# Default bail under BNSS Section 187(3): the 60/90-day right

**TL;DR:** Default bail, also called statutory or compulsive bail, is the right of an accused to be released when the investigating agency fails to file the chargesheet within the time the law allows. Under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), it lives in Section 187(3), the successor to Section 167(2) of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The window is 90 days for offences punishable with death, life, or imprisonment of ten years or more, and 60 days for everything else. The right is not discretionary. Once the period expires without a chargesheet, the accused who applies and is ready to furnish bail must be released, even for the gravest charges. BNSS carries over the old scheme almost intact, with one heavily contested change to how the 15 days of police custody can be spread across the detention window. This guide covers the right, the thresholds, the police custody amendment, the governing cases, and how to claim it.

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## On this page

- [What default bail is and why it exists](#what-default-bail-is-and-why-it-exists)
- [Section 187(3) BNSS: the statutory scheme](#section-1873-bnss-the-statutory-scheme)
- [60 days or 90 days: how to pick the right window](#60-days-or-90-days-how-to-pick-the-right-window)
- [The contested 15-day police custody change](#the-contested-15-day-police-custody-change)
- [When the right accrues and when it dies](#when-the-right-accrues-and-when-it-dies)
- [The leading cases every litigator should know](#the-leading-cases-every-litigator-should-know)
- [Special statutes: UAPA, NDPS and extended periods](#special-statutes-uapa-ndps-and-extended-periods)
- [How to apply for default bail step by step](#how-to-apply-for-default-bail-step-by-step)
- [CrPC 167 to BNSS 187: a clause-by-clause map](#crpc-167-to-bnss-187-a-clause-by-clause-map)
- [Recent rulings under BNSS Section 187](#recent-rulings-under-bnss-section-187)
- [How Niyam helps](#how-niyam-helps)
- [Frequently asked questions](#frequently-asked-questions)
- [Key takeaways](#key-takeaways)

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## What default bail is and why it exists

Default bail answers a simple question. How long can the State hold a person in custody while it investigates, before it has to either charge them or let them go?

The premise of our criminal procedure is that an arrest during investigation is a temporary measure, not a punishment. A person under investigation has not been convicted of anything. Holding them indefinitely while the police take their time would turn the investigation itself into a sentence served before trial. So the law fixes an outer limit. If the agency cannot complete its work and file the chargesheet within that limit, the accused earns the right to walk out on bail, however serious the allegation.

This is why the right is called "default" bail. It is triggered by the prosecution's default, its failure to file the report in time, not by the merits of the case. The Magistrate does not weigh whether the accused looks guilty, whether the evidence is strong, or whether the offence shocks the conscience. The only question is arithmetic. Has the clock run out? If yes, and the accused asks for bail and is ready to furnish it, release follows.

The right rests on Article 21 of the Constitution, the guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly tied default bail to this guarantee, treating the time limits not as a procedural courtesy but as a substantive safeguard for personal liberty. As the Supreme Court put it in [Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10807134/), decided on 12 October 2020, the right to default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) "is not a mere statutory right" but "part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution."

That constitutional grounding has practical consequences. Because the right flows from Article 21, courts read the time limits strictly against the State and liberally in favour of the accused. The agency cannot manufacture extra time by filing a "preliminary" chargesheet to stop the clock, cannot keep a bail application pending until the chargesheet lands, and cannot argue that the offence is too grave to allow release. Default bail is one of the few corners of bail law where gravity simply does not enter the room.

A word on terminology. You will see this right called default bail, statutory bail, and compulsive bail. They mean the same thing. "Statutory" because it comes from the statute, not the court's discretion. "Compulsive" because the Magistrate has no choice but to grant it once the conditions are met. We use "default bail" through most of this guide.

If you are still getting your bearings on the basic bail vocabulary, our explainer on [bailable versus non-bailable offences](/blog/bailable-vs-non-bailable) sets out the framework that default bail sits inside. Default bail is special precisely because it cuts across that bailable/non-bailable divide. It is available even for the most serious non-bailable offences.

