# Indian Evidence Act to BSA section mapping: a working table

**TL;DR:** The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) on 1 July 2024, with 170 sections against the IEA's 167. Most of the BSA is the IEA renumbered rather than rewritten: the table below covers verified mappings for the provisions that come up most often in practice, and flags the ones where the underlying rule of evidence actually changed, not just the section number.

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## On this page

- [How to use this table](#how-to-use-this-table)
- [Which Act applies: the date rule](#which-act-applies-the-date-rule)
- [The mapping table: high-frequency provisions](#the-mapping-table-high-frequency-provisions)
- [Where the law changed, not just the number](#where-the-law-changed-not-just-the-number)
- [Electronic evidence: the certificate regime, before and after](#electronic-evidence-the-certificate-regime-before-and-after)
- [Advocate-client privilege and in-house counsel under the BSA](#advocate-client-privilege-and-in-house-counsel-under-the-bsa)
- [Renumbered only vs law changed](#renumbered-only-vs-law-changed)
- [BSA provisions with no Evidence Act ancestor](#bsa-provisions-with-no-evidence-act-ancestor)
- [Evidence Act provisions with no BSA successor](#evidence-act-provisions-with-no-bsa-successor)
- [Electronic evidence admissibility: a decision path](#electronic-evidence-admissibility-a-decision-path)
- [How Niyam helps with cross-regime research](#how-niyam-helps-with-cross-regime-research)
- [Frequently asked questions](#frequently-asked-questions)

---

## How to use this table

This is a lookup table, not a section-by-section commentary on all 170 sections of the BSA. Two things to keep straight before using it.

**Direction matters.** Most rows here run from the old number to the new one, because that is the direction a practitioner usually needs: you are reading a 2019 judgment that cites Section 65B, or a client's file that pre-dates July 2024, and you need to know what governs the same point today. A handful of entries are useful in the other direction too, for a lawyer reading a post-2024 charge-sheet or plaint who needs to check the older case law on the same rule. The table states both numbers either way, so it works for both directions.

**The table is selective, on purpose.** The BSA has 170 sections. This piece verifies and lists mappings for the provisions that come up in daily practice: relevancy, admissions and confessions, dying declarations, expert evidence, character evidence, documentary and electronic evidence, presumptions, burden of proof, estoppel, privileged communications, and the mechanics of examining witnesses. It does not attempt every section. Every row below was checked against the statutory text on Indian Kanoon and, where noted, PRS Legislative Research. A row that is not here was either not checked, or could not be confirmed to the standard this page holds itself to, and was left out rather than guessed. If you need a mapping that is not below, verify it against [India Code](https://www.indiacode.nic.in) or the statute itself before relying on it, the same way you would for any provision this table did not reach.

For the fuller picture of all three new codes, including how the BNS and BNSS fit alongside the BSA, see [what changed when the new criminal laws came into force](/blog/new-criminal-laws-bns-bnss-bsa). For the deepest treatment of the electronic evidence certificate specifically, see the dedicated piece on [Section 63 BSA and electronic evidence](/blog/bsa-section-63-electronic-evidence): this page summarises that ground rather than repeating it. If you are new to reading the judgments cited below, [how to read a judgment](/blog/how-to-read-a-judgment) is a useful companion.

## Which Act applies: the date rule

The governing principle is the date of the offence or the transaction the evidence relates to, not the date of trial. For criminal matters, this tracks the same rule that governs the [BNS and BNSS transition](/blog/new-criminal-laws-bns-bnss-bsa): an offence committed on or before 30 June 2024 is tried, including on questions of evidence, under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An offence committed on or after 1 July 2024 is tried under the BSA. This holds regardless of when the FIR was registered, when the charge-sheet was filed, or when the trial actually starts.

