Full Judgement
Maharao Sahib Sri Bhim Singhji Etc Vs. Union of India & Ors [1985] INSC 142 (1 July 1985)
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
TULZAPURKAR, V.D.
SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION: 1985 AIR 1650 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 862 1986 SCC (4) 615 1985 SCALE (2)289
CITATOR INFO: RF 1986 SC2030 (17) R 1989 SC1796 (3)
ACT:
A. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976) -Whether constitutionally valid vis-a-vis Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution.
B. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976), section 2(g),-Artificial definition of family in section 2(f), whether offends against Article 14 of the Constitution.
C. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976), section 11(6) validity of-Whether the maximum limit of the amount of compensation payable fixed at Rupees two lakhs is illusory and confiscatory and therefore, violative of Article 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution, as amended by the Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971-Effect of the Amendment.
D. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation), Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976), section 23 validity of-The provision subserves the objectives of Articles 39(b) and (c) and hence protecte by Articles 31 and C, but the governing test of disposal of excess lands being "social good", any disposal in any particular case or cases which does not subserve that purpose will be invalid.
E. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 section 27(1), validity of-Whether offends Articles 14 and 19(1) (f).
F. Interpretation of statutes-Rule of reading down the provision, Permissibility as a part of the judicial process.
G. Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 31 and 300 -A- Basic structure of the Constitution, thereby applicability of-Whether right to property is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution-State's power of "eminent domain", and conditions precedent to exercise of that power, explained.
H. Constitution of India, 1950-Part IV-Directive Principles of State Policy, character and cognisability by the Courts.
863
1. Interpretation of Constitution and the approach to be adopted, explained.
J. Interpretation of statute-External and Internal Aids, use of LK. Words and Phrase-Concept and meaning of "Public Purpose."
HEADNOTE:
The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act XXXIII of 1976) is in force in 17 States and all the Union Territories in the country. It seeks to impose a ceiling on vacant lands in urban agglomerations having a population of two lakhs or more and for that purpose classifies such urban agglomerations in various cities and towns in all the States and Union Territories into four categories and fixes the ceiling limit for each such category.
The primary object and purpose of the Act, as its long title and the Preamble show, is to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land for matters connected there with, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good, presumably in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Article 39(c) and (b) respectively. The enactment has also been put in the Ninth Schedule as Item 132 by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976; in other words, the enactment enjoys the benefit of protective umbrella of both the articles, Article 31-B and 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.
By these writ petitions the petitioners, who are holders of vacant land in the urban agglomerations in various States, are seeking to challenge the vires of some of the salient provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (XXXIII of 1976) and since, according to them, some of the impugned provisions are pivotal and non-severable, having an impact on its entire scheme, the whole Act is liable to be struck down as being invalid and unconstitutional. The petitioners have, therefore, prayed for an order quashing notices issued to them by the concerned competent authorities under the Act and a mandamus directing the respondents not to implement the provisions thereof against them.
Dismissing the petitions and upholding the constitutional validity save and except section 27(1) by a majority of 4:1 (A-P. Sen, J- partially dissenting on the validity of sub-sections (1),(2), (3) and the opening words of sub-section (4) of section 23), the Court.
^ HELD: Permajarity: (Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., P.N. Bhagwati, V.R, Krishna Iyer and an.Sen. jj; V.D, Tulzapurkar, J. dissenting).
864
1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is constitutionally valid save and except section 27(1) in so far a it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban of urbanisable land with a building or of a portion of such building. which is within the ceiling area. [877 E-F] Per Chandrachud. C.J. and P.N. Bhagwati, J.
1. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. 1976 is valid. The vice from which a provision here or a provision there of the impugned Act may be shown to suffer will not justify the conclusion that the Act is not intended to or does not, by its scheme; in fact implement or achieve the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution.[878 C-D]
2. The definition of "family" in section, 2(f) of the Act, which in relation to a person means the individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children, will not necessarily lead to concentration of wealth in the hands of a few persons or families. Such is not the intendment, nor the drive, nor the direct and inevitable consequences of the definition of "family", [873 D-E]
3. Section 11(6) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 which provides that the amount payable under sub-section (I) or sub-section (5) of section 11 shall, in no case, exceed two lakhs of rupees is valid. The amount thus payable, is not illusory and the provision is not confiscatory Rupees two lakhs is not like a farthing even if the excess land may be a fortune.
[879 F]
4. Section 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act is valid and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. Sub-section (4) of section 23 is the prepondering provisio governing the disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act. Though it is "subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) (2), and (3)", the provisions of sub-section (1) are enabling and not compulsive and those of sub-sections (2) and (3) are incidental to the provisions of sub-section (1). The disposal of excess vacant lands must therefore be made strictly in accordance with the mandate of sub-section (4) of section 23, subject to this, that in a given case such land may be allotted to any person, for any purpose relating to, or in connection with any "industry" or the other purposes mentioned in sub-section (1), provided that by such allotment, a common good will be subserved. The governing test of disposal of excess land being "social good", any disposal in any particular case or cases which does not subserve that purpose will be liable, to be struck down as being contrary to the scheme and intendment of the Act. The preamble to the Act ought to resolve interpretational doubts arising out of the defective drafting of section 23. "Common Good", being the writing on the wall, any disposal which does not serve that purpose will be outside the scope of the Act and, therefore, lacking in competence in diverse senses.
Private property cannot under the Constitution be acquired or allotted for private purposes though an enabling power like that contained in sub-section (I) of section 23 865 may be exercised in cases where the common good dictates the distribution of excess vacant land to an industry, as defined in clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 23.
[878' G-H; 879 A-E]
5. Sub-section (I) of section 27 of the Act is invalid insofar as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urbanisable land with a building or a portion only of such building, which is within the ceiling area. Such property will therefore be transferable without the constraints mentioned in sub-section (I) of Section 27 of the Act.