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## Section 187(3) BNSS: the statutory scheme

Section 187 of the BNSS is the successor to Section 167 of the CrPC. It governs what happens when investigation cannot be wrapped up within 24 hours of arrest. The section applies to all offences investigated on or after 1 July 2024, the date the new criminal codes came into force. For a wider view of how the three codes restructure the old law, see our primer on [the new criminal laws under BNS, BNSS and BSA](/blog/new-criminal-laws-bns-bnss-bsa).

The section has a clear internal logic. Read it in three layers.

**Sub-section (1)** deals with the first 24 hours. When the police cannot finish investigating within 24 hours of arrest and there are grounds to believe the accusation is well-founded, the officer must forward the accused to the nearest Magistrate, along with a copy of the case diary entries.

**Sub-section (2)** deals with remand. The Magistrate, whether or not they have jurisdiction to try the case, may authorise the detention of the accused. This sub-section also carries the much-discussed rule on police custody, which we unpack in its own section below. The total period of such detention runs up to the outer limit set in sub-section (3).

**Sub-section (3)** is where default bail lives. This is the proviso that fixes the outer limit on detention and creates the right. It says, in effect, that the Magistrate cannot authorise detention of the accused beyond:

- **90 days**, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; and
- **60 days**, where the investigation relates to any other offence.

On the expiry of that period, the accused "shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail." And the proviso adds that every person so released on default bail "shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter," which is the BNSS equivalent of the old rule that default bail is treated like ordinary bail once granted.

The architecture, then, is straightforward. Detention during investigation is capped. The cap depends on the gravity of the offence, measured by its punishment. Cross the cap without a chargesheet, and the right to bail switches on.

One nuance worth flagging early. The 60 or 90-day clock counts the period of detention authorised by the Magistrate, which in practice runs from the date of first remand, not always from the moment of arrest. Courts have generally computed the period from the date the accused is first produced and remanded. The exact date of commencement can become a live issue in close cases, so the actual remand orders on the file matter, not a rough mental count from the date of the FIR.

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## 60 days or 90 days: how to pick the right window

This is where a small change in wording has created a genuine and still-unresolved problem.

The old CrPC Section 167(2)(a)(i) fixed the 90-day window for offences punishable with "death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of **not less than ten years**." The new BNSS Section 187(3)(i) fixes the 90-day window for offences punishable with "death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of **ten years or more**." Sub-clause (ii) keeps the 60-day window for "any other offence."

At first glance the two phrases look identical. "Not less than ten years" and "ten years or more" seem to say the same thing. But practitioners have long known that under the old CrPC, "not less than ten years" was read to mean the **minimum** sentence prescribed for the offence must be ten years. An offence where the punishment could go up to ten years, but could also be less, did not attract the 90-day window. It fell into the 60-day basket. The leading authority on the point under the CrPC was the Supreme Court's approach in cases like *Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam*, where an offence carrying a maximum of ten years but no ten-year minimum was held to fall in the 60-day category, entitling the accused to default bail after 60 days.

So when the BNSS swapped "not less than ten years" for "ten years or more," lawyers reasonably asked whether the drafters intended to change the result. If "ten years or more" is read to include offences whose **maximum** is ten years, more offences would slide into the 90-day basket and accused persons would lose 30 days of the earlier, shorter clock.

The early judicial answer has leaned towards continuity. The Karnataka High Court, in *State of Karnataka v. Kalandar Shafi* and related rulings in 2024, treated the change as "only a play of words" with no substantive effect, holding that the threshold still looks to the minimum punishment of ten years, not the maximum. Several commentators, writing on platforms like [LiveLaw](https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/bnss-right-to-default-bail-under-bharatiya-nagarik-suraksha-sanhita-282457), have pushed back, asking why Parliament would deliberately alter the language if it meant nothing. The Supreme Court has so far declined to give a reasoned interpretation, dismissing a related special leave petition without laying down the law under Article 141. The confusion, as one headline bluntly put it, continues.