For civil proceedings and for evidence already recorded before 1 July 2024 in a matter that continues after that date, the position rests on ordinary principles of statutory transition: evidence lawfully recorded under the old Act does not become inadmissible because the Act it was recorded under has since been repealed. The BSA does not purport to reopen or invalidate evidence properly taken under the IEA before the new Act commenced. A trial that straddles the transition date will typically have part of its evidentiary record governed by the old Act's procedural requirements as they stood when that evidence was recorded, while evidence recorded from 1 July 2024 onward follows the BSA. Where the specific procedural consequence of straddling matters, for example whether a certificate defect can be cured, the safer course is to check the applicable savings provision and, where the point is contested, the specific court's practice directions, rather than assume a blanket rule either way.

## The mapping table: high-frequency provisions

Every row below has been checked against the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam's statutory text and, for the old Act, against the Indian Evidence Act's text, both via Indian Kanoon. Where a row states a topic without further comment, the heading of the BSA section matches the heading of its IEA predecessor closely or exactly, indicating a renumbering rather than a substantive rewrite. Rows with a genuine substantive change are flagged and covered in more depth in the next section.

| Topic | IEA 1872 section | BSA 2023 section |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence of facts in issue and relevant facts (general relevancy) | Section 5 | Section 3 |
| Admission defined | Section 17 | Section 15 |
| Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise (irrelevant) | Section 24 | Section 22 |
| Confession to police officer (not provable) | Section 25 | Section 23 |
| Statement of relevant fact by a person who is dead (includes dying declarations) | Section 32 | Section 26 |
| Opinions of experts | Section 45 | Section 39 |
| Character to prove conduct imputed, irrelevant in civil cases | Section 52 | Section 46 |
| Previous good character relevant in criminal cases | Section 53 | Section 47 |
| Primary evidence | Section 62 | Section 57 |
| Secondary evidence | Section 63 | Section 58 |
| Admissibility of electronic records (computer output, certificate regime) | Section 65B | Section 63 |
| Burden of proof: whoever asserts a fact must prove it | Section 101 | Section 104 |
| Court may presume the existence of certain facts | Section 114 | Section 119 |
| Estoppel | Section 115 | Section 121 |
| Communications during marriage (spousal privilege) | Section 122 | Section 128 |
| Evidence as to affairs of state (unpublished official records) | Section 123 | Section 129 |
| Professional communications (advocate-client privilege) | Section 126 | Section 132 |
| Order of examinations: examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re-examination | Section 138 | Section 143 |
| Leading questions: definition | Section 141 | Section 146 |
| Question by party to his own witness (the hostile witness mechanism) | Section 154 | Section 157 |
| Refreshing memory from a writing | Section 159 | Section 162 |

A note on what is missing from this list on purpose. The presumption of legitimacy from birth during marriage (Section 112 IEA) is a high-frequency provision in matrimonial and succession matters, but this piece could not independently confirm its BSA successor section against a primary source within the scope of this research, so it has been left out rather than guessed. The same caution applies to several presumption sub-provisions (dowry death, abetment of suicide by a married woman) and to the detailed sub-clauses within confessions by co-accused. Verify these directly against the statute before relying on them in a filing.

## Where the law changed, not just the number

Most of the table above is a straight renumbering: the rule is the same, only the section number moved. A smaller set of provisions carry a genuine change in the underlying law, not just its address. Three are confirmed here.

**Electronic and digital records reclassified as primary evidence.** Under the IEA, electronic records were treated as secondary evidence requiring authentication through the Section 65B certificate mechanism, a regime that produced two decades of litigation. The BSA's Section 57 (the primary evidence provision) expressly brings electronic and digital records from proper custody within the definition of primary evidence, through explanations covering records stored or created in multiple locations, records produced from proper custody, video recordings that are simultaneously stored and transmitted, and automated storage instances including temporary files. This is a real change in classification, not a relabelling: primary evidence does not require the Section 63 certificate at all. Where a party can produce the original device or a record from proper custody that is not disputed, the certificate requirement in Section 63 never comes into play. This is the single most consequential substantive change carried into the BSA, and it is covered in full detail, including the certificate's Part A and Part B structure, in the [dedicated piece on Section 63 BSA](/blog/bsa-section-63-electronic-evidence).