Nothing usefully can be added to the Judgment delivered by Krishna Iyer, J and the reasons given therein are fully agreed to. [879 G-H] Per Krishna Iyer, J. (Concurring)
1. The legislation on the Ceiling and Regulation of urban lands is constitutionally valid, though section 27(1) is partially invalid. The legislation is obviously a measure for inhibiting concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and for equitable distribution of such land to subserve the common good. Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution are directly attracted and the fullest exploitation of the material resources of the community undoubtedly requires distribution of urban land geared to the common good.
[880 E-F] 2, Family as defined in section 2(f) of the Act accords with the current life style in urban conditions and is neither artificial nor arbitrary nor violative of Article
14. And the courts, in these days of family planning and self-reliance of the adult cannot condemn as arbitrary, by a process of judicial ratiocination, the legislative provision that a family shall be defined as the parents plus their minor children. [886 B-C]
3.1 The payment, fixed under section 11(6) of the Act of a sum of Rs. two lakhs whatever be the total value of the property in the market is not so fictitious and flimsy as to be a farthing. There are no absolutes in law as in life and the compulsions of social realities must unquestionably enter the judicial verdict. [881 G-H]
3.2 The various amendments to Article 31 culminating in the present provision which provides for the payment of the "amount" disclose a determined approach by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power to ensure that full compensation or even fair compensation cannot be claimed as fundamental right by the private owner and that short of paying a "farthing for a fortune" the question of compensation is out of bounds for the court to investigate.
[881 D-F]
3.3 Having regard to the human condition of a large percentage of pavement dwellers and slum dwellers in our urban areas and proletarian miserables in our rural vastnesses, any one who gets Rs. 2 lakhs can well be regarded as having got something substantial to go by. In a society where half of humanity lives below the breadline, to regard Rs. 2 lakhs as a farthing is farewell to poignant facts and difficult to accept. Therefore, section 11(6) is invulnerable and does not contravene Article 31(2) the payment stipulated is reasonable, neither a mere mockery or discriminatory. [884 E-F] 866
4. The whole story of the legislation, the long gestation of pre-legislative consideration, the brooding presence of Article 39(b) and (c) and the emphasis in Section 23(4) on common good as the guiding factor for distribution point to public purpose, national development and social justice as the cornerstone of the policy of distribution. Any transgression of Article 39(b) and (c) is beyond the scope of Section 23(1) and disposal of land thereunder must subserve the common good and not the reverse. This limitation on the wide words of section 23(1) is a matter of semantics and reading down the judicial process. To sustain a law by interpretation is the rule. To be trigger-happy in shooting at sight every suspect law is judicial legicide. Courts can and must interpret words and read their meanings so that public good is promoted and power misuse is interdicted. The wide definition of "industry" or the use of general words like "any person" and "any purpose" cannot free the whole clause from the inarticulate major premise that only a public purpose to subserve the commom on good and filing the bill of Article 39(b) and (c) will be permissible. The touchstone is public purpose, community good and like criteria. If the power is used for favouring a private industrialist or for nepotistic reasons the oblique act will meet with its judicial Waterloo. To presume as probable graft, nepotism. patronage, political clout. friendly pressure or corrupt purpose is imper missible. The law will be good, he power will be impeccable but if the particular act of allotment is mala fide or beyond the statutory and constitutional parameters such exercise will be a casualty in court and will be struck down. The power of judicial review to strike at excess or mala fides is always there for vigilant exercise. Hence, even the crude drafting of section 23(4) by the unwanted "subject to" will not whittle down the power, why the obligation, to distribute vacant land, not according to personal, political or official fancy but strictly geared to the good set down in Article 39(b) and (c).
[887 D-H; 888A; 889D] 5. Section 27(1) of the Act, is invalid, partially. [880 A]
6.1 The question of basic structure being breached cannot arise when examining the vires of an ordinary legislation as distinguished from a Constitutional amendment. Nor, indeed, can every breach of equality spell disaster as a lethal violation of the basic structure.
Peripheral inequality is invitable when large-scale equalization processes are put into action. What is a betrayal of the basic feature is not a mere violation of Article 14 but a shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice. If a legislation does go that far it shakes the democratic foundation and must suffer the death penalty. But to permit the Bharti ghost to haunt the corridors of the court brandishing fatal writs for every feature of inequality is judicial paralysation of parliamentary function. Nor can the constitutional fascination for the basic structure doctrine be made a Trojan horse to penetrate the entire legislative camp fighting for a new social order and to overpower the battle for abolition of basic poverty by the basic structure 'misslle.
[889 E-H; 890A]
6.2 Right to property is not part of the basic structure even his right to develop is not the basic structure of India for ever. The whole adventure of the Constitution is to remove poverty and in that process remove concentration of 867 property, not for a return, but for almost free, if the justice of the situation commended itself to the legislation to take it that way.
Kesavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1972] Supp. SCR p. I referred to.