What does this mean for a litigator on the ground in 2026? Treat the 60 versus 90-day question as a live, arguable point, not a settled rule, especially for offences whose punishment is "up to ten years" rather than "not less than ten years." The conservative course for the defence is to compute the shorter 60-day window for such offences, apply for default bail the moment it expires, and be ready to argue that the wording change did not enlarge the State's time. The conservative course for the prosecution is to assume the shorter window may apply and file within 60 days where the offence does not carry a firm ten-year floor.

Here is a working table you can use to classify offences quickly. Always check the actual punishment clause of the specific offence, because the chart is a guide, not a substitute for reading the section.

| Punishment prescribed for the offence | Likely window under BNSS 187(3) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Death | 90 days | Clear, no controversy |
| Imprisonment for life | 90 days | Clear, no controversy |
| Minimum (not less than) ten years | 90 days | Clear, no controversy |
| Maximum up to ten years, no ten-year minimum | Arguable, defence should claim 60 days | This is the disputed zone; courts so far lean to 60 days following the CrPC approach |
| Maximum below ten years | 60 days | Falls into "any other offence" |

The safe takeaway: when the punishment clause does not impose a ten-year floor, the defence has a strong, presently supported argument that the 60-day window applies, and the right to default bail crystallises on day 60.

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## The contested 15-day police custody change

This is the most debated feature of Section 187, and it has nothing to do with the default bail clock directly, but it sits in the same section and shapes how custody plays out, so litigators must understand it.

Under the old CrPC, the rule was settled by long practice. Police custody, as opposed to judicial custody, could not exceed 15 days in total, and crucially, those 15 days had to be taken **within the first 15 days from the date of remand**. After the first 15 days, the accused could only be sent to judicial custody. The police could not come back later and ask for more custody for fresh interrogation. The 15-day police custody door shut early and stayed shut.

BNSS Section 187(2) changed the second half of that rule. It still caps police custody at 15 days in total. But it now allows those 15 days to be sought **in parts, spread across the early part of the detention window**, rather than only within the first 15 days. Specifically, the 15 days of police custody may be sought within the first 40 days of the detention period for offences in the 60-day basket, and within the first 60 days for offences in the 90-day basket.

The practical worry that lawyers raised is real. Under this reading, the investigating officer can take a few days of police custody early, send the accused to judicial custody, and then come back on, say, day 35 with "newly discovered" material and seek the balance of the 15-day quota. The accused, who under the old law was safe from police custody after the first 15 days, now faces the prospect of being pulled back into police custody at almost any point in the first 40 or 60 days. Civil liberties groups, including the [People's Union for Civil Liberties](https://pucl.org/manage-writings/open-letter-to-home-minister-amend-sec-1873-bnss-in-line-with-clarification-on-police-custody/), wrote to the Home Minister and the Law Minister asking that the provision be amended to track the old CrPC position.

The Union government's position, stated by the Home Minister, was that the maximum police custody remains 15 days, only now spread across the 60 or 90-day window. That clarification was welcomed but, as commentators noted, a verbal assurance does not have the force of law. Courts interpret the words on the page, not statements in the press, and the words of Section 187 leave the spreading mechanism intact.

The courts have begun to put guardrails on the provision. In an important ruling affirmed by the Supreme Court on 8 January 2025 (a bench of Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prashant Kumar), the Court upheld the [Karnataka High Court's interpretation](https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/s187-bnss-supreme-court-affirms-hc-judgment-that-police-custody-must-be-within-first-40-days-for-offences-punishable-upto-10-yrs-imprisonment-280315) that the 15-day police custody must be sought **within the first 40 days** in cases of offences punishable up to ten years of imprisonment, and within the first 60 days for graver offences. So while the 15 days can be split, they cannot be taken at any time during the whole detention period. The early-window limit is now judicially anchored.