**Secondary evidence extended to cover disputed genuineness.** PRS Legislative Research's analysis of the bill notes a provision not present in the IEA's secondary evidence framework: the BSA's Section 58 allows secondary evidence to be given where the genuineness of the document itself is in question, a scenario the old Section 63 IEA did not explicitly address. This is a small but real expansion of when a party can fall back on secondary evidence rather than being required to produce the original.

**What did not change despite recommendations.** The Law Commission's 2003 report proposed that facts discovered from information given by an accused in police custody should be barred from proof where that information was obtained through threat, coercion, violence, or torture. PRS's analysis notes that this recommendation was not incorporated into the BSA. The confession-related provisions (Sections 22 to 24 BSA, corresponding to Sections 24 to 26 IEA) carry the old framework forward largely unchanged. Anyone citing the BSA as having reformed the treatment of confessions obtained under duress should check the actual text before relying on that characterisation: the mechanism for excluding involuntary confessions is substantively the same as it was under the IEA.

## Electronic evidence: the certificate regime, before and after

Given how often this comes up, it is worth stating plainly, and cautiously, what the electronic evidence position actually is. Anyone citing these judgments in a filing should also confirm the citation format itself; see [how to cite Indian judgments](/blog/how-to-cite-indian-judgments) for the convention this piece follows below.

Under the old Act, the Supreme Court's position was settled in three stages. **Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer**, (2014) 10 SCC 473, decided on 18 September 2014 by a three-judge bench of Justices R.F. Nariman, Kurian Joseph, and R.M. Lodha, held that a Section 65B(4) certificate is mandatory for secondary electronic evidence, that Sections 65A and 65B form a complete code excluding the general secondary evidence provisions for electronic records, and that the only evidence exempt from the certificate is primary electronic evidence where the original device itself is produced. The court expressly overruled the earlier two-judge bench ruling in *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu* on this point.

**Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh**, (2018) 2 SCC 801, decided on 30 January 2018 by a two-judge bench, relaxed the Anvar rule for a specific situation: where the party relying on the electronic evidence was not in possession of the device that produced it, the certificate could not be insisted upon, and the court could instead admit the evidence on its own satisfaction. Because a two-judge bench cannot depart from a three-judge bench ruling, this created a live conflict that needed resolution.

**Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal**, (2020) 7 SCC 1, decided on 14 July 2020, resolved it. The bench expressly overruled Shafhi Mohammad, restored Anvar's mandatory certificate rule, and added a practical mechanism: where the person who can issue the certificate is not a party to the proceedings, the court can direct that person to produce it, and the certificate can be furnished during the trial rather than only at the moment the record is first tendered.

What does this mean under the BSA. Electronic records from proper custody are now classified as primary evidence under Section 57, which was not the position under the old Act's classification. That is a genuine change, and it means the Section 63 certificate is engaged less often than the old Section 65B certificate was, because more electronic material now qualifies as primary evidence outright. Where a record does not qualify as primary evidence and Section 63 does apply, the certificate is still mandatory, and the four substantive conditions in Section 63(2) track the old Section 65B(2) conditions closely.

What is genuinely unsettled: whether Arjun Panditrao's specific procedural holdings (the timing rule for producing the certificate, the mechanism for compelling a non-party to issue one) carry forward to Section 63 in the same terms is a question the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to answer directly under the new Act, because the case itself was decided under the old Section 65B. High Courts applying Section 63 have generally proceeded on the footing that the reasoning in Anvar and Arjun Panditrao remains persuasive for the equivalent BSA provision, since the underlying certificate mechanism and its four conditions are substantially carried forward. But a Supreme Court ruling squarely construing Section 63 on these procedural points, as opposed to applying pre-2024 reasoning to it, had not been reported at the time of writing. Treat the read-across from Anvar and Arjun Panditrao as strong persuasive authority, not as settled BSA-specific precedent, until the Supreme Court rules directly on Section 63.

## Advocate-client privilege and in-house counsel under the BSA

Advocate-client privilege sits at Section 132 of the BSA, the successor to Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act. Its text protects communications made to "an advocate" in the course of his service as such advocate, and applies that protection to interpreters and to the clerks and employees of advocates. Section 134 BSA, a separate and narrower provision, protects confidential communications with a "legal adviser" more generally from compelled disclosure to a court, without using the word "advocate."