6.3 Part IV which seeks to build a Social Justice Society, is basic to our constitutional order. The Directive Principles of State Policy being paramount in character and fundamental in the country's governance, distributive justice, envisaged in Article 39(b) and (c) has a key role in the developmental process of the Socialist Republic that India has adopted. [888 C; 880 G] Per Tulzapurkar, J. (dissenting)
1. The urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, though purporting to do so, does not, in fact, further the directive principles in Article 39(b) and (c). The measure was, undoubtedly, taken in hand with a view to achieve the unexceptional objectives underlying Article 39(b) and (c) and supported by several State Legislatures as per their resolutions passed under Article 252(1) with a laudable object namely, to clothe the Parliament with legislative competence to enact a law for the imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property for the country as a whole, but the enacted provisions misfire and produce the opposite results and also damage or destroy the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution. Section 2(f) in relation to prescription of ceiling area permits unwarranted and unjustified concentration of wealth instead of preventing the same and is in teeth of the objective under Article 39(c): Similarly section 23 produces results contrary to the objectives under Article 39(b) Therefore, the impugned Act is outside the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. Further, sections 2(f) 23 and 11(6) which puts a maximum limit on the quantum of the amount payable in respect of excess vacant land acquired from a holder irrespective of the extent of area held by him-these three provisions flagrantly violate those aspects of Articles 14 and 31 which constitute the essential and basic features of the Constitution and hence the protective umbrella of Article 31-B is not available to the impugned Act inasmuch as the Fortieth Constitution Amendment Act, 1976 to the extent to which it inserts the Act in the Ninth Schedule is beyond the constituent power of the Parliament. Section 23 which authorises compulsory acquisition of property for private purposes is in breach of the doctrine of eminent domain and since it flagrantly violates Article 31(1) is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
Similarly section 27 being severable is partially ultra vires and unconstitutional, being beyond the ambit of the Act and also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.[916 H, 917A-D] The legislative competence of the Parliament bring still there, a well drafted enactment within the constitutional limitations of the subject would be the proper remedy.[198 G-H] Union of India v. Valluri Basaviah Chowdhry, [1979] 3 SCR 802 referred to.
2.1 The artificial definition of " Family" given in section 2(f) of(t) of Act, when considered in relation to the prescriptions of the ceiling area under 868 section 4(1) is clearly violative of and strikes at the root of the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. This artificial definition together with the double standard adopted for fixing the ceiling area runs through and forms the basis of chapter III of the Act and the discriminatory result or inequalities produced thereby are bound to have an impact on the scheme of that chapter and, therefore, along with it the whole chapter III must fall being violative of Article 14. [898 C-F]
2.2 The classification made between minor children and major children belonging to a family is not based on any intelligible differentia having no nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, which is to acquire excess vacant land after leaving the ceiling area to the family. It has not been shown that so called nuclear families alleged by in vogue have replaced normal families which include major sons or joint Hindu families in urban areas. [898 B-C] Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 829; A.P. Krishnasami Naidu v. State of Madras [1964] 7 S.R 82 followed.
2.3 Apart from the discriminatory result which the artificial definition of family in section 2(f) produces, the adoption of the artificial definition of "family" and double standard for fixing ceiling area one for a family with minor children and another for a family with major children and completely ignoring the concept of Joint Hindu Family in relation to prescription of ceiling area clearly lead to results which run counter to the directive principles contained in Article 39 (c) of the Constitution.[899 E-F]
3.1 Section 11(6) of the Act, which puts the maximum limit of Rupees Two lakhs on the amount payable to a holder of excess vacant land acquired under the Act irrespective of the extent of such excess vacant land held by him is not merely violative of Articles 14 and 32(2) of the Constitution, but would be a piece of confiscatory legislation, because vacant land in excess of that portion which at the prescribed rates is worth Rupees Two lakhs stands confiscated to the State without any payment whatsover. [911 C-D]
3.2 The enactments involving large schemes of social engineering like abolition of Zamindars, agrarian reforms nationalisation of undertakings and businesses and the like, where avowedly the benefit of the community or public at large is the sole consideration are distinguishable from the instant case, where "industry" has been expressly defined to include business, trade or profession in private sector and where power has been coffered upon the State Government to allot properties acquired under the enactment to individual businessman, trader or professional to enable him to carry on his private business, trade or profession, that is to say, where the legislation is a fraud on State's power of eminent domain, such a provision of putting a maximum limit on compensation payable in respect of the acquired property irrespective of its extent will have to be regarded as confiscatory in nature. [911E 912 A-C] 869 However, section 11 (6) is clearly a severable provision, and, therefore, ultra vires and unconstitutional.
[913A] State of Kerala v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg.Co. Ltd.
[1974] I SCR 671 distinguished.
4.1 Section 23 of the Act which authorises compulsory acquisition of property for private purposes flagrantly violates those aspects of Article 31 which constitute the essential or basic features of the Constitution and is, therefore, ultra vires and unconstitutional. Further, indispensably, it is the most vital, integral and non- severable part of the entire scheme of urban ceiling as without it the scheme will merely remain a scheme for unjust and illegal enrichment of the State, and therefore, the whole of chapter III in which it occurs, must fall with it.
[906 A-B]
4.2 Article 31 of the Constitution has more than one facet: it undoubtedly confers upon individuals (including non citizens) and corporate bodies a fundamental right to property and incorporates in our Constitution the concept of State's power of eminent domain i.e. power of compulsory acquisition of private property and prescribes two conditions precedent to the exercise of that power, namely, (i) such acquisition cannot be except for a public purpose and (ii) it must be on payment of compensation (now termed amount") to the claimant having interest in the property.
But these two conditions precedent are sine qua non for the exercise of the State's power of eminent domain and, represent those aspects of the right to property under Article 31 which constitute the essential or basic features of our Constitution and for that matter these would be so of any democratic constitution and, therefore, any law authorising expropriation of private property in breach of anyone of those conditions would damage or destroy the basic structure of our Constitution. [903 H, 904A, B-E] H.H. Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India & Ors.
[1973] Supp. SCR 1 referred to.
State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, [1952]SCR 889 relied on.