For the default bail analysis, the key point is this. The police custody spreading mechanism does **not** change the 60 or 90-day outer limit on total detention. The chargesheet still has to be filed within 60 or 90 days. The spreading affects the **type** of custody, not the **duration** before default bail kicks in. A common mistake is to conflate the two. They are separate clocks.

Here is the contrast at a glance.

| Feature | CrPC Section 167 (old) | BNSS Section 187 (new) |
|---|---|---|
| Maximum police custody | 15 days | 15 days |
| When police custody can be taken | Only within first 15 days of remand | In parts, within first 40 days (60-day offences) or 60 days (90-day offences) |
| Total detention cap (60-day basket) | 60 days | 60 days |
| Total detention cap (90-day basket) | 90 days | 90 days |
| Default bail trigger | Expiry of 60/90 days with no chargesheet | Expiry of 60/90 days with no chargesheet |

The default bail right itself is essentially unchanged. The police custody mechanics around it are not.

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## When the right accrues and when it dies

Default bail is unusual because it can be won and lost on timing alone, regardless of merits. Getting the sequence right is the whole game.

**The right accrues** on the expiry of the 60 or 90-day period, provided no chargesheet has been filed by then. From that moment, the accused has an enforceable right to be released on bail.

**The right must be availed.** This is the part that trips up the unwary. The right does not release the accused automatically. The accused, or their counsel, has to **apply** for default bail and indicate readiness to furnish bail. If the accused sits on the right and does nothing, and the prosecution then files the chargesheet, the right is extinguished. The accused can still seek ordinary bail, but the indefeasible default bail right is gone.

The Supreme Court explained what "availed of" means in [Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1747003/), decided on 29 March 2001. The Court held that the accused "avails" the right the moment they file an application for bail pointing out that no chargesheet has been filed within the period and expressing readiness to furnish bail. The accused does not have to wait for the court to actually pass the order or to physically furnish the bond. As the Court put it, "if the accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail, on being directed, then it has to be held that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused has not furnished the same."

That holding has a sharp practical edge. The agency cannot defeat the right by stalling. The Supreme Court reinforced this in [M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/88760594/), decided on 26 October 2020. There the Court held that the right to be released on default bail "continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court."

In plain terms, what M. Ravindran establishes is this. The decisive moment is **when the accused files the default bail application**, not when the court finally hears it. If the application was filed after the period expired but before the chargesheet was filed, the right survives even if the chargesheet lands the next day while the application is pending. The Court squarely condemned the practice of "keeping the applications for bail pending till the time the chargesheets are submitted" so that the accrued right is defeated.

The mirror image is the trap. If the accused **fails to apply** when the right accrues, and the chargesheet (or a valid report seeking extension of time) is filed **before** the application, the default bail right dies. This is the rule from the line of authority running through the Constitution Bench in *Sanjay Dutt v. State* (1994), where the Court considered when and how the right could be "availed of," and the interpretation that *Uday Mohanlal Acharya* later refined.

So the timeline that wins is: period expires, no chargesheet on file, accused immediately files the default bail application and offers to furnish bail. The timeline that loses is: period expires, accused waits, chargesheet gets filed first.

A practical drafting note. Because the right can turn on the moment of filing, default bail applications should be filed the very day the period expires, ideally first thing, with a clear averment that the statutory period has lapsed, that no chargesheet has been filed, and that the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail. For a deeper walk-through of drafting bail applications generally, see our [guide to drafting a bail application](/blog/anticipatory-bail-bnss-section-482), which covers the anticipatory bail context but shares much of the drafting discipline.

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## The leading cases every litigator should know

Default bail has a tight, well-defined case law spine. Five decisions do most of the work. Knowing them cold lets you argue the right confidently.

**Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994).** This Constitution Bench decision, arising out of the TADA prosecution, is the foundational authority on the nature of the right. It held that the indefeasible right to default bail is enforceable only up to the filing of the chargesheet and must be "availed of" before that. The case set up the central tension that later decisions had to resolve: what exactly does "availed of" mean, and at what moment is the right lost?

**Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra (2001).** This decision settled the meaning of "availed of." As discussed above, filing the application and offering to furnish bail is enough to avail the right, even before the court passes any order. The accused need not have furnished the bond. This protects accused persons against delays in the court's own processing of the application.

**Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2020).** A three-judge bench held that the right to default bail is part of Article 21 and is therefore a fundamental right, not just a statutory one. Critically, it applied this in the UAPA context, holding that the stringent bail bar under Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, which blocks regular bail where a prima facie case exists, does **not** apply to default bail. Default bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) survives even in UAPA cases. The reading of the [judgment on Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10807134/) repays close study for anyone handling special-statute matters.

**M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, DRI (2020).** This decision locked in the timing rule. The right, once the application is filed before the chargesheet, is not defeated by the subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension. It also condemned the tactic of keeping applications pending to defeat the right. M. Ravindran is the case you cite when the prosecution argues that the chargesheet filed during the pendency of your application has cured the default.

**Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (2017).** This is the authority on the 60 versus 90-day question under the old CrPC. It held that where an offence carries a maximum of ten years but no ten-year minimum, the 60-day window applies, not the 90-day window. As discussed above, this approach has carried into the early BNSS rulings, though the wording change in Section 187(3) keeps the point arguable.

A compact reference table:

| Case | Year | Core holding for default bail |
|---|---|---|
| Sanjay Dutt v. State | 1994 | Right is indefeasible but must be availed before chargesheet |
| Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra | 2001 | "Availed of" means filing the application and offering bail; no need to wait for the order |
| Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam | 2017 | Offence with max ten years (no ten-year minimum) gets the 60-day window |
| Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab | 2020 | Right is a fundamental right under Article 21; survives the UAPA bail bar |
| M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, DRI | 2020 | Right survives chargesheet filed after the application; no stalling allowed |

These five decisions were rendered under the CrPC, but because BNSS Section 187(3) carries the same scheme, courts have continued to apply them to BNSS matters. The constitutional reasoning in Bikramjit Singh, in particular, does not depend on the statute number. It depends on Article 21, which has not changed.

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## Special statutes: UAPA, NDPS and extended periods

The 60 and 90-day periods are the default. Several special statutes lengthen them, and they do so through a specific mechanism that defence counsel must watch.

**UAPA.** Under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Section 43-D extends the investigation period. Where the investigation cannot be completed within 90 days, the court may, on a **report of the Public Prosecutor** indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the continued detention of the accused, extend the period up to **180 days**. The default bail right does not arise at 90 days if a valid extension has been granted before then. But the extension is not automatic. It requires the Public Prosecutor's report and a judicial application of mind. If the extension is sought without a proper report, or sought after the 90 days have already lapsed, the right to default bail can crystallise. Our deeper treatment of [UAPA bail jurisprudence](/blog/uapa-bail-jurisprudence) covers the interaction between the extension mechanism and the bail bar in detail.

**NDPS.** Under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Section 36A(4) operates similarly. The standard period for serious NDPS offences is already 180 days, and the Special Court may extend it up to one year on a report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for continued detention. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that there is [no default bail if the statutory period is extended under Section 36A(4)](https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/andhra-pradesh-high-court-section-36a4-ndps-default-bail-extension-statutory-period-194918) before the expiry of 180 days. As with UAPA, timing is everything. The extension must be sought and granted before the running period expires.

The common thread across these special statutes is the **Public Prosecutor's report**. The extension is not a rubber stamp. The report must indicate genuine progress and give specific reasons for continued detention. A defence challenge to an extension usually attacks the quality of that report. Where the report is absent, perfunctory, or filed late, the accused's default bail right may revive.