Whether Section 132's protection reaches a salaried in-house counsel the same way it reaches an independently briefed advocate is not settled by any reported Supreme Court ruling. There is older High Court authority, in a different context, describing salaried legal advisers as occupying the same professional position as independent practitioners and sharing the same privileges (K.C. Sud v. S.C. Gudimani, Delhi High Court, 13 February 1981, quoting Lord Denning's observation in *Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise*), but that was said in passing while deciding an unrelated question about the office of Public Prosecutor, not as a direct holding on Section 126 or Section 132. Companies and legal departments relying on privilege for in-house communications should treat the question as open rather than settled either way, and should not assume Section 132 automatically covers internal legal advice the way it covers a law firm's client communications.

A related mismatch worth flagging rather than papering over: the Bar Council of India's Rule 17 still quotes the old Evidence Act's Section 126 verbatim and has not been amended to reflect the BSA's renumbering. A lawyer citing BCI Rule 17 today is technically reading a rule that references a repealed section number. This is a drafting gap in the BCI's rules, not a change in the underlying law, since the substantive privilege now runs through Section 132 regardless of what number the BCI rule quotes.

## Renumbered only vs law changed

| Provision | Renumbered only | Law changed |
|---|---|---|
| Relevancy of facts in issue (IEA s.5 to BSA s.3) | check | cross |
| Admission defined (IEA s.17 to BSA s.15) | check | cross |
| Confession to police officer (IEA s.25 to BSA s.23) | check | cross |
| Dying declaration provision (IEA s.32 to BSA s.26) | check | cross |
| Opinions of experts (IEA s.45 to BSA s.39) | check | cross |
| Estoppel (IEA s.115 to BSA s.121) | check | cross |
| Professional communications, text of the privilege itself (IEA s.126 to BSA s.132) | check | cross |
| Hostile witness mechanism (IEA s.154 to BSA s.157) | check | cross |
| Electronic records: primary vs secondary classification (IEA s.65B to BSA s.57/63) | cross | check |
| Secondary evidence where genuineness disputed (BSA s.58 addition) | cross | check |
| Application of Section 132 privilege to in-house counsel (unsettled) | cross | check |

The table above uses ✓ where the substance of the rule tracks the old provision closely and ✗ where it does not, so a ✓ in the "renumbered only" column means the section moved but the rule stayed put, and a ✓ in the "law changed" column means the underlying rule itself is different from what the IEA provided.

## BSA provisions with no Evidence Act ancestor

This is the shortest section in this piece, deliberately. The BSA, unlike the BNS, is overwhelmingly a consolidation and renumbering of the existing Evidence Act rather than an introduction of new subject matter. PRS Legislative Research's own analysis of the bill describes it as retaining most of the IEA's provisions. The clearest confirmed example of genuinely new content within an existing provision, rather than a wholly new section, is the Section 58 addition on secondary evidence where a document's genuineness is disputed, discussed above. This piece could not confirm, to the verification standard it holds itself to, a BSA section with no IEA lineage at all in the way that BNS Sections 111 (organised crime), 113 (terrorism), or 69 (sexual intercourse by deceitful means) have no IPC lineage. If such a section exists among the roughly 170 in the BSA, it was not confirmed here and is not asserted here.

## Evidence Act provisions with no BSA successor

The same caution applies in the other direction. This piece did not independently verify a specific Evidence Act provision that was dropped outright with no BSA counterpart at all. The overall section count moved from 167 to 170, a net increase, which is consistent with consolidation plus the electronic evidence expansions rather than wholesale removal of old provisions. Anyone relying on a specific IEA section having been dropped entirely, rather than renumbered, should verify that directly against the BSA's full text or a repeal-and-savings analysis before building an argument on it.

## Electronic evidence admissibility: a decision path

The flow below sets out, at a high level, how the primary-versus-secondary classification and the certificate requirement interact under the current framework. It does not capture every exception; use it as an orientation map, not a substitute for reading Sections 57 and 63 directly.