4.3 It is extremely doubtful whether compulsory acquisition of all the excess vacant land in all urban agglomerations throughout the country for a bald, indefinite and unspecified objective like "industry" simpliciter without any attempt at dovetailing it by having a proper scheme for industrial development will constitute a valid public purpose for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" [905 C-D]
4.4 The adoption of a wide definition of a wide definition of industry so as to include any business, trade or profession in private sector not only makes a mockery of "public purpose", but also, in the context of eminent domain is clearly suicidal. What is worse is that under the priorities laid down such private 870 purposes are to be catered to first and then comes the disposal or distribution thereof to subserve common good, which clearly smacks of depriving Peter of his property to give it to Paul and, therefore, clearly amounts to an invalid exercise of State's power of "eminent domain". [905 F,G-H,906 A]
4.5 Besides, the wide definition of "industry" and the priorities for disposal or distribution of excess vacant land laid down in sub-sections (1) to (5) have adverse impact on the directive principle contained in Article 39(b) in as much as private purposes receive precedence over common good. The enactment which contains such provisions that produce contra results cannot be said to be in furtherance of the directive principle of Article 39(b) and cannot receive the benefit of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. [906 C-D,G-H]
4.6 It is well settled that it is only when there is ambiguity in the text of any provision in the enactment that the preamble could be looked into. Here, there is no ambiguity whatsoever in section 23(1) and (4). Far from there being any ambiguity there is express provision in section 23(1) and (4) indicating the priorities in the matter of disposal or distribution of excess vacant land, in face of which, the Preamble cannot control, guide, or direct the disposal or distribution in any other manner. [907 A-C]
4.7 No rules framed under section 46(1), which empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act, and the disposal or distribution of excess vacant land can override the express provisions of section 23. Here, no rules have so far been framed. 907 C-D]
4.8 No reliance can be made on the "Compendium of Guidelines" issued by the Central Government in the Ministry of Works and Housing under the Act either. No doubt, the recommendations made by the 9th Conference of State Ministers of Housing and Urban Development seek to furnish improved guidelines but in the process reverse the priorities given in section 23 in the matter of disposal or distribution of excess vacant land. Hence, the priorities given in section 23 and as have been summarised in para 3 of the Note must prevail over the priorities indicated in the guidelines contained in para 4 of the Note and the latter are of no avail. [907 F-G-H, 908 A-B]
4.9 Section 23 by no stretch deals with the objective of Article 39(c) at all but only deals with the objective underlying the directive principle of Article 39(b) and its provisions clearly run counter to that objective and as such the enactment which contains such provisions must forfeit the benefit of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. [908 C-D] 4.10 The definition of "industry" in section 23 cannot be read down by the Court so as to confine the same to industries is public sector or co-operative sector or the like where benefit to community or public at large would be the sole consideration, so that allotment of excess vacant land acquired under the Act to private entrepreneurs for private purposes which runs counter to the 871 doctrine of eminent domain would be completely eschewed, because Parliament has for the purpose of section (i.e. for purposes of disposal or distribution of such excess vacant land) deliberately and in express terms adopted a very wide definition which includes within its scope not merely trading or manufacturing activity but also any business or profession in private sector and reading down the definition would be doing violence to the Parliament's intention stated in express terms. [908 G-H, 909A] 4.11 Nor can sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act be read as containing merely an enabling provision; the scheme of sub-sections (1) to (4) read together clearly shows that the disposal of excess vacant land is first to be done under sub-section (1) and disposal under sub-section (4) comes thereafter. The opening words of sub-section (4), "subject to sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)" cannot be read as constituting a non obstante clause giving an overriding effect to sub-section (4) nor can sub-section (4) be read as if the opening words were absent. By indulging in such interpretative acrobatics, the Court cannot reach the opposite result than is warranted by the plain text of the provision. Further, to say that every disposal of excess vacant land under sub-section (1) must be for 'common good is to read into that sub-section something which is not there; it amounts to rewriting that sub-section, which cannot be done, the preamble notwithstanding. Such interpretations require the restructuring of the entire section-a function legitimately falling within the domain of legislature. Moreover, sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of section 23 are integral parts of the whole scheme dealing with the disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act and as such cannot be severed from one another. The attempt to salvage section 23, either wholly or in part, by seeking to free it from the two vices, namely (i) the adoption of the wide definition of "industry" and (ii) the priorities mentioned therein governing the disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act, must, therefore. fail. [909 C-G]
5.1 Though the authorisation was for imposition of ceiling on whom immovable property Parliament deliberately kept out built up properties from the purview of the Act and the Act seeks to impose ceiling only on vacant land in urban agglomerations; that being so any restriction on transfer of built up properties or part thereof (including flats therein) standing on urban land falling within the permissible ceiling area would be outside the purview of the Act. [915 E-F]
5.2 Such a provision, as in Section 27 of the Act would not be incidental or ancillary to the ceiling contemplated by the Act and would not fall within the phrase "for matters connected therewith" occurring in the Preamble and the long title of the Act, for the words "matters connected therewith" occurring in the concerned phrase must be correlated to what precedes the phrase, namely, "an Act to provide for ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land", and therefore, the words "matters connected therewith" must mean matters in relation to the ceiling imposed by the Act. A reference to objectives under Article 39(b)(c) 872 (for the achievement of which the enactment is allegedly taken in hand) in the Preamble or long title cannot enlarge the ambit or scope of the Act. Any restriction imposed on built-up properties falling within the permissible ceiling area left with the holder would, therefore, be outside the ambit and scope of the Act. [914 G-H, 915A]
5.3 In the absence of any guidelines for the exercise of the power and in the absence of any standards having been laid down by the Legislature for achieving the objectives of prevention of concentration, speculation and profiteering in urban land and urban property, it cannot be said that there three broad objectives recited in the Preamble could effectively or adequately guide the exercise of power by the competent authority in the matter of granting or refusing to grant the permission under section 27 and is bound to produce arbitrary or discriminatory results. Further, the provision for appeal under section 33 the Appellate Authority and a revision under section 34 to the State Government would not be of much avail to preventing arbitrariness in the matter of granting of refusing to grant the permission. Section 27 which does not adequately control the arbitrary exercise of the power to grant or refuse the permission sought, is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and as such the requirement of permission contained therein is ultra vires and unconstitutional, [915 G-H,916A-B] Per A.P. Sen, J. (concurring)
1.1 Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 23 and the opening words subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) "in section 23(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 are ultra vires of the Parliament and these provisions are not protected under Article 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution. Sub-section (1) of section 27 of the Act is invalid in so for as it imposes a restriction of transfer of urban property for a period of ten years from the commencement of the Act, in relation to vacant land or building thereon, within the ceiling limits. The remaining provisions of the Act, including sub-section (4) of section 23 being in conformity with Part IV of the Constitution and Article 31(2) are valid and constitutional. The Act is in furtherance of the directive principles under Article 39(b) and (c) and has the protection of both Article 31-B and 31- C. [946 B-F]
1.2 To strike down the whole Act would be against the national interest. Unless it becomes clear beyond reasonable doubt that the legislation in question transgresses the limits of the organic law of the Constitution, it must be allowed to stand as the true expression of the national will. Here, the invalidity of the provisions of sub-sections (1) to (3) of section 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)" in section 23(4) cannot affect the validity of the Act as a whole, in as much as the said provisions are not inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act. Further, the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires. The Act still remains the Act as it was passed i.e. an Act for imposition of ceiling on urban land [935 D-E, 9.6 A-B] Attorney-General for Alberin v. Attorney General for Canada [1947] AC-505 at 518 quoted with approval.