A note of caution for cases booked under more than one special statute. Where an accused is charged under both the UAPA and the NDPS Act, courts have held that the provisions must be read harmoniously, and an extension validly obtained under one may affect the custody computation under the other. The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court recently held that [Section 36A of the NDPS Act is not ousted by Section 48 of the UAPA](https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/jammu-kashmir/jammu-and-kashmir-high-court-ndps-act-and-uapa-must-be-harmoniously-construed-section-36a-ndps-not-ousted-by-section-48-uapa-536506) in a narco-terror financing case. The lesson is that the longest applicable period across the charged statutes will usually govern, so the defence cannot assume the shorter period applies merely because one of the offences carries it.

A short comparison of the extended windows:

| Statute | Standard period | Extended period | Mechanism for extension |
|---|---|---|---|
| BNSS (general, 60-day basket) | 60 days | None | Not extendable |
| BNSS (general, 90-day basket) | 90 days | None | Not extendable |
| UAPA | 90 days | Up to 180 days | Public Prosecutor's report plus judicial order |
| NDPS (serious offences) | 180 days | Up to 1 year | Public Prosecutor's report plus Special Court order |

For ordinary BNSS offences, there is no extension mechanism at all. The 60 or 90-day limit is hard. Only the special statutes provide the extension valve, and only on the Public Prosecutor's report.

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## How to apply for default bail step by step

The application itself is simple, but the discipline around timing and content decides the outcome. Here is a practical sequence.

**1. Compute the deadline accurately.** Identify the date of first remand and count forward 60 or 90 days, depending on the correct basket for the offence. Where the offence is in the disputed "up to ten years" zone, compute both, and prepare to apply on the 60-day mark. Cross-check the actual remand orders on the case file rather than counting from the FIR date.

**2. Confirm no chargesheet is on record.** Verify on the day the period expires that the chargesheet, final report, or a valid extension report has not been filed. This is a factual check against the court record, not an assumption.

**3. File the application the moment the period expires.** Do not wait. The decisive moment, per M. Ravindran, is the filing of the application before the chargesheet. File first thing on the day the period lapses. An oral application has been held sufficient in some circumstances, but a written application is far safer and creates a clear record of the filing time.

**4. State the three essentials in the application.** The application should aver, clearly, that (a) the statutory period of 60 or 90 days has expired, (b) no chargesheet has been filed within that period, and (c) the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail. The third averment matters because the right is to be released "if he is prepared to and does furnish bail." Expressing readiness is part of availing the right.

**5. Do not argue merits.** Default bail is not a merits hearing. The Magistrate cannot examine the strength of the evidence, the seriousness of the offence, or the likelihood of conviction. Keep the application crisp and procedural. The only relevant facts are the dates.

**6. Be ready to furnish the bond.** Once the court fixes terms, furnish the bond and sureties promptly. The right is availed on filing, but release follows the furnishing of bail.

**7. Resist a belated chargesheet.** If the prosecution rushes to file the chargesheet after your application but argues the default is cured, cite M. Ravindran. A chargesheet filed after a properly filed default bail application does not defeat the accrued right.

A few common pitfalls. Do not delay the application hoping for a clearer record; delay is the single most common way the right is lost. Do not accept a "preliminary" or incomplete chargesheet, filed without the material needed to take cognizance, as valid compliance; courts scrutinise whether such a report genuinely completes the investigation. And do not assume the 90-day window applies just because the offence sounds serious; check the actual punishment clause.

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## CrPC 167 to BNSS 187: a clause-by-clause map

For practitioners moving between the old and new codes, here is a direct mapping of the key elements. The substance is largely preserved, with the police custody change being the most significant departure.

| Element | CrPC Section 167 | BNSS Section 187 | Changed? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trigger | Investigation not complete in 24 hours of arrest | Investigation not complete in 24 hours of arrest | No |
| Remand authority | Magistrate, with or without jurisdiction | Magistrate, with or without jurisdiction | No |
| Maximum police custody | 15 days | 15 days | No |
| Police custody window | Within first 15 days of remand | In parts, within first 40/60 days of detention | Yes (contested) |
| 90-day basket | Death, life, "not less than ten years" | Death, life, "ten years or more" | Wording changed; effect disputed |
| 60-day basket | Any other offence | Any other offence | No |
| Default bail trigger | Expiry of 60/90 days, no chargesheet | Expiry of 60/90 days, no chargesheet | No |
| Right must be availed | Yes, before chargesheet | Yes, before chargesheet | No |
| Deemed ordinary bail once granted | Yes | Yes | No |

The headline for transitioning lawyers is reassurance with one asterisk. The default bail right works the same way. Cite the same cases. Apply the same timing discipline. The one thing to relearn is the police custody mechanism, which now spreads across the early window rather than sitting in the first 15 days.