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    A["Electronic or digital record offered as evidence"] --> B{"Original device or record from proper custody produced, and not disputed?"}
    B -- Yes --> C["Primary evidence under BSA Section 57"]
    C --> D["No certificate required"]
    B -- No --> E["Computer output / secondary evidence under BSA Section 63"]
    E --> F{"Four conditions in Section 63(2) satisfied?"}
    F -- No --> G["Not admissible as computer output"]
    F -- Yes --> H{"Certificate under Section 63(4) produced, Part A and Part B, with hash value?"}
    H -- No --> I["Party in possession refuses or unavailable"]
    I --> J["Court may direct production, per Arjun Panditrao reasoning"]
    H -- Yes --> K["Admissible over a certificate objection"]
    K --> L["Reliability and chain of custody remain open to challenge on the merits"]
```

## How Niyam helps with cross-regime research

A lawyer working a matter that straddles 1 July 2024, or reading a 2018 judgment on evidence alongside a 2025 one, needs to hold two section-numbering systems in their head at once and get the mapping right every time. Getting a single number wrong in a filing is the kind of error that undermines an otherwise sound argument. A research tool that tags judgments and statutory citations by the applicable regime, and that flags whether a cited section is IEA or BSA rather than leaving that inference to the reader, removes a category of error that is easy to make under deadline pressure. [Niyam](https://niyam.ai) applies this kind of regime-aware tagging across its judgment corpus, so a search for a BSA provision can surface relevant IEA-era authority on the same point of evidence law, with the applicable Act marked rather than assumed.

Where the open question is not the section number but whether an old certificate-based authority like Arjun Panditrao still controls a specific BSA scenario, the honest answer is often that the point has not yet been tested by the Supreme Court under the new numbering. A [citator that tracks whether a judgment has been followed, distinguished, or left untouched](https://niyam.ai) is the practical way to confirm that a given authority is still being applied as persuasive rather than binding on the new provision, rather than assuming continuity because the underlying rule looks similar. The same discipline that applies to [checking whether a judgment is still good law](/blog/good-law-checking) applies here: a section mapping being correct does not mean every old case decided on that section still controls.

## Frequently asked questions

### When did the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam come into force?

The BSA came into force on 1 July 2024, the same date as the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. It replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The BSA has 170 sections against the IEA's 167, a modest net increase driven mainly by the expanded treatment of electronic and digital records.

### Is the Indian Evidence Act completely repealed?

Yes, for matters governed by the BSA. The Indian Evidence Act continues to govern evidence in matters where the underlying offence or transaction predates 1 July 2024, under the same date-based transition principle that applies across the BNS, BNSS, and BSA. It is not in force for new matters arising after that date.

### What is the BSA equivalent of Section 65B of the Evidence Act?

Section 63 of the BSA is the direct successor to Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, both governing the certificate required to admit a computer output as secondary evidence. The four substantive conditions carry forward closely, though the certificate itself now requires two signatories and a hash value under the BSA's Schedule format. Full detail is in the [dedicated piece on Section 63 BSA and electronic evidence](/blog/bsa-section-63-electronic-evidence).

### Do Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao still apply under the BSA?

Their reasoning is treated as strongly persuasive by courts applying the equivalent BSA provisions, since Section 63's structure and conditions closely track the old Section 65B. But both judgments were decided under the Indian Evidence Act, and the Supreme Court had not, at the time of writing, issued a ruling construing Section 63 BSA directly on the same procedural points. Treat the read-across as persuasive, not as settled BSA precedent.

### Where does advocate-client privilege sit under the BSA?

Advocate-client privilege is at Section 132 BSA, the successor to Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, and its text protects communications with "an advocate." Whether that reaches a salaried in-house counsel the same way it reaches an independently briefed advocate has not been settled by any reported Supreme Court ruling. Section 134 BSA separately protects confidential communications with a "legal adviser" more generally from compelled disclosure, a broader term than "advocate," but its scope on this specific question has also not been authoritatively tested.

### Does the Bar Council of India's Rule 17 use the correct BSA section number?

No. BCI Rule 17 still quotes Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act verbatim and has not been updated to reference Section 132 BSA. This is a drafting gap in the Bar Council's rule, not a change in the underlying privilege, which now runs through Section 132.