873
1.3 In determining the effect of law upon the individual's right to property, the Court must take judicial notice of the fact of vast inequalities in the existing distribution of property in the Country. The Court's concern lies not merely with applying the preexisting sets of theories, concepts, principles and criteria with a view to determining what the law is on a particular point. The proper approach should be to view the principles with the realisation that the ultimate foundation of the Constitution finds its ultimate roots in the authority of the people.
And, constitutional questions should not be deter- mined from a doctrinaire approach, but viewed from experience derived from the life and experience or actual working of the community, which takes into account emergence of new facts of the community's social and economic life affecting property rights of the individual, whenever, among there, the validity of a law prescribing preference or discrimination is in question under the "equal protection" guarantee. [936 B-E]
2. The artificial definition of family in section 2 (f) of the Act is valid. As a result of the artificial definition of "family" in section 2(f), a Joint Hindu family is excluded from the purview of section 2 of the Act, but such a total exclusion of Joint Hindu Family does not render the Act void and unconstitutional as violative of Article
14. Parliament deliberately excluded a joint family from the purview of the section as it was beset with difficulties in imposing a ceiling. The Act applies to Hindus, Mohammedans and Christians alike. By the exclusion of a Joint Hindu Family the members of a Joint Hindu family, whether governed by the Mitakshara school or the Dayabhaga school were brought at par with others. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in the exclusion. [937E-H, 938A, C-E]
3.1 The contention that the amount fixed by sub-section (6) of section (1) of the impugned Act is totally arbitrary and illusory since there is no nexus between the value of the property and the amount fixed and, therefore, the maximum amount fixed under sub-section (6) makes the Act confiscatory in total abrogation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 31(2) cannot be accepted. [938 F-A]
3.2 The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, has placed the matter of adequacy of compensation beyond the pale of controversy by substituting the word " amount" for the word "compensation" in Article 31(2) and made the adequacy of the amount payable for acquisition or requisition of the property nonjusticiable. When the Court has no power to question the adequacy of the amount under Article 31(2), it cannot be said, that the amount determined according to the principles laid down in sub-section (1) subject to the maximum fixed under sub-section (6) thereof is illusory merely because of inadequacy. The legislature in its wisdom has laid down the principles and fixed a ceiling on the maximum amount payable and considers that Rupees Two Lakhs is a fair and just recombines. That is a legislative judgment and the Court has no power to question it. [938 G, 939 FG, 942 E-F,G] H.H. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. SCR P.I; R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 531; State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayan 874 Silk Manufacturing Co. [1974] 1 SCR 671; State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [1978] 1 SCR 641 followed.
4.1 Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) in sub-section (4) of section 23 are ultra vires of the Parliament [935 B-C]
4.2 Apart from the five pillars or the Constitution, namely, Sovereign Democratic Republic, Equality of status and opportunity, Secularism, Citizen s right to worship and the Rule of law-, the concept of social and economic justice-to build a welfare State-, is equally a part of the basic structure or the foundation upon which the Constitution rests. The provisions of sections 23(1), (2) and (3) and the opening words in sections 23(4) are the very antithesis of the idea of a welfare State based on social and economic justice. Since these provisions permit acquisition of property under the Act for private purposes, they offend against the Directive Principles of State Policy of Article 39 (b) and (c) and are also violative of Article 31(2) and therefore, not protected under Article 31-B, [934 G-H 935 A-B] Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976]2SCR 347 relied on H.H. Kesavananda Bharyti v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. SCR p.1 explained.