A second asterisk, smaller but real, is the 60 versus 90-day wording change, which keeps the threshold question arguable for offences without a ten-year minimum.

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## Recent rulings under BNSS Section 187

The BNSS is young, and the case law is still forming. A few 2025 and 2026 rulings show how courts are applying Section 187 in practice.

On the police custody question, the Supreme Court's affirmation of the Karnataka High Court position on 8 January 2025 is the most important development. It confirms that the 15 days of police custody, though splittable, must be sought within the first 40 days (for offences punishable up to ten years) or the first 60 days (for graver offences). This puts an outer rail on the spreading mechanism.

On procedural rigour, the Bombay High Court granted default bail in October 2025 in a case where the Magistrate had extended judicial custody with nothing more than a "seen" remark, without a reasoned order. As reported by [SCC Online](https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2025/10/20/bom-hc-grants-default-bail-magistrate-seen-remark-not-enough/), the Court held that the failure to file the chargesheet within 60 days, combined with the absence of a reasoned order extending judicial remand, violated the accused's indefeasible right to default bail under Section 187(3). This is a useful authority for the proposition that mechanical or unreasoned remand extensions do not stop the default bail clock.

On the interaction between further investigation and default bail, the Delhi High Court has clarified that further investigation under Section 193(9) BNSS is court-regulated and distinct from default bail under Section 187(3), declining a constitutional challenge to the scheme. The takeaway is that a chargesheet filed within time is not undone for default bail purposes merely because further investigation continues afterward; the two operate on different tracks.

On custody computation, the Delhi High Court held in early 2026 that only **actual custody** counts towards remand under Section 187 BNSS, so a period of interim or medical bail is not counted, as reported by [SCC Online](https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2026/02/23/delhi-hc-interim-bail-period-not-counted-for-police-remand-bnss-section-187/). This matters for the default bail computation too, because time spent out on interim bail does not run against the State's investigation clock in the same way.

The overall trajectory is continuity with vigilance. Courts carry forward the CrPC jurisprudence on the substance of the right while policing the procedural edges, especially unreasoned remand extensions and the police custody window. Two genuinely open questions remain: the 60 versus 90-day wording and the precise contours of the spread-out police custody, both awaiting an authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement.

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## How Niyam helps

Default bail is a timing game, and timing games reward preparation. The accused who computes the deadline correctly, confirms the absence of a chargesheet, and files on the right day wins. The one who is a day late, or who applies under the wrong window, loses an indefeasible right.

Niyam is built for exactly this kind of precise, deadline-driven legal work. Ask it to lay out the 60 versus 90-day analysis for a specific offence and it walks you through the punishment clause and the disputed wording. Ask it to summarise M. Ravindran or Bikramjit Singh and it gives you the holding with the citation, grounded in the actual judgments rather than invented case names. Ask it to draft a default bail application skeleton with the three essential averments and it produces a clean starting point you can adapt to your facts.

Because Niyam is trained on Indian law and built to cite real sources, it is designed to avoid the fabricated citations that plague general-purpose chatbots. For a right where a wrong case name or a wrong section number can sink an application, that reliability is the whole point.

You can put Niyam to work on your next bail matter today. **[Start for ₹100](https://app.niyam.ai/register)** and see how fast accurate, India-specific legal research can be.