### Is a dying declaration still admissible under the BSA?

Yes. The provision covering statements by a person who is dead or cannot be found, which includes dying declarations, is carried forward from Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act to Section 26 of the BSA. The underlying evidentiary principle, that such statements are an exception to the hearsay rule, is unchanged; only the section number moved.

### What section covers expert opinion evidence under the BSA?

Section 39 of the BSA is the successor to Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, both dealing with opinions of experts. The heading and substance of the provision carry forward without a substantive change confirmed by this research.

### Where is the hostile witness provision in the BSA?

Section 157 of the BSA, titled to match the old Section 154 IEA provision on questions by a party to his own witness, allows a court to permit a party to put questions to its own witness that would ordinarily be reserved for cross-examination. This is the statutory basis for what is commonly called declaring a witness hostile.

### Has the burden of proof changed under the BSA?

The general rule, that whoever desires a court to give judgment on a legal right or liability dependent on facts must prove those facts, is carried forward from Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act to Section 104 of the BSA without a confirmed substantive change. Specific presumption-shifting provisions in particular subject areas should be checked individually rather than assumed to track this general rule automatically.

### Is estoppel still governed by the same rule under the BSA?

Yes. Section 121 of the BSA carries forward the estoppel rule from Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act: a person who by declaration, act, or omission causes another to believe a thing to be true and act on that belief cannot later deny it, as against the person who so acted. Multiple courts applying Section 121 have expressly described it as the replacement for Section 115.

### What happened to spousal privilege under the BSA?

It is carried forward. Section 128 of the BSA corresponds to Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, protecting communications made during marriage from compelled disclosure, subject to the same exceptions that applied under the old Act.

### Does the BSA still protect official records relating to affairs of state?

Yes. Section 129 of the BSA is the successor to Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, restricting evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to affairs of state without the permission of the relevant department head.

### Can I rely on a Section 65B certificate issued before 1 July 2024 in a BSA-governed matter?

A certificate prepared in the old Section 65B(4) single-signatory format does not meet the BSA's Schedule requirements under Section 63(4), which requires two signatories and a hash value. Where the matter is governed by the BSA, a fresh certificate in the prescribed Schedule format is generally required, as covered in more detail in the [Section 63 electronic evidence piece](/blog/bsa-section-63-electronic-evidence).

### Why does the mapping table not cover more sections?

Because an unverified mapping in a reference table that lawyers use to cite section numbers is worse than no mapping at all. Every row in the table above was checked against the statutory text; sections this research could not confirm, including the legitimacy presumption and several sub-clauses within the confession provisions, were left out rather than guessed. Verify anything not listed here directly against the statute before citing it.

### Where can I verify a BSA section number myself?

[India Code](https://www.indiacode.nic.in) hosts the authoritative text of central legislation, including the BSA. [PRS Legislative Research](https://prsindia.org) publishes bill-stage analysis that is useful for understanding what changed and why. [Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org) hosts searchable full text of the Act and the case law applying it, which is useful for checking both the section text and how courts have read it.

### Did the BSA change how confessions obtained under police pressure are treated?

Not in the way some commentary suggests. The Law Commission's 2003 recommendation to bar proof of facts discovered through information obtained by threat, coercion, violence, or torture was not incorporated into the BSA. The confession framework in Sections 22 to 24 BSA tracks Sections 24 to 26 of the Indian Evidence Act closely. Anyone citing the BSA as having reformed this area should verify that claim against the actual text rather than assume it from the Act's broader modernisation narrative.

### Does the reclassification of electronic records as primary evidence mean certificates are no longer needed?

No, not across the board. Section 57 BSA reclassifies electronic records from proper custody, where authenticity is not disputed, as primary evidence, which does not require a Section 63 certificate. But secondary electronic evidence, meaning a computer output, printout, or extracted copy where the original is not produced, still requires the Section 63(4) certificate. The reclassification narrows how often the certificate is needed; it does not eliminate the requirement.