4.3 It is extremely doubtful whether compulsory acquisition of all the excess vacant land in all urban agglomeration throughout the country for a bold, indefinite and unspecified objective like ' industry", simpliciter would be a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
[928H-929A]
4.4 Although the impugned Act is enacted with a laudable object to subserve the common good, in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 39(b) and (c), in terms of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 23 it would be permissible to acquire vacant land in urban agglomerations and divert it for private purposes, the whole emphasis being on industrialisation. The opening words in section 23 (4) "subject to the provisions of sub section (1), (2) and (3)" make the provisions of section 23(4) subservient to section 23(1), which make it lawful for the allottee that is the industrialist to hold such land in exceess of the ceiling limit. [928 D-F]
4.5 The provisions of sub-section(1), (2) and (5) of section 23 cannot be read in the light of the Preamble of the Act or the Directive Principles under Article 39(b) and (c). [929 B-C] When the language of the section is clear and explicit, its meaning cannot be controlled by the Preamble. It is not for the Court to restructure the section. The restructuring of a statute is obviously a legislative function. The matter is essentially of political expediency and as such it is the concern of the statements and, the therefore, the domain of the legislature and not the judiciary. [929 C-E] 875 The use of the words "subject to the provisions of sub- sections (1), (2) and (3)" in section 23(4) takes away the compulsion on the State Government to adhere to the Directive Principles under Article 39 (b) and (c) in making allotment of the vacant lands in an urban aggolomereration acquired under the Act. The words "-subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)" in section 23(4), appearing in the context means " in addition to if anything is left over after the allotment under section 23(1)"[929 F-G] A legislation built on the foundation of Article 39(b) and (c) permitting acquisition of private property must be for a Public purpose. that is to subserve the common good Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 23 of the Act negate that principle. Furthermore, Article 31(2) consists of three prerequisites, namely, (i) the property shall be acquired by or under a valid law; (ii) it shall be acquired only for a public purpose, and (iii) the person whose property has been acquired shall be given an amount in lieu thereof. The definition of 'industry ' in Explanation (b) to section 23(1) is wide enough to include any business, trade or vocation carried on for private grain. There cannot be "mixed purpose of public and private to substain under legislation Article 39(b) and (c) The vice lies in section 23(1) and the Explanation (b) thereto, which on a combined reading, frustrate the he very object of the legislation.
[930 A-C]
4.6 The concept of "public purpose" necessarily implies that it should be a law for the acquisition or requisition of property in the interest of the general public, and the purpose of such a law directly and vitally subserves public interest. If In reality the object of the acquisition under the Act is to set up industries in the private sector as is permissible from the provisions of section 23(1) of the Act, nothing prevents the State from taking recourse to section 40 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for which there must be quid pro quo that is, payment of compensation according to the market value.
[930 F-G]
4.7 The guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing clarifying the intent and purpose of the provisions of the Act cannot supersede or alter any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The Guidelines cannot alter the "priorities" laid in the sections. The guidelines are nothing but in the nature of Executive Instructions and cannot obviously control the plain meaning of the section. [930 G-H, 932E] Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, the Courts must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature. Therefore, the courts cannot be called upon the interpret the provisions of section 23 of the Act in the light of the Guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing.
932 E-F]
4.8 The provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 23 and the opening words "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) in section 23(4) which makes the setting up of industries the dominent object for 876 the acquisition of vacant land in urban agglomerations under the Act are not in keeping with Part IV of the Constitution and, therefore, not protected under Article 31-C. [932 G-H]
4.9 A legislation which directly runs counter to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Article 39(b) and (c) cannot by the mere inclusion in the Ninth Schedule receive immunity under Article 31-B. The Directive Principles are not mere homilies. Though these Directives are not cognizable by the Courts and if the Government of the day fails to carry out these objects no court can make the Government ensure them , yet these principles have been declared to be fundamental to the governance of the country.
In short, the Directives emphasise, in amplification of the Preamble, that the goal of the Indian policy is not laissez faire, but a welfare State, where the State has a positive duty to ensure to its citizens social and economic justice and dignity of the individual. It would serve as an "Instrument of Instructions" upon all future governments, irrespective of their party creeds. 933A-B, E-F]
5.1 The provisions of sub-section ( 1) of section 27 of the Act is invalid in so far as it seek to affect a citizen's right to dispose of his urban property in an urban agglomeration within the ceiling limits. [946 B-C]
5.2 The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property guaranteed to a citizen under Article 19(1)(f) carries with it the right not to hold any property. As such a, citizen cannot be compelled to own property against his will [945 G- H] There is no justification at all for the freezing of transactions by way of sale, mortgage, gift or lease of vacant land or building for a period exceeding ten years or otherwise for a period of ten years from the date of the commencement of the Act, even though such vacant land with or without building thereon falls within the ceiling limits.
[945 E-F] If vacant land owned by a person falls within the ceiling limits for an urban agglomeration he is outside the purview of section 3 of the Act. That being so, such a person is not governed by any of the provisions of the Act.
[946A] Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. [1979] 1 SCR 1009 relied on.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 350/ of 1977 etc.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
S.K. Jain and S.S. Khanduja for the Petitioners.
R.N. Poddar and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The following Judgments were delivered 877 CHANDRACHUD, C.J.: A large group of persons holding vacant lands in different urban agglomerations in the country had filed writ petitions in this Court, challenging the validity of some of the key provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 33 of 1976. Those writ petitions were disposed of on November 13, 1980 by a Constitution Bench consisting of Krishna Iyer J., Talzapurkar J., A.P.Sen J., and the two of us. Each of our three learned Brethren delivered a full judgment. We delivered a short judgment and stated that fuller reasons will follow later.
We had discussed with one another the several points arising in the writ petitions. But, we were running against time, not an unusual predicament, since Krishna Iyer J. was due to retire on November 15, 1980, Tulzarpurkar J. differed from all of us, holding that the impugned Act is not protected under Article 31-C or under Article 31-B since, it did not further the Directive principles contained in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. The learned Judge held further that since Chapter III of the Act, comprising the substratum of the very scheme of the Act was invalid the entire Act had to be struck down as unconstitutional. A.P. Sen J. agreed with us on all the points except that according to him, subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 23 and the opening words of section 23(4) of the Act are unconstitutional, not being protected by Articles 31-B and 31-C of the Constitution. Krishna Iyer J.
concurred with us in holding that the entire Act is valid save and except section 27(1), insofar as that section imposes restrictions on the transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion of such building, which is within the ceiling area. We took the view that the impugned Act was intended to and did in fact implement or achieve the purpose of clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 and that, the vice from which a few provisions of the Act could be shown to suffer, would not justify a contrary conclusion.