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## Frequently asked questions

**What is the difference between default bail and regular bail?**

Default bail is granted because the prosecution failed to file the chargesheet within the statutory 60 or 90-day period. The Magistrate has no discretion and cannot consider the merits or the gravity of the offence; the only question is whether the period expired without a chargesheet. Regular bail, by contrast, is discretionary and turns on factors like the nature of the accusation, the risk of flight, the likelihood of tampering with evidence, and the strength of the case. Default bail is a right; regular bail is a request.

**Does the accused get released automatically when 60 or 90 days pass?**

No. The right accrues on expiry of the period, but the accused must apply for default bail and indicate readiness to furnish bail. If the accused does nothing and the prosecution then files the chargesheet, the right is extinguished. This is why default bail applications should be filed the very day the period lapses.

**Is default bail available for serious offences like murder or terrorism?**

Yes. Default bail cuts across the gravity of the offence. Even for offences carrying death or life imprisonment, if the chargesheet is not filed within 90 days and the accused applies in time, release follows. In UAPA cases, the Supreme Court in Bikramjit Singh held that the stringent UAPA bail bar does not block default bail. The only thing that lengthens the period for special statutes is a valid extension on the Public Prosecutor's report.

**Can the prosecution defeat default bail by filing the chargesheet after I apply?**

No, not if you filed your application first. In M. Ravindran, the Supreme Court held that the right survives the subsequent filing of the chargesheet, provided the default bail application was filed after the period expired but before the chargesheet was filed. The Court specifically condemned the tactic of keeping bail applications pending until the chargesheet is filed.

**How is the 60 versus 90-day window decided?**

It depends on the punishment prescribed for the offence. Offences punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of ten years or more fall in the 90-day basket; everything else gets 60 days. There is a live dispute over offences whose maximum is ten years but which carry no ten-year minimum. The CrPC approach in Rakesh Kumar Paul placed such offences in the 60-day basket, and early BNSS rulings have leaned the same way, though the wording change in Section 187(3) keeps the point arguable.

**Did BNSS Section 187 change how police custody works?**

Yes, in one significant respect. Police custody is still capped at 15 days total. But under the old CrPC, those 15 days had to be taken within the first 15 days of remand. Under BNSS Section 187(2), the 15 days can be split and spread across the first 40 days (for 60-day offences) or the first 60 days (for 90-day offences). This is the most contested change. It does not affect the 60 or 90-day outer limit for default bail; it changes only the type and timing of custody within that window.

**What should a default bail application actually say?**

It should state three things clearly: that the statutory period of 60 or 90 days has expired, that no chargesheet has been filed within that period, and that the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail. Do not argue the merits of the case; default bail is purely procedural. File it the moment the period expires, and verify against the court record that no chargesheet or valid extension report is on file.

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## Key takeaways

- Default bail under BNSS Section 187(3) is the successor to CrPC Section 167(2). The scheme is almost unchanged.
- The window is 90 days for offences punishable with death, life, or ten years or more, and 60 days for everything else.
- The right is indefeasible and is grounded in Article 21, but it must be **availed** by filing an application and offering to furnish bail. It does not operate automatically.
- The decisive moment is when the application is filed, not when it is heard. A chargesheet filed after a timely application does not defeat the right (M. Ravindran).
- The 15-day police custody can now be spread across the first 40 or 60 days, the most contested change, but this does not move the default bail clock.
- The 60 versus 90-day question for offences without a ten-year minimum remains arguable; the defence should compute and apply on the shorter 60-day window.
- Special statutes like UAPA and NDPS extend the period only on a proper Public Prosecutor's report and a timely judicial order. A defective or late report can revive the right.
- File on the day the period expires, state the three essentials, and do not argue merits. Timing wins or loses default bail.

For related reading, see our guides on [bailable versus non-bailable offences](/blog/bailable-vs-non-bailable), [anticipatory bail under BNSS Section 482](/blog/anticipatory-bail-bnss-section-482), [what changed under the new criminal laws](/blog/new-criminal-laws-bns-bnss-bsa), and [UAPA bail jurisprudence](/blog/uapa-bail-jurisprudence).