ours)
41. At page 75 the Federal Court has answered the said question in the following words:- "It is not to be supposed that a legislative body will waste its time by discussing a bill which, even if it receives the Governor- General's assent, would obviously be beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact, but if it chooses to do so, that is its own affair, and the only function of a Court is to pronounce upon the bill after it has become an Act. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, it is immaterial that the powers of the Legislature changed during the passage of the bill from the Legislative Assembly to the Council of State. The only date with which the Court is concerned is 14th April 1937, the date on which the Governor-General's assent was given; and the question whether the Act was or was not within the competence of the Legislature must be determined with reference to that date and to none other." (underlining is ours)
42. By relying upon the said decision, learned counsel contended that the date of passing of the Act was irrelevant and what was relevant is the date when the Act was notified, namely, 01.04.1976. We find force in the said submission and without diluting much on the said contention we proceed to consider the other contentions raised on the footing that the amendment came into effect only from 01.04.1976 i.e. after the coming into force of the Act, 1976, namely, 17.02.1976. We have kept ourselves abreast of the various provisions of the unamended Act of 1960, the definition of 'Bid land' under Act XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and III of 1952 and keeping aside whatever amendment sought to be introduced by the Amendment act of 1974 with effect from 01.04.1976 we proceed to examine whether the contention of the respondent can be countenanced.
43. In this context, we are also obliged to note the definition of 'vacant land' under the Act, 1976 as defined under Section 2(q) and also the definition of 'Urban Land' under Section 2(o). Since the respondent strongly relied upon the operation of the Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976 in order to contend that the Amendment Act of 1974 will be of no consequence being a still born child after the coming into force of the Act, 1976 it will be appropriate to examine the said contention in the first instance.
44. Under the Act, 1976 while defining 'vacant land', the said definition specifically excludes a 'land' used for the purpose of 'agriculture'. The definition of 'Urban Land' again makes the position clear that any land situated within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of 'agriculture'. Under the Explanation A to Section 2(o) such of those lands which are used for 'raising of grass' stood excluded from the use of 'agriculture'. It is worthwhile to note that the 'land used for grazing' has however not been specifically excluded from the definition of 'agriculture' in the said Explanation 'A'.
The conspectus consideration of the above provisions leads us to conclude that the apparent purport and intent, therefore, was to exclude lands used for agriculture from the purview of Act, 1976 which would enable the holders of lands of such character used for agriculture to be benefited by protecting their holdings even if such lands are within the urban agglomeration limits and thereby depriving the competent authority from seeking to acquire those lands as excess lands in the hands of the holder of such lands.
45. That being the position, by the implication of the Act, 1976 in respect of the land used for agriculture within the urban agglomeration, the question for consideration is whether such exclusion from acquisition having regard to the character of the land as used for agriculture would entitle the owner of such land to contend that such exclusion would deprive the competent authorities under the 1960 Act to restrict their powers to be exercised under the said Act and from resorting to acquisition by applying the provisions contained in the said Act.
We are of the considered opinion that the conspectus consideration of the various provisions of the Act, 1976 considered again in the light of the object and purport of the 1960 Act which was intended for equal distribution of agricultural lands to the landless poor agriculturists, the application of the said Act will have to be independently made and can be so applied as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976. At this juncture it will have to be noted and stated that the subject namely, the 'land' being an item falling under Entry 18 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution, by virtue of the so-called surrender of power of legislation in respect of the said entry namely 'land' by way of Central Legislation namely Act, 1976 to be enacted by the Parliament pursuant to a State resolution by invoking Article 252 (1) of the Constitution, there would be every justification in the submission on behalf of the respondent that any subsequent legi