We are free to confess that if the full text of the judgment of Krishna Iyer J. were available to us sufficiently in advance we would not have delivered a separate order stating that fuller reasons will follow later. The judgment had to be pronounced on November 13, 1980 since, Krishna Iyer J. was due to retire two days later. As we have stated earlier, all of us had together discussed the various points arising in these cases and we knew the conclusions to which we had respectively come. But, it is not possible to express agreement with the line of reasoning of a judgment, without examining 878 the judgment carefully. That opportunity became available to us latter. We have gone through Krishna Iyer J.'s judgment closely and find that there is nothing that we can usefully add to it.
The only further order which we propose to pass now is say that we agree fully with the reasons given by Krishna Iyer J. in his judgment reported in 1981(1) S.C.C. 166.
CHANDRACHUD, C.J. We have perused the judgment prepared by Brother Tulzapurkar with care but, with respect, we are unable to agree with him that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 33 of 1976, does not further the Directive Principles of State Policy in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. The vice from which a provision here or a provision there of the impugned Act may be shown to suffer will not justify the conclusion that the Act is not intended to or does not, by its scheme, in fact implement or achieve the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39.
The definition of 'family' in section 2(f), which in relation to a person means the individual, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such individual, and their unmarried minor children, will not necessarily lead to concentration of wealth in the hands of a few person or families. Such is not the intendment, nor the drive, nor the direct and inevitable consequence of the aforesaid definition of 'family'.
Section 23 of the Act is in our opinion valid and does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. The definition of the word 'industry' in clause (b) of the Explanation to that section is undoubtedly unduly wide since it includes "any business, profession, trade, undertaking or manufacture". If sub-section (1) of section 23 were to stand alone, no doubt could have arisen that the Urban Land Ceiling Act is a facade of a social welfare legislation and that its true, though concealed, purpose is to benefit favoured private individuals or associations of individuals.
But the preponderating provision governing the disposal of excess vacant land acquired under the Act is the one contained in sub-section (4) of section 23 whereby, all vacant lands deemed to have been acquired by the State Government under the Act "shall be disposed of...to subserve the common good". The provisions of sub-section (4) are "subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) "but the provisions of sub-section (1) 879 are enabling and not compulsive and those of sub-sections (2) and (3) are incidental to the provisions of sub-section (1). The disposal of excess vacant lands must therefore be made strictly in accordance with the mandate of sub-section (4) of section 23, subject to this, that in a given case such land may be allotted to any person; for any purpose relating to, or in connection with, any 'industry' or for the other purposes mentioned in sub-section (1), provided that by such allotment, common good will be subserved. The governing test of disposal of excess land being 'social good', any disposal in any particular case or cases which does not subserve that purpose will be liable to be struck down as being contrary to the scheme and intendment of he Act. The Preamble to the Act ought to resolve interpretational doubts arising out of the defective drafting of section 23, It shows that the Act was passed with the object of preventing concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. 'Common good' being the writing on the wall, any disposal which does not serve that purpose will be outside the scope of the Act and therefore lacking in competence in diverse senses. Private property cannot under our Constitution be acquired or allotted for private purposes though an enabling power like that contained in sub-section (1) of section 23 may be exercised in cases where the common good dictates the distribution of excess vacant land to an industry, as defined in clause (b) of the Explanation to section 23.
Section 11(6) which provides that the amount payable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5) of section 11 shall, in no case, exceed two lakhs of rupees is valid. The amount thus payable is not illusory and the provision is not confiscatory. Rupees two lakhs is not like a farthing even if the excess land may be a fortune.
Finally, we are of the opinion that subsection (1) of section 27 of the Act is invalid in as far as it imposes a restriction on transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with a building or a portion only of such building, which is within the ceiling area. Such property will therefore be transferable without the constraints mentioned in sub- section (1) of section 27 of the Act.
The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed except for the restricted striking down of section 27(1) of the Act.
There will be no order as to costs 880 Fuller reasons will follow latter.
KRISHAN IYER, J. I agree with the learned Chief Justice both regarding the constitutionality of the legislation and regarding the partial invalidation of s. 27 (1).
Nevertheless, I consider it necessary to strike a few emphatic notes of concordance having special regard to the discordance of my learned brother Tulzapurkar, J. I have carefully perused the judgment of Tulzapurkar, J, but must express my deferential disagreement because on a few fundamentals there is sharp divergence between us.
I proceed to turn the focus only on three issues, namely, the alleged artificiality of "family' as defined in s. 2 (f) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short, the Act), the invalidity of s. 23 of the Act as discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional and the invalidity of s. 11 (6) of the Act on the score that the compensation offered is illusory and, therefore, violative of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.
The legislation, as its title indicates, is obviously a measure for inhibiting concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and fore quitetable distribution of such land to subserve the common good. Article 39 (b) and (c) of the Constitution are directly attracted and there is no doubt that the fullest exploitation of the material resources of the community undoubtedly requires distribution of urban land geared to the common good. It is also a notorious fact that concentration of urban land in private hands is an effective forbiddance of the maximum use of such land for industrial purposes at a critical juncture when the nation is fighting for survival through industrialisation.
It needs no argument to conclude that the objective of the legislation as set out in the long title and in the statutory scheme is implementation of Part IV of the Constitution. The Directive principles of State policy being paramount in character and fundamental in the country's governance, distributive justice envisaged in Art. 39 (b) and (c) has key role in the developmental process of the socialist Republic that India has adopted. The conclusion is inevitable that is a broad measure of State policy, ceiling on and regulation of urban land ownership is an imperative of economic independence and is, therefore, on the national agenda of planned development. Indeed, there was no controversy on this question before us. One of the points which has been argued and has found approval with my learned brother 881 Tulzapurkar, J., turns on the gross inadequacy of compensation fixed under s. 11 (6) of the Act. There is a specific case before us that urban land worth a few crores will fall a prey to acquisition under this Act, but thanks to s. 11 (6), "the amount" payable in return to the owner shall not exceed Rs. 2 lakhs. This, it is contended, is an illusory compensation in reckless disregard of the market value of the property acquired. I am unable to agree with this submission.
The taking over of large conglomerations of vacant land is a national necessity if Art. 39 is a constitutional reality. "Law can never be higher than the economic order and the cultural development of society brought to pass by that economic order." (Marx). Therefore, if Art. 38 of the Constitution which speaks of a social order informed by economic justice, is to materialise, law must respond effectively and rise to the needs of the transformation invisioned by the founding fathers. But it is contended that any legislation which violates Art. 31 (2) or Art. 19 (1) (f) (both of them have since been deleted by the 44th Amendment to the Constitution although on the relevant date they were part of part III) must fail notwithstanding the fact that Arts. 31B and 31 C shield the legislation in question. It is said that the Act is vulnerable for the reason that right to property armoured by the above two Articles is inviolable unless the taking is for a public purpose in contrast to a private industry and the payment in return, even if not an equivalent, is be fair enough so as not to be castigated as illusory. The various amendments to Art. 31 culminating in the present provision which provides for the payment of an "amount" disclose a determined approach by parliament in exercise of its constituent power to ensure that full compensation or even fair compensation cannot be claimed as a fundamental right by the private owner and that short of paying a 'farthing for a fortune' the question of compensation is out of bounds for the court to investigate.
The question is whether in the light of Kesavananda Bharati (especially the observations of Chandrachud, J), a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs in s. 11 (6) is a farthing for a fortune.
I repudiate the proposition that payment of a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs, whatever the total value of the property in the market may be is so fictitious and flimsy as to be a farthing. There are no absolutes in law as in life and the compulsions of social realities must unquestionably enter the judicial verdict.
882 What is the dimension of Indian penury? What is the basis of our constitutional order? What is the goal of the Republic? What is the meaning of the egalitarian ethos of our society? What do we mean by "We, the people of India"? Unless these profound roots of our social constitutional order are probed, we can never reach an effective answer to legal formal issues. The roots and fruits of our National Charter depend on a clear grasp of the constitutional fundamentals.
In this context, it is important to remember what, right at the beginning even as the proceedings of the constituent Assembly were culminating, Nehru had warned:
If we cannot solve this problem soon, all our paper constitutions will become useless and purposeless. If India goes down, all will go down; if India thrives, all will thrive; and if India lives, all will live.
He had repeated with emphasis:
The first task of this Assembly is to free India through a new constitution, to feed the starving people and to clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian the fullest opportunity to develop himself according to his capacity.
Indeed, the tryst with destiny that India made when it became free found expression in a historic speech by the then Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru:
The service of India means the service of the millions who suffer. It means the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.
The ambition of the greatest man of our generation has been to wipe every tear from every eye. That may be beyond us, but as long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be over.
We must notice the Indian human condition. "Indian poverty, to many who have an acquaintance with poverty in similar societies is unique", writes Segal in his book The Crisis of India: "It is unique in its depths, which seems incapable of supporting life at all; unique in its blatancy, for it is everywhere, in city and village, and concealed among chimneys or trees, not isolated like an epidemic in an 883 inaccessible slum, but everywhere, on the movement of one's feet, always some where in the circle of one's sight; unique in its sheer magnitude for in India the poor are not to be numbered in hundreds of thousands, but in hundreds of millions; unique in the quality of its submission, which registers a kind of glazed pride." In this context we may also read what Rajen Babu stated as a framer of the Constitution:
To all we give the assurance that it will be our endeavour to end poverty and squalor and its companions hunger and disease, to a abolish distinctions and exploitation and to ensure decent conditions of living.
We may have to remember that a galaxy of Constitution-makers like Sardar Patel and B. Pant and Rajagopalachari, not to speak of Jawahar Lal Nehru, where doubtful about the court being given the power to pronounce upon the question of compensation when the State acquired property. Indeed, it is revealing to read the debates in condensed form given by Granville Austin:
Sardar Patel closed the debate with a speech that sounded like a requiem for land-lords....What did 'public use' mean he wondered. Pant then said: Suppose the government acquires zamindari rights and then abolishes them. Or what if the Government takes over Connaught Place (the central shopping and office area of New Delhi) and then redistributes the buildings to the tenants? The first stage is acquisition. Does that come under this clause? To Ayyar's answer of 'Certainly', Pant replied that he opposed the wording if it means that the government would not be free to determine the compensation it would have to pay. If this clause covers all cases of acquisition said Rajagopalachari, then the question of the justness of compensation will go to the courts 'with the result that government functioning will be paralysed'.
Panikkar suggested that they should take out the 'just' so that it would not be justiciable. Pant replied that if this covered acquisition for social purposes, 'then I submit payment of compensation should not even be compulsory'. Patel concluded the discussion.
884 'If the word 'just' is kept,' he said, 'we come to the conclusion that every case will go to the Federal Court.' Therefore "just" is dropped ........The Assembly greeted the committee's actions favourably.
We need not go into the details except to state that even Gandhiji took the view that anything like compensation could possibly not be given when property was taken from the property owners by the State for community benefit. I mention this only to drive home the point that right to property is not part of the basic structure of the Constitution even as right to poverty is not the basic structure of India for ever. The whole adventure of the Constitution is to remove poverty and in that